The term hypothetical means facts that are assumed rather than actual. The term a hypothetical means a scenario composed of such facts. Reasoning from hypotheticals takes two forms. In one form, a hypothetical is employed to view a case in a broader perspective to help decide the case. Hypotheticals in this form have three characteristics. First, the hypothetical differs from the case in its particulars, but as a matter of social morality, social policy, and experience the hypothetical is comparable to the case in its basic structure. Second, intuitively the hypothetical is easier to decide than the case. Third, because the hypothetical and the case are comparable as a matter of social propositions, the hypothetical and the case cannot be justifiably distinguished. That being so, the result in the case should be the same as the result in the hypothetical. In the second form of reasoning from hypotheticals, a hypothetical is employed to show that a case should not be decided in a certain way because if the case were decided that way, hypothetical similar cases would have to be decided the same way and deciding those cases the same way would be unsound.

In contrast to CDR, the institutions seeking to govern emissions reductions seem poorly suited to govern SRM and specifically SAI. SAI does not fall squarely under the jurisdiction of any existing international treaties, and even domestic laws provide few constraints. Voluntary norms such as the Oxford Principles are not yet codified into agreed obligations. Harvard’s intended SCoPEx experiment demonstrates the great trepidation with which SAI is perceived. Attempts to curtail pre-deployment field research generally rest on faulty assumptions, including a presumed slippery slope, technological lock-in, fears of covert or non-state deployment, weaponization, and a blurry line between research and deployment. Without robust research, there is a danger that future climate emergencies may be met with rash and risky deployment. Therefore, global institutions are needed to encourage, fund, and vet research and ensure its transparency. Deployment itself would require new, empowered international institutions to coordinate the program and monitor its effects. While sovereign national deployment efforts by major powers are a salient paradigm, a better outcome for both nature and humanity would be a single global monopolist deployer acting on behalf of the world. Such a unitary global effort would have enormous implications for the international order.

This analysis traces the history of the 1990 Act (as amended) and summarises the present regulatory framework governing the embryo in vitro with reference to its legal ‘special status’. It briefly summarises some of the key arguments put forward in the Warnock Report relating to the moral and legal status of the embryo in vitro and the enactment of these arguments in law, including subsequent amendments of the framework. The Chapter finds that, like its historical counterparts, embryonic, moral, scientific, and other forms of process were important considerations for the Report, which provided the intellectual basis for the 1990 Act.