Primates are highly social animals and appropriate enrichment is required to ensure their psychological well-being. Mirrors are sometimes used as social or sensory environmental enrichment. In this paper we investigate the suitability of mirrors as enrichment for captive primates, by reviewing the literature on mirror implementation in captive primate environments. Mirror-directed responses are mainly social as the mirror self-image is often seen as a conspecific. Although positive exploration and affiliative behaviours are observed, negative aggressive behaviours towards the mirror are most frequently recorded, and abnormal behaviours in primates do not decrease in mirror-enriched environments. There appear to be differences in habituation rates to mirrors amongst primates. While habituation to enrichment is generally perceived to be undesirable, this criterion should not apply when mirrors elicit negative behaviours. Primates that show mirror self-recognition, which are mostly great apes, may be best suitable for mirror enrichment, as they do not perceive the mirror self-image as a threatening conspecific. Increasing the understanding of the reflective properties of a mirror might help primates to understand that the image in the mirror is not real. This could be attained by using small, mobile mirrors. We suggest that mirrors can make decent primate enrichment if the primate understands its reflective properties, which should be evaluated on an individual level. Appropriate use of mirrors as sensory enrichment can improve primate well-being and prevent suffering.

Miranda Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and remedies for this injustice are widely debated. This article adds to the existing debate by arguing that theories of recognition can fruitfully contribute to Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice and can provide a framework for structural remedy. By pairing Fricker's theory of hermeneutical injustice with theories of recognition, I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical claim. The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; recognition theory can give a name to the seriousness of the long-term effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is more radical: thinking of hermeneutical injustice as preventing what I call “self-recognition” provides a structural remedy to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice. Because hermeneutical injustice is first and foremost a structural injustice, I contend that every virtue theory of hermeneutical justice should be complemented by structural remedies in terms of recognition. Finally, what I argue sheds light on the seriousness of cases of exclusion of and discrimination against women in academia and helps to draw our attention to new ways to combat such problems.

The presence of visual hallucinations in addition to auditory hallucinations (V + AH) is associated with poor prognosis in patients with schizophrenia. However, little consideration has been given to these symptoms and their underlying cognitive bases remain unclear. Based on cognitive models of hallucinations, we hypothesized that V + AH are underpinned by an impairment in reality-monitoring processes. The objective of the present study was to test whether reality-monitoring deficits were associated with V + AH in schizophrenia. This study examined reality-monitoring abilities in two groups of patients with schizophrenia: a group of patients with V + AH (n = 24) and a group of patients with AH only (n = 22). Patients with V + AH were significantly more likely to misremember imagined words as being perceived from an external source, compared to patients with AH only (p = 0.008, d = -0.82). In other words, V + AH patients display a larger externalization bias than patients with AH only. One explanation for these results could be that experiencing hallucinations in two sensory modalities may contribute to increased vividness of mental imagery and, in turn, lead to disruption in reality-monitoring processes. This study helps to refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the presence of both auditory and visual hallucinations in patients with schizophrenia.

The initial process of self development involves interaction with others and the establishment of relationships taking different paths depending on the socio-cultural context. Self-recognition and self-regulation are considered manifestations of this development between 18 and 24 months of age. This study aimed at analyzing the relationship between these two aspects, maternal beliefs about autonomy and relatedness, as well as identifying differences between boys and girls in this developmental stage. Participants were 94 mothers of different educational levels and their children of 17-22 months of age in two Brazilian cities. Socialization Goals Inventory and Parental Practices in the First Year Inventory were used to collect data on mothers' beliefs. Children performed tasks related to self-recognition (the mirror test) and self-regulation (compliance to requests). The group of mothers studied valued both autonomy and interdependence. Children's responses are consistent with a perspective of relational autonomy, which value both independence and interdependence. Differences were found in relation to sex in both self-recognition and self-regulation, and baby girls showed superior performance than boys in both tasks.

The purpose of this article is to evaluate from a legal and critical perspective the recognition of regional languages by the introduction, in July 2008, of article 75-1 in the French Constitution of 1958. The author evaluates the impact of the reference to regional languages; the contributions of this state recognition; its symbolic, psychological, and legal effects; and also its limits. Without calling into question the benefits of the state recognition process, the author concludes that a simultaneous self-recognition by the speakers themselves and by the non-speaker members of local communities is also necessary.

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.

Some persons with Alzheimer's disease (AD) lose the ability to recognize themselves, as when they cannot overtly recognize their reflection in a mirror. There is evidence, however, that covert or unconscious self-recognition might be displayed in such individuals. In this study, 3 persons with AD lacking the ability to overtly self-recognize demonstrated multiple instances of unconscious or covert self-recognition. A variety of interventions, inspired by research with prosopagnosics, was implemented to remediate this loss. Interventions enabled all participants to exhibit overt self-recognition, though each did so with the aid of a different intervention. In addition, successful overt self-recognition required a verbal probe and was entirely intervention-dependent: When the intervention was removed, overt self-recognition was lost. Results support a dissociation between explicit–declarative versus implicit–nondeclarative memory systems, and extends this dissociation into the realm of self-recognition in AD. (JINS, 1997, 3, 195–198.)