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ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute has commissioned a second nationwide survey in Indonesia as a follow-up to the first similar project in 2017 called the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP). Its broad aim is to enhance understanding of political, economic, and social developments in Indonesia.
The COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and US-China trade disputes, and the Russia-Ukraine war have increased the risk of global value chain (GVC) disruptions and forced firms to strengthen resilience in their supply chains and operations. MNCs have diversified suppliers, established new production sites, and shifted production closer to consumers. ASEAN countries are becoming increasingly attractive destinations for foreign investors. This paper gauges the position of ASEAN in GVCs and assesses the risks and opportunities of GVC reconfiguration for ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries are increasing their participation in GVCs and raising domestic value-added. The relocation of production sites from China to ASEAN countries could enhance their participation in GVCs. Should MNCs increase the concentration of supplier and buyer markets, ASEAN countries could become more vulnerable to external shocks.
The upstream and downstream GVCs in ASEAN countries are dominated by the US, China and Japan. Extraregional trade integration could be enhanced by linking key suppliers and buyers in China, the US, and Japan to producers in ASEAN countries. Trade policy measures to strengthen ASEAN GVCs should focus on a faster release of perishable goods and intermediate inputs at border checkpoints, accelerating the cross-border paperless trade reforms, promoting the utilization of rules of origins under RCEP, streamlining non-tariff measures, and digitalizing ASEAN GVCs.
The Islamic political party Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS) has governed the state of Kelantan on the northeastern coast of peninsular Malaysia for most of Malaysia's post-independence history. Until 2020, PAS functioned as an opposition party at the federal level, going against the government led by its long-time nemesis the politically stronger and better resourced United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The David-versus-Goliath story has made PAS's longevity and durability in Kelantan all the more impressive for having endured decades of marginalization by the federal government. This has to an extent led to the state's laggard developmental growth and poor socio-economic indicators.
PAS has often been portrayed by the mainstream media as an anachronistic and extremist party ill-equipped to cope with, much less solve, the myriad challenges faced by modern society. Notwithstanding PAS's shortcomings, this article provides an analysis of the factors that have allowed the party to remain in power in Kelantan for so long. It argues that after winning back Kelantan from UMNO in 1990, PAS transformed itself into a modern, well-oiled political machine, particularly when it comes to socializing its agenda to the people of Kelantan and reaching out to many out-of-state Kelantan voters.
The concept of fandom, which contributes to the construction of fan fiction, provides fresh insights into the seemingly inexplicable and irrational popularity of disgraced political celebrities. Political fandom provides the critical framework for contextualizing the continuing popularity of political social media influencers such as Najib Razak within an environment of populist politics.
Political fandom comprises fans and anti-fans, each of whom is capable of critical reasoning regardless of conclusions drawn. The presence of anti-fans of an influential figure speaks not to the waning of popularity, but rather, the continuing relevance of that figure within socio-political spaces. Malaysia's political fandom does not subscribe to well-defined morality when it comes to celebrity politicians. The fans appear more tolerant of the amorality of said politicians than they would be of themselves, their circle, and their peers. Among the Malay-speaking and especially the more rural constituents, the way politicians portray their stance on Islam and address the bread-and-butter issues of their constituents appear to be more important than the politicians' personal ethics.
Although Najib Razak is the main focus here, a comparative analysis of Anwar Ibrahim, as a rival politician, is provided to demonstrate how Najib constructed his social media persona in ways savvier than his political opponents.
While the South China Sea dispute remains Vietnam's top security concern, the country also confronts a variety of growing non-traditional threats, such as illegal fishing, maritime violence, smuggling, ecological degradation and climate change. These issues adversely affect Vietnam's external relations, socio-economic development, marine ecosystems and political stability, while engendering and exacerbating regional tensions. In response, at the national level, Vietnam has focused on building a blue economy and strengthening its law enforcement capacity. At the international level, Vietnam has participated in a variety of bilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms. However, these efforts have been impeded by internal and external factors, such as corruption, inadequate capacity and lack of budget, as well as ASEAN's institutional limitations and sovereignty sensitivities.
To better confront these multifaceted maritime issues, Vietnam will need to (1) formulate a comprehensive national strategy for maritime security; (2) streamline the overlapping responsibilities of maritime security agencies; (3) enhance its maritime domain awareness; (4) ensure proper policy and investment to improve climate resilience and coastal development; and (5) optimize its approach to multilateralism.
