This chapter explores the intersection of transnational law with contemporary corporate governance laws and principles. Corporate governance, with its complex array of public and private actors, fits naturally within the modern concept of transnational law as a species of law that "can no longer be viewed through a purely national lens." Financial markets today are global and interconnected and events, such as the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis, exemplify the risk of contagion across those markets. Not only can corporate governance problems transcend national boundaries, so too can their solutions, which often involve regulatory efforts that operate at a transnational level. The chapter explores, from a transnational perspective, the transmission of laws and norms that are designed to constrain directors’ conduct and enhance corporate accountability. It focuses on two key examples of such accountability mechanisms-fiduciary duties and corporate codes. The chapter examines, for example, the global transmission of corporate governance and shareholder stewardship codes. These codes, which are a relatively recent phenomenon, play an important role as “norm creators.” The chapter assesses the transmission of laws and norms against the backdrop of convergence and path dependence theories of corporate governance.

The nature of stewardship varies based on shareholder structures. In the Nordic region (similar to many Asian jurisdictions), the role of states, sovereign holding companies and wealth funds, other public market actors such as public pension funds, families, family-controlled investment companies and family-based foundations is significant compared to (other) national and international institutional investors. In this chapter, we discuss the peculiarities of Nordic stewardship as a backdrop for our analysis of Norwegian stewardship, which is dominated by the state and the municipalities, but also to some extent by private investors. In Part II we discuss the Nordic stewardship in light of international stewardship discussion, before concentrating on Norway and the current regulatory framework of stewardship there in Part III, reflecting on the Norwegian choices concerning stewardship in light of global challenges. Part IV reflectss on why a stewardship code is not needed in Norway. What Norway does need, is a clear and mandatory regulation to ensure that Norwegian business and finance contribute to the transition to sustainability. A stewardship code would not be a sufficiently strong measure. Conversely, it could hold Norwegian business and finance back in the face of the rapid developments on EU and international level.

In today’s world, the transfer of laws and regulations between different legal systems is commonplace. The global spread of stewardship codes in recent years presents a promising, but yet untested, terrain to explore the diffusion of such norms. This Chapter aims to fill this gap. Employing the method of content analysis and using information from 41 stewardship codes enacted between 1991 and 2019, we systematically examine the formal diffusion of these stewardship codes. While we find support for the diffusion story of the UK as a stewardship norm exporter, especially in former British colonies in Asia, we also find evidence of diffusion from transnational initiatives, such as the EFAMA and ICGN codes, as well as regional clusters. We also show that the UK Stewardship Code of 2020 now deviates from these current models; thus, it remains to be seen how far a second round of exportation of the revised UK model into the transnational arena will follow.

Italy has a stewardship code, and institutional investors are on the rise, playing an increasingly active role in the governance of listed companies. Against this background, this chapter sheds fresh light on the distinctive features which make the Italian regulatory system unique in promoting active institutional ownership. A distinctive characteristic of the Italian corporate governance system is the so-called slate (or list) voting system, which enables minority shareholders to appoint at least one board member. Also, implementation of the Shareholders Rights Directive and, specifically, the record date system for participating in and voting at general meetings has contributed significantly in turning institutional investors into major players in the corporate governance arena. Moreover, the Investment Management Association, which represents most Italian and foreign asset managers operating in Italy (Assogestioni), plays a particularly effective role by publishing the Italian Stewardship Principles and promoting collective engagement initiatives aimed at facilitating the appointment of management and statutory auditor board members through the slate voting system.