The Tempest throws us into the midst of a world of tragic repetition, in which usurpation, oppression, and the drive for mastery repeat themselves again and again. The chapter argues that it also offers a precious, if tenuous, escape from tragic history, by calling for a politics of humble disappointment. This tentative path runs through abjuration or negation. The play consistently stages violent and intrusive spectacles that break the characters (and the audience) out of their initial subject positions and into a more outward-looking mode. Such interruptions connect to the tradition of negative theology, in which poorness or nothingness “is the ultimate state of receptivity” (Meister Eckhart). They offer a breath of air from outside the masterful self, a sliver of distance from the tragic past. In particular, the play institutes a theatrical form of collectivity through the isle’s inclusive dramatic “air”. It draws us, as well as the sovereign figure of Prospero, into a broader dramatic life-force or “intersubjective phenomenology” (Schalkwyk). Indeed, in the Epilogue, the sovereign power is subject to the many; subject to audience’s judgment, pleasure, and approval. It is this recognition of mutual need (Plato) that opens the vision of a renewed political community.

This chapter examines the issue of the “logic” underlying Hegel’s exposition of the “concept of nature.” Given the systematic structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, which is positioned between the Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit, the problem of the logic guiding the immanent development of nature’s forms as well as the development of the philosophical cognition of them is, in Hegel’s view, a particularly relevant one. At the center of this chapter is the question of whether the “logic of nature” is the same logic presented in the first systematic division of Hegel’s philosophy or rather a modified variant of such a logic. The logic of nature, it argues, combines the determinations of pure speculative thinking (or the determinations of the “absolute idea”) with the specific conditions offered by the concept and by the reality of nature. Crucial to this logic is, first, Hegel’s famous definition of nature as the “idea in the form of otherness.” Such a definition obtains from the end of the Logic, which is be examined in detail, and followed through some crucial passages from the Philosophy of Nature. This chapter follows the development of the logic of nature between two extremes – the “absolute idea” and “spirit” – and concludes with a brief examination of the three syllogisms with which Hegel crowns his encyclopedic system.

The main question this chapter asks and attempts to answer is: What is the principal difference between animal life and human spirit, as Hegel construes it at the end of his Philosophy of Nature? More specifically, in what way are non-human animal organisms “inadequate” or “imperfect” and in what way, correspondingly, are human beings the “perfect” animal? Answering this question requires getting clear on the different ways in which non-human and human animals bear their respective natures, the connection between reproduction and the manner in which non-human animals relate to their genus, and the role of biological death within that process of reproduction. To the extent that Hegel commentators have dealt with the relation between animal life and human spirit, they have been predominantly concerned in recent years with Hegel’s Anthropology. The end of the Philosophy of Nature has, by contrast, been relatively neglected. On the occasions when it has been discussed, the latter text has tended to be the object of passing paraphrase rather than the focus of an attempt at philosophical comprehension. This chapter contributes to remedying this scholarly situation.

This chapter works through Romans 10 and Galatians 3:10–14 in conversation with other early Jewish evidence, arguing that Paul is participating in a long-standing Jewish debate about the relationship between repentance and Israel’s redemption. Specifically, will Israel’s repentance initiate the restoration or will God’s redemptive intervention produce Israel’s repentance? Paul comes down squarely on the latter side, arguing for a divinely-initiated redemption through the obedient fidelity of Jesus, whose status and authority as “the just one”—the figure divinely appointed to bring about redemption—was validated by the resurrection. In the process, this chapter provides an elegant solution for the longstanding problem of how to understand Paul’s citations of Lev 18:5 and Deut 30:12–14 in these passages.

This chapter argues that Paul’s gospel was based on the conviction that God’s promises through the prophets—specifically the promise of a renewed covenant with Israel—were being fulfilled through Jesus’ death, resurrection, and the gift of the spirit. Working primarily from 2 Corinthians 3 and the central chapters of Romans, this chapter puts Paul in conversation with Jubilees, a variety of texts from the Dead Sea Scrolls (1QS, CD, 1QPHa, etc.), Philo of Alexandria, and more. The chapter demonstrates that all of these texts bear witness to a view of Israel as having fallen under the Torah’s curses for covenantal disobedience and awaiting a restoration that includes an ethical transformation through divine intervention.