Forced labour, encompassing various types of coercive practices and rights violations, is an entrenched problem in Malaysia. Recent years have seen more decisive and concerted efforts to resolve the problem and repair Malaysia's damaged reputation, but the country's forced labour woes escalated amid COVID-19, with exposés and trade embargoes in 2020-21. Most consequentially, the US has imposed withhold release orders (WROs) on major rubber glove manufacturers and palm oil producers. For two consecutive years, 2021-22, Malaysia has occupied the lowest Tier 3 in the US Trafficking in Persons report. In November 2021, the country's National Action Plan on Forced Labour (NAPFL), formulated through tripartite engagements with the participation of the International Labour Organization, was launched, with the third National Action Plan on Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP 3.0) operating in tandem. The NAPFL outlines strategies and integrated measures for eventually eliminating forced labour by 2030, which requires systemic solutions commensurate with the magnitude of underlying problems. Forced labour has persisted despite the official termination of labour outsourcing and increased intergovernmental bilateral initiatives to better manage foreign worker flows.
Continual challenges in the labour supply industry and the administrative system, including the problematic overlapping powers of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Human Resources, complicate the creation and implementation of a more just, effective and accountable migrant worker system. Government-to-government (G2) agreements, through Memorandum of Understanding, have become the established platform, but are marred by inconsistency and lack of transparency.
There is a growing policy trend that in addressing climate change, various trade measures must be implemented to enhance the sustainable practices of global stakeholders. As a response to level up the playing field of global trade partners in enhancing sustainability, the EU recently introduced the European Union (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which will impose a carbon price on certain imports, namely, electricity, aluminium, cement, iron and steel, and fertilizer, to the EU. The EU CBAM may, however, cause trade disputes among World Trade Organization (WTO) members.
EU and ASEAN trade relations are currently on an upswing trajectory, and there are therefore some risks involved in implementing the EU CBAM in the ASEAN region. At the same time, despite the perceived adverse effects, there is room for improvement in communicating EU CBAM implementation in ASEAN. The EU should introduce more calibrated approaches to implementing the EU CBAM in ASEAN, particularly considering the political and strategic risks, economic development and capacity, and climate ambitions of individual ASEAN countries.
On 28 April 2021, the Indonesian government, under President Joko Widodo, dissolved the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (Kemenristek-Dikti). Since then, the management of higher education has been taken over by the Ministry of Education and Culture, while research and innovation are now the responsibility of the National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, or BRIN). Based on Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Nos. 33 and 78 of 2021, various research institutes, such as LIPI, BATAN, LAPAN and BPPT, and research agencies in some ministries have been or will be merged into BRIN, making it a 'super-government agency' with an 'overarching' role. With a Rp26 trillion budget allocated by the government for research per year and with a large number of researchers, BRIN is expected to boost national research and innovation, and help the country catch up with countries such as Singapore and South Korea. BRIN, however, faces some serious challenges. Technocratism, which has been restricting research in the country, will be its first challenge. Politicization of research institutions as indicated by the involvement of political parties in research supervision is another issue. Achieving an environment that makes good and healthy research possible built around an effective system of funding, academic rewards, and a vibrant academic community, will be the third challenge. If BRIN manages to overcome these challenges sufficiently, it will be in a good position to enhance the capacity and competence of Indonesian researchers as the foundation for an advanced Indonesia by 2045.
The ASEAN+6 Single Window (ASW+6) in this study refers to the geographic expansion of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) to enable cross-border electronic exchange of trade-related data and documents among ASEAN member states and six FTA partners, namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The ASW is part of ASEAN's trade facilitation reform to reduce intraregional trade costs and time.
This study considers cross-border paperless trade measures to represent the implementation of ASW+6, using data from the UN Global Survey on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation in 2019. The simulation analyses reveal that the ASW+6 has significant potential to reduce times required to export and import, and to boost trade in ASEAN and its FTA partners.
The sequence of expanding the ASW to FTA partners may begin with countries that are major sources of ASEAN's export gains identified in this study and those that have expressed their political will to move in that direction. These are Japan and South Korea. The ASW should then be enlarged to remaining FTA partners, especially China and India.
While trade gains from ASW+6 are substantial, the implementation costs can also be significant due to different regulatory requirements across ASEAN+6 countries. Aid for trade and capacity-building to support the reform process have to be an integral part for the design of ASW+6.
