What use (if any) may be made of settled practice in statutory interpretation and what are the potential justifications for its use? Debate about the use of settled practice is often framed in terms of a tension between legal certainty, on the one hand, and legal correctness in giving effect to Parliament's will, on the other. That account presents a false choice. This article explores the use of settled practice and argues that it has a legitimate role to play in statutory interpretation and one that is consistent with the prevailing approach of the courts to statutory interpretation.

The paper argues that the principle of technological neutrality in copyright law is best grasped, not as a policy-driven imperative seeking to adapt copyright law to the exigencies of the digital environment, but rather as a principle immanent in the modern concept of copyright subject matter providing that merely technical or non-expressive uses of works of authorship do not attract liability. Technological neutrality is but a corollary of originality; that is, of the elementary proposition that copyright law protects original expression and nothing but original expression.

The logical “slippery slope” argument is of key relevance to the ongoing debate about “assisted dying”. The argument runs that if the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle of beneficence justify voluntary euthanasia, then the principle of beneficence justifies non-voluntary euthanasia. Several prominent scholars of medical law and medical ethics have either rejected or at least not accepted the argument, including Gerald Dworkin and Raymond Frey; Margaret Battin; Hallvard Lillehammer; Stephen Smith; Robert Young; Emily Jackson; and Steven Daskal. This paper analyses their reasoning and finds it wanting. It concludes that the logical argument stands unrebutted and merits much greater attention.

This essay argues that a defining characteristic of modern law – the distinctive way in which it judges its addressees – will disappear. After sketching the distinctive nature of modern law's judgment, I show that it is part of a broader regulatory paradigm (rule or East Coast regulation) which is itself being superseded. Technological management is the alternative regulatory paradigm and I examine its rise and salience, showing how it might, in combination with the advent of ubiquitous computing, machine learning and artificial intelligence, cure a range of alleged pathologies that mark contemporary legal systems. The essay also demonstrates why technological management is now our regulatory default, its salience flowing from changes in the nature of our thinking about, and deployment of, power. The essay combines the work of Roger Brownsword, a leading contemporary jurist of technological management, with that of the world-renowned social theorist Michel Foucault.

In Abbey National Building Society v Cann, the House of Lords held that a mortgagee who has funded the purchase of the mortgaged title to land (an “acquisition creditor”) has a right over the land that binds any other grantee of the purchaser. This article considers the basis for and limits of this principle, in light of its origins. It argues that the cases treat the lender's financial contribution as an independent source of an equitable interest in the purchased asset, rather than as a reason why the grant in favour of the lender takes effect earlier in time than the grant in favour of any third party. This has important and desirable consequences for the scope of the principle, rendering it more coherent with general principles of English property law and allowing for an apportionment solution in some situations involving co-contributors to acquisition.

Insurers are increasingly using big data analytics and artificial intelligence in rating risks and customising insurance products particularly in the context of consumer insurance. The primary aim of this article is to elaborate the extent to which the legal rules in force could ensure that consumers are not treated unfairly as a result of the use of such disruptive technologies. Relevant insurance law principles and doctrines are also considered as part of this analysis. The article concludes that despite the protection provided to consumers by data and consumer protection legislation, unregulated and unlimited use of data analytics and algorithms in the risk assessment process could create significant difficulties for consumers. It is argued that further regulation, especially making regular audits essential for insurers employing such technologies in risk assessment process, is required. The article also finds that the use of artificial intelligence in customising insurance products does not present similar degree of difficulties for consumers.