This final chapter wraps up the study as a whole, assessing how this argument about gentile incorporation into Israel and the role of Torah in Paul’s thought fits into the larger context of Paul’s thought and why, if Paul believes gentile men are being transformed into Israelites, he argues against requiring physical circumcision of non-Jewish men who receive the spirit. The chapter closes with an assessment of how this model accounts for the development of Pauline thought in early Christianity as the movement became more gentile-dominated.

Machiavellis last successor is Montesquieu, whose great work The Spirit of the Laws is analyzed and its secret design exposed for the first time.

The Introduction notes that early critical scholarship paid scant attention to books deemed to be late, including the book of Joel. However, in recent years studies have proliferated. Literary study of the text reveals three sections: 1:1–2:27; 2:28–32; 3:1–21. The first section 1:1–2:27 describes a disastrous plague of locusts. The people are urged to call upon YHWH to have mercy. He hears, and promises restoration of the land. The second section foresees a time of future blessing in which YHWH’s spirit will be poured out. This section, which entered the text later than chapter 3, now introduces that chapter. The final chapter announces judgment on the nations and blessing for Israel. There are Closer Look sections (Fasting; The Day of YHWH; The Destiny of the Nations). A Bridging the Horizons section examines Joel 2:28–32 in the New Testament.

When we think about faith as a relationship with god, rather than a set of propositional beliefs, this changes the way we think about ethics. We think about ethics more as a set of practices and orientations than as rules. The chapter considers this claim through examining the way evangelical Christians come to understand their relationship with Jesus, and more briefly through Catholics who seek to understand what it is to be a modern Mexican, through Amazonian shamans who want to know their spirits, and modern magicians. When we focus on religion as something people do, rather than just what they believe, we must approach ethics as a series of incremental interpretations of how people make sense of who they have become in the world, rather than a carefully considered set of logical arguments.

This chapter shows that Hegel’s discussion of cognition in his Logic fits his previous conclusions on teleology. I argue first that both cognising and acting are analysed by Hegel as processes that have an inner purpose. I, then, explain what Hegel calls being alive ‘for itself’. For being alive for itself, Hegel requires that a concept be realised in a medium that is itself of an ideal, inner purposive character. The objectification of teleology in a purposive element, one that sustains its own existence, is the source of an ‘imperishable life’, as Hegel puts it –the life of a concept qua concept. The upshot of my entire discussion is that Hegel’s Science of Logic succeeds in making sense of the idea that an objective activity can be the accomplished realisation of a purpose and, indeed, of a purpose for itself.

Chapter 5 treats Kant’s notions of genius and aesthetic ideas. It argues that his discussion of genius forms a kind of deduction for the possibility of producing and then judging objects that exceed our own capacities. In this, it focuses on Kant’s descriptions of spirit as what nature gives both to the genius and thereby also to the work of beautiful art, thus allowing it to enliven our minds. This playful enlivening through spirit is what makes it possible for the human mind to present, in art, what otherwise exceeds it, namely aesthetic ideas. Here, we find that human beings belong to a nature that is much more expansive than the one ruled by the understanding in the first Critique; nature here is the source of spirit and liveliness. The chapter concludes by highlighting Kant’s repeated observations that nature is expressing itself through genius, and links this to the communicability that underlies the judgment of taste more generally.

Chapter 5 examines Kant’s modern theory of the fine arts with reference to his predecessors, in particular, Charles Batteux and Christian Wolff. Kant experiments with different classificatory themes over the years. Starting in the mid-1770s, Kant conceives of aesthetic experiences of fine art as evoking a free play between the imagination and understanding, distinguishes fine art from handicraft, and views the fine arts as products of genius (and spirit) that express or exhibit aesthetic ideas.

This chapter begins by showing why Hegel thinks that recognition depends on sociality, on shared forms of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). Drawing on a comparison with Rahel Jaeggi’s conceptions of “social practices” and “forms of life,” I consider the central elements of the social theory advanced in the Phenomenology. I show that “ethical life,” in particular when understood as a configuration of “spirit,” both provides the terms for individual self-understanding and secures the conditions for equality and reciprocity with other subjects. At the same time, I demonstrate that relations of reciprocal intersubjective recognition will not be possible in all forms of social life. While social forms that entrench relations of domination and inequality among their members are among the primary threats to the achievement of reciprocal recognition, I argue that, in the Phenomenology, Hegel makes a unique argument that it is possible for a form of social life to be structured so that no one is recognized within them, in which even one-sided configurations of recognition are impossible. I conclude by pointing to Hegel’s proposed solution to this problem, a universal conception of the self that is explicitly articulated within a shared way of life.