Rapid urbanization and development in Southeast Asia have impacted its high biodiversity and unique ecosystems, directly through the use of forest lands for infrastructure building, and indirectly through increasing ecological footprints. In Greater Bandung, Indonesia and Greater Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, rapid urbanization over the last thirty years has resulted in an increase in built infrastructure of approximately two and three times respectively. A Nature-Based Solutions approach can potentially underpin urban design and planning strategies in Greater Bandung and Greater Kuala Lumpur, as well as other cities in Southeast Asia, to address biodiversity conservation and also global environmental challenges such as climate change adaption and mitigation, while supporting well-being. Mainstreaming Nature-Based Solutions in Southeast Asia will require knowledge gaps to be addressed, greater awareness, increasing the evidence base, metrics for measuring success, support from institutions and stakeholders, and new and innovative financing. The urgency of global socio-ecological challenges, in particular the biodiversity and climate crisis, means transformational change is needed in Southeast Asia, for urban, ecological, technical, economic, and social systems, while still supporting sustainable development.
Hashtag campaigns on social media enable users to express their sentiments on various issues and mobilize people to be part of a movement or cause; they have been used effectively by disenfranchised members of society against powerful elites. While some are of the opinion that online campaigns are ineffective due to 'slacktivism', such campaigns can spill over to offline protests, especially if there are strong emotions such as anger, or a sense of injustice or social deprivation, spurring people on. The earlier hashtag campaigns in Malaysia - #AntaraDuaDarjat (#BetweenTwoStatus) and #DengkiKe (#AreYouJealous) - were expressions of unhappiness over perceived double standards in the enforcement of COVID-19 public safety protocols. Later hashtag campaigns such as #KerajaanGagal (#FailedGovernment), #KerajaanZalim (#CruelGovernment) and #KerajaanPembunuh (#MurdererGovernment) became increasingly negative as public disenchantment grew due to the government's weak handling of the pandemic and the consequent economic fallout. Public frustration that manifested itself in the #BenderaHitam (#BlackFlag) and #Lawan (#Protest) movements soon transitioned into offline campaigns and protests against the government. Apart from political hashtag campaigns, there were also welfare movements such as #KitaJagaKita (#WeTakeCareOfOurselves), #BenderaPutih (#WhiteFlag) and #RakyatJagaRakyat (#CitizensTakeCareOfCitizens), which enabled Malaysians to help those affected by the COVID-19 lockdowns, by rendering food aid and other assistance. A key conclusion of this study is that online hashtag campaigns have served as early warning of trending public sentiment. They also have the potential to hype up emotions online and subsequently galvanize support for offline campaigns and protests. As #Lawan and #BenderaHitam showed, these can have direct political outcomes.
Malaysia was initially lauded for its ability to combat the first few waves of COVID-19 but infection spikes since the Sabah state elections in September 2020 and subsequent exponential increases in both infections and deaths in 2021 left the nation reeling. Nationwide vaccination is seen as the only way out of the pandemic. Malaysia's COVID-19 communication strategy was hampered by political machinations and myriad changes in government. The need to shore up favour among the electorate resulted in inconsistent messaging and regular U-turns whenever there was public outrage at arbitrary restrictions. This resulted in confusion on the ground, preventing successful COVID-19 management and containment. Under the current regime, claims to more accessible data have been disputed and doubts have surfaced over data transparency and accuracy. There is an urgent need to ensure convincingly reliable information, as well as to use more engaging messaging on more suitable media. A holistic and effective COVID-19 communication strategy should adopt principles from several communication approaches, resulting in messages that are clear, simple and accessible as well as consistent and credible. Audiences should be segmented so that messages can be better tailored to their needs, with adequate information on the necessary steps to prevent infection and spread. Fake news, misinformation, and disinformation should be constantly tackled and debunked. The Gerai OA and OA Lindungi Komuniti Facebook pages are outstanding examples of grassroots information dissemination channels that effectively provide fact-checked, coherent and accessible information to local communities in languages and on media best-suited to their audiences.
