We introduce three measures of complexity for families of sets. Each of the three measures, which we call dimensions, is defined in terms of the minimal number of convex subfamilies that are needed for covering the given family. For upper dimension, the subfamilies are required to contain a unique maximal set, for dual upper dimension a unique minimal set, and for cylindrical dimension both a unique maximal and a unique minimal set. In addition to considering dimensions of particular families of sets, we study the behavior of dimensions under operators that map families of sets to new families of sets. We identify natural sufficient criteria for such operators to preserve the growth class of the dimensions. We apply the theory of our dimensions for proving new hierarchy results for logics with team semantics. To this end we associate each atom with a natural notion or arity. First, we show that the standard logical operators preserve the growth classes of the families arising from the semantics of formulas in such logics. Second, we show that the upper dimension of $k+1$-ary dependence, inclusion, independence, anonymity, and exclusion atoms is in a strictly higher growth class than that of any k-ary atoms, whence the $k+1$-ary atoms are not definable in terms of any atoms of smaller arity.

In this article, we study the complexity of weighted team definability for logics with team semantics. This problem is a natural analog of one of the most studied problems in parameterized complexity, the notion of weighted Fagin-definability, which is formulated in terms of satisfaction of first-order formulas with free relation variables. We focus on the parameterized complexity of weighted team definability for a fixed formula $\varphi$ of central team-based logics. Given a first-order structure $\mathcal{A}$ and the parameter value $k\in \mathbb N$ as input, the question is to determine whether $\mathcal{A},T\models \varphi$ for some team T of size k. We show several results on the complexity of this problem for dependence, independence, and inclusion logic formulas. Moreover, we also relate the complexity of weighted team definability to the complexity classes in the well-known W-hierarchy as well as paraNP.

In this paper, we introduce a logic based on team semantics, called $\mathbf {FOT} $ , whose expressive power is elementary, i.e., coincides with first-order logic both on the level of sentences and (possibly open) formulas, and we also show that a sublogic of $\mathbf {FOT} $ , called $\mathbf {FOT}^{\downarrow } $ , captures exactly downward closed elementary (or first-order) team properties. We axiomatize completely the logic $\mathbf {FOT} $ , and also extend the known partial axiomatization of dependence logic to dependence logic enriched with the logical constants in $\mathbf {FOT}^{\downarrow } $ .

Inquisitive modal logic, InqML, is a generalisation of standard Kripke-style modal logic. In its epistemic incarnation, it extends standard epistemic logic to capture not just the information that agents have, but also the questions that they are interested in. Technically, InqML fits within the family of logics based on team semantics. From a model-theoretic perspective, it takes us a step in the direction of monadic second-order logic, as inquisitive modal operators involve quantification over sets of worlds. We introduce and investigate the natural notion of bisimulation equivalence in the setting of InqML. We compare the expressiveness of InqML and first-order logic in the context of relational structures with two sorts, one for worlds and one for information states, and characterise inquisitive modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic over various natural classes of two-sorted structures.

We analyse the two definitions of generalized quantifiers for logics of dependence and independence that have been proposed by F. Engström, comparing them with a more general, higher order definition of team quantifier. We show that Engström’s definitions (and other quantifiers from the literature) can be identified, by means of appropriate lifts, with special classes of team quantifiers. We point out that the new team quantifiers express a quantitative and a qualitative component, while Engström’s quantifiers only range over the latter. We further argue that Engström’s definitions are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics, and fail to capture an adequate notion of team-theoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also raise several doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in this context. In the appendix we develop some proof theory for Engström’s quantifiers.

This paper investigates formal logics for reasoning about determinacy and independence. Propositional Dependence Logic ${\cal D}$ and Propositional Independence Logic ${\cal I}$ are recently developed logical systems, based on team semantics, that provide a framework for such reasoning tasks. We introduce two new logics ${{\cal L}_D}$ and ${{\cal L}_{\,I\,}}$, based on Kripke semantics, and propose them as alternatives for ${\cal D}$ and ${\cal I}$, respectively. We analyse the relative expressive powers of these four logics and discuss the way these systems relate to natural language. We argue that ${{\cal L}_D}$ and ${{\cal L}_{\,I\,}}$ naturally resolve a range of interpretational problems that arise in ${\cal D}$ and ${\cal I}$. We also obtain sound and complete axiomatizations for ${{\cal L}_D}$ and ${{\cal L}_{\,I\,}}$.

Both propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic are expressively complete. As a consequence, every formula in the language of inquisitive logic with intuitionistic disjunction or intuitionistic implication can be translated equivalently into a formula in the language of propositional dependence logic without these two connectives. We show that although such a (noncompositional) translation exists, neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in propositional dependence logic.