In this chapter, the author sets out a unitive way of thinking about the relationship between spirituality, psychiatry and psychotherapy. An introduction to spirituality in mental health care is followed by a discussion of the meaning of ‘spirit’, ‘soul’ and ‘ego’ and how these terms may be understood with reference to ongoing developmental tasks. The poem I AM, written by the nineteenth-century poet John Clare, who suffered from enduring mental illness, is considered in depth from both psychoanalytic and Jungian approaches in order to illustrate different perspectives on Clare’s anguish and spiritual yearning. The evolution of transpersonal psychology, in which Jung’s concepts play an important part, is traced historically, with the increasing recognition of the value of spiritually orientated psychotherapy. The chapter concludes with several case studies by the author, illustrating how a range of soul-centred approaches can readily and helpfully engage with the spiritual reality of the patient.

Referencing the poem I AM by John Clare, who suffered from mental illness. Psychoanalytic and Jungian therapies are compared in order to illustrate different perspectives on Clare’s anguish and spiritual yearning. A brief history of the evolution of transpersonal theory and of spiritually oriented therapeutic approaches is provided, and the chapter concludes with case studies illustrating how soul-centred therapy can readily and helpfully engage with the spiritual reality of the patient.

Disenchantment is doubtless a serious part of a modern attitude to nature. Even Lucretius’ ancient materialism gave good reasons for celebrating nature as a random interplay of forces without seeking a deeper meaning within. In addition, experiences of a silent nature and personal accounts by the deaf have become common. Nevertheless, human consciousness exhibits phenomena that allow us to speak of a voice of nature; closer examination of these phenomena of resonance and empathy provides good reasons for an idealistic understanding of the enchantment of nature. In the human mind, the spirit of the universe awakens unto itself.

The somewhat neglected Wisdom of Solomon, or ‘Book of Wisdom’, contains concepts important not only for understanding wisdom in the rest of the OT but also for understanding how wisdom bridged both testaments. Joachim Schaper gives priority to the book’s theology and its place in Hellenistic Jewish and early Christian thought. He provides an overview of the book’s structure and versions, its intellectual context, its universalistic conceptions of God and humans in history, and how the book exhibits a ‘spiritual exercise’. Most important here are Wisdom’s use of πνευμα (‘spirit’) and its amalgam of Platonic, Stoic and Egyptian elements. It offers a distinct interpretation of the exodus, with which Schaper accounts for ideas of liberation and eschatology. As for the book as spiritual exercise, the discussion turns to matters of genre and literary function, disclosing its purpose to fortify religious beliefs and one’s self-mastery.

Remembering is also the theme of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) but of a different kind than Schelling’s. It is not of a cosmic event; nor does it yield a theogony. The issue for Hegel is rather the actualization of the historical human individual and of humanity accordingly, and the remembering is of how being rational affects an individual’s relation to nature. At origin this relation is worked out unconsciously. It is visibly reflected, however, in the sense of self-identity into which an individual is historically born, just as one is born into a family. To retrieve the source of the identity, thus to make it deliberately one’s own – by the same token to make of nature a work of intelligence – is the factor that motivates experience. Chapter 5 contrasts Schelling’s and Hegel’s respective ideas of history. It then proceeds with a detailed examination of the Phenomenology up to the section on Religion. It argues that, while in some ways a work of conceptual fiction, the Phenomenology must nonetheless have historical anchoring and logical significance. It also underscores the debt Hegel owes to Fichte that makes him quite different from Schelling.

This chapter reviews the complex evidence for differing conceptions of the locus of cognitive and affective faculties that have been entertained, as reported in modern ethnography and in the evidence for ancient societies such as Greece and China. The contrast between physicality and interiority that Descola uses to draw up a taxonomy of ontological regimes is subject to qualifications insofar as mind–body dualism is only one of a number of schemata that are to be found across cultures.