In the first half of 2021, COVID-19 vaccine doses from the COVAX Facility were in short supply, and the plan to mass produce COVAX vaccines through the Serum Institute of India (SII) faltered as the pandemic surged in India in March 2021. Due to COVAX's shift in approach towards convincing richer nations to redistribute their excess doses, the second half of 2021 saw increases in the frequency and volume of its shipments. Donors were however able to 'earmark' their dose donations and identify their intended recipients. The six Southeast Asian countries which qualified for free COVAX shots - Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam (the AMC6) - received 16 million doses in the first half of 2021. In the second half, they received 128 million doses from COVAX, 80.9 per cent of which were earmarked donations. Despite making up 7 per cent of the world population, the AMC6 collectively accounted for 24.3 per cent of all earmarked dose donations (and 25 per cent of the United States' total dose donations) to COVAX in 2021. The AMC6 greatly benefitted from COVAX's pivot to dose donations. This demonstrated the region's strategic salience to Washington and its allies, but came at the expense of vaccine equity, which the region has prudential reasons to care about. The execution of COVAX hammers home the hard truth that multilateral governance is a difficult act to pull off even with the best intentions and is not impervious to the geopolitical interests and agendas of the major powers.
Until approximately two decades ago, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) struggled to make inroads in Johor due to: (1) the unique historical developments in the state, which benefited its primary opponent Barisan Nasional (BN), and (2) the decentralized party structure in Johor with party branches serving as the main player responsible for grassroots mobilization and campaigning, which resulted in an underdeveloped and less cohesive state party structure. Despite Lee Kaw playing a crucial leadership role for the nascent party to take root in the state, Johor remained in the periphery during the initial decades of the party's establishment. The party managed to achieve some electoral success only in central Johor around the Kluang. The party achieved a rare breakthrough in Johor during the 1990 General Election when numerous Chinese educationalists allied with the DAP under the call of then Dong Zong chairman Lim Fong Seng. However, the national alliance frayed soon after, with the DAP losing its momentum in Johor by the next general election. In the aftermath of GE2008, where DAP made unprecedented gains in Penang, Selangor and Perak, the national DAP leadership shifted their attention towards Johor as the latter was perceived as the next frontline state. The party continued its upward swing and made unprecedented gains in the 2013 General Election. As DAP maintained its momentum, coupled with the success of other Pakatan Harapan (PH) component parties in Johor during the 2018 General Election, the DAP under the PH coalition displaced BN as the Johor state government.
This report presents findings from a nationwide face-to-face survey of 2,627 Malaysians between March and April 2021 regarding public perceptions on the Election Commission (EC) and on election management.
Malaysians by and large hold a cautious, moderate affirmation of the state of democracy in Malaysia, and of it having made notable progress over the past decade. A quarter of respondents regard the 2018 general election to be very free or/and fair, while 43 per cent think that it was free/fair though not without problems. This perception appears to have been influenced by the fact that there was a change of federal government. Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the election management process and the EC is weakly affirmative, as revealed by a majority expressing a lack of confidence in an eventual online voting system being handled transparently. Urban residents generally have greater distrust in state institutions.
Some notable contrasts in regional trends: (a) Sarawakians have a high level of trust in state institutions; (b) Sabahans have the lowest appreciation for the progress made in the state of democracy in the country, the lowest satisfaction with civil liberty, or the lowest trust in state institutions except for the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the EC; and (c) West Malaysians have the lowest level of trust in the MACC and EC but express the highest level of appreciation for the progress that have made in the state of democracy.
In 1992, a group of academics at the National University of Malaysia (UKM) organized a seminar titled 'Seminar Ahli Sunnah dan Syiah Imamiyyah' ('Seminar on Ahl al-Sunnah and Imami Shi'ism') in Kuala Lumpur. It aimed to demonize Shi'a Muslims and ban Shi'ism, effectively escalating sectarianism in Muslim society. A Deobandi presenter at the seminar by the name of Muhammad Asri Yusoff put forth arguments about Shi'ism, which later became the 'intellectual base' for the discrimination and repression of Shi'a Muslims by Islamic authorities in Malaysia. This repression continues till the present day, and other religious leaders - particularly those with a Salafi orientation - take part in this. While much attention has been given to those who have escalated sectarianism, there have also been efforts to de-escalate sectarianism. These efforts come from groups such as Persatuan Ulama Malaysia, and individuals such as Abdul Hadi Awang of PAS, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the leader of International Movement for a Just World, Chandra Muzaffar, as well as Malaysian academic, Syed Farid Alatas. Nevertheless, the roots of sectarianism have been deeply laid since the seminar in 1992. Unsurprisingly, the sectarian campaign against Shi'as is aligned with the agenda of extremist and terrorist organizations such as ISIS. The sectarian campaign thus arguably emboldens such groups and puts Malaysia and the entire Southeast Asia at risk.
This article reports the findings of an online survey conducted in November - December 2021 on Indonesians' experience and perception of fintech tools, focusing on fintech adoption in the Greater Jakarta region, which besides Jakarta, includes Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi. One key finding is that, in the Greater Jakarta region, socio-economic status as measured by income is not a key determinant of fintech adoption. This is likely due to the more developed and mature ICT infrastructure in the Greater Jakarta region, which makes fintech tools readily accessible. However, the kinds of fintech tools that are more likely to be used - M-banking, E-wallet, Online Lending, Investment, Donations, and so on - are influenced by factors such as income, education, gender, age and occupation, suggesting that different fintech tools appeal to different groups in society according to their needs and resources. Psychological factors that are important in the adoption of fintech include having many choices in the needed financial services and feeling in control. While fintech users are concerned about data leaks and fraud, this does not deter them from using fintech. It may be anticipated that with the deepening of ICT infrastructure and public education on the safe use of fintech, fintech usage in Indonesia will continue to spread throughout the country.
A few ASEAN countries have signed the Global Methane Pledge, but methane should receive a broader and higher priority from the entire region, given its significant contribution to climate change, and the availability of solutions. The agriculture sector contributes the most amount of methane emissions with a steadily rising share over the past decade. Several Southeast Asian countries face similar methane abatement challenges (i.e., agricultural productivity in Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines; gas leakage in Malaysia and Brunei; and waste management in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), warranting closer collaboration at the subregional level. While it is true that countries have been participating in international initiatives and implementing national policies related to rice cultivation and oil and gas processing, their impacts have not been thoroughly evaluated. Rather than creating new institutional structures, ASEAN could for example ensure that its existing working groups and networks prioritize methane abatement. Missing data on the relative contribution to methane emissions from livestock, rice paddies and informal economies should be collected to help refine problem definition and formulate effective solutions.
Micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account for approximately 97 per cent of all active business entities within the ASEAN region. They are an important contributor to both emissions generation and future reduction. A recent large-scale, multi-country quantitative assessment was undertaken into how SMEs are dealing with climate change in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. Most respondents reported a high level of concern about climate change.
Over 90 per cent of firms are currently undertaking measures to reduce emissions, albeit that they are typically simple steps such as reducing air conditioning and electricity, recycling or installing low-energy lighting. Common intentions to deal with future extreme weather events include reducing emissions, developing a disaster plan, or reviewing business insurance policies. Major obstacles to dealing with climate issues are firstly, a lack of knowledge and secondly, insufficient funds. Governments are the preferred source of information, followed by business associations/chambers, friends and family. Social media, YouTube and websites are overwhelmingly the dissemination modes of choice. There were significant variations in these patterns from one reporting country to another.
Policymakers can help SMEs adjust to climate change by: encouraging them to adopt simple emission reduction measures; providing training and financial support; ensuring appropriate online delivery of advisory and assistance measures; and localising responses to meet the needs of SMEs which are specific to different ASEAN member states.
Organized propaganda and public opinion manipulation are increasing in Indonesia's cybersphere. Specifically, since 2019, there has been a marked rise of cyber troop campaigns that serve to mobilize public consensus for controversial government policies. Cyber troop operations played a crucial role in three controversial events in which public opinion had been initially critical of the government policy at issue. These were: (a) the revision of the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission in September 2019; (b) the launch of the New Normal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic in May 2020; and (c) the passing of the Omnibus Law for Job Creation in October 2020. In all three cases, there is clear evidence of cyber troops manipulating public opinion in support of government policy. In all three cases, the cyber troops manufactured consent by flooding social media with narratives that promoted the governing elite's agenda, often using deceptive messages and disinformation that were amplified by numerous 'buzzer' and 'bot' accounts. Thereby they effectively drowned out oppositional discourses on social media and neutralized dissent, especially as mainstream media simultaneously echoed the cyber troops' narratives. The ever more systematic use of cyber troops indicates increasing co-optation of Indonesia's cybersphere for elite interests. This threatens to undermine the quality of public debate and democracy in Indonesia because cyber troop operations not only feed public opinion with disinformation but also prevent citizens from scrutinizing and evaluating the governing elite's behaviour and policy-making processes, which further exacerbates Indonesia's ongoing democratic regression.
