Appendix
Table A.1 Additional descriptive statistics
| Variable | N | Mean | Range | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Controls: Electoral | Vote Gap, 2002 | 13,754 | 0.358 | 0–1 | Author Coded; Direction Generale des Elections |
| Vote Gap, 2009 | 13,595 | 0.378 | 0–1 | Author Coded; Direction Generale des Elections | |
| Winning % Votes, 2002 | 13,756 | 0.657 | 0.047–1 | Author Coded; Direction Generale des Elections | |
| Winning % Votes, 2009 | 13,593 | 0.659 | 0–1 | Author Coded; Direction Generale des Elections | |
| Nat’l Alignment, 2002 | 14,461 | 0.6 | 0–1 | Author Coded; Direction Generale des Elections | |
| Nat’l Alignment, 2009 | 14,461 | 0.67 | 0–1 | Author Coded; Direction Generale des Elections | |
| Controls: CG Favoritism | Teacher/Student Ratio, 2002 | 14,461 | 0.266 | 0–1 | Author Coded from Ministry of Education data |
| Teacher/Student Ratio, 2009 | 14,461 | 0.292 | 0–1 | Author Coded from Ministry of Education data | |
| Avg. CG Transfers | 14,457 | 23,495 | 13,201–86,186 | Direction des Collectivities Locales | |
| Controls: Ethnicity | Wolof, 2002 | 14,461 | 0.499 | 0–1 | Author Coded |
| Wolof, 2009 | 14,461 | 0.494 | 0–1 | Author Coded | |
| Ethnic Fractionalization, 2002 | 14,457 | 63.84 | 16.66–98 | Author Coded | |
| Ethnic Fractionalization, 2009 | 14,457 | 63.79 | 16.66–98 | Author Coded | |
| Controls: Social Capital | # Civic Associations, 2002 | 14,489 | 1.839 | 0–5 | ANSD Enquête Villages 2002, 2009 |
| # Civic Associations, 2009 | 14,490 | 2.474 | 0–5 | ANSD Enquête Villages 2002, 2009 | |
| Location-Allocation Models | Max. Attendance, Schools 2002–2009 | 285 | 305.63 | 0–2,680.3 | Author Coded |
| Max. Attendance, Schools 2009–2012 | 318 | 579.9 | 0–4,169.4 | Author Coded | |
| Max. Attendance, Clinics 2009–2012 | 183 | 2,805.6 | 0–22,759.6 | Author Coded | |
| Max. Coverage, Schools 2002–2009 | 285 | 766.31 | 0–5,945 | Author Coded | |
| Max. Coverage, Schools 2009–2012 | 318 | 413.3 | 0–4,678 | Author Coded | |
| Max. Coverage, Schools 2009–2012 | 183 | 639.9 | 0–8,580 | Author Coded | |
| Placebo Test Outcomes | New High Schools | 14,509 | 0.002 | 0–1 | ANSD Enquête Villages 2002, 2009 |
| Electrification | 12,266 | 0.028 | 0–1 | ANSD Enquête Villages 2002, 2009 | |
| New Roads | 12,266 | 0.109 | 0–1 | ANSD Enquête Villages 2002, 2009 |
Table A.2 Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new social services (Figure 5.2)
| New primary school access, odds ratios | New clinic access, odds ratios | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2009–2012 | ||||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 2.762*** (0.404) | 2.775*** (0.404) | 2.341*** (0.355) | 2.452*** (0.379) | 2.035*** (0.314) | 2.022*** (0.309) | 1.597*** (0.255) | 1.573** (0.261) | 1.662** (0.273) | 1.655** (0.271) | 1.919*** (0.329) | 1.850*** (0.325) |
| Ln Population | 1.417*** (0.037) | 1.387*** (0.037) | 1.341*** (0.036) | 1.354*** (0.038) | 1.586*** (0.046) | 1.551*** (0.046) | 1.457*** (0.044) | 1.473*** (0.046) | 1.223*** (0.040) | 1.229*** (0.041) | 1.234*** (0.042) | 1.231*** (0.043) |
| Dist. School Baseline (sqrt) | 1.038*** (0.001) | 1.038*** (0.001) | 1.041*** (0.001) | 1.043*** (0.001) | 1.037*** (0.001) | 1.036*** (0.001) | 1.039*** (0.001) | 1.041*** (0.001) | 1.025*** (0.001) | 1.025*** (0.001) | 1.026*** (0.001) | 1.026*** (0.001) |
| Population Density | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) |
| % Villages Schools | 1.007** (0.003) | 1.009** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | 1.013*** (0.003) | 1.008** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | ||||||
| % Villages Clinics | 0.174** (0.132) | 0.977 (0.595) | 0.832 (0.521) | |||||||||
| Local Economic Activity | 1.045** (0.023) | 1.023 (0.023) | 1.025 (0.028) | 1.031 (0.020) | 1.019 (0.020) | 1.066** (0.028) | 0.969 (0.026) | 0.984 (0.027) | 0.959 (0.030) | |||
| Department Wealth Measure | 1.054 (0.074) | 1.127 (0.074) | 1.064 (0.072) | 1.117 (0.076) | 1.158 (0.133) | 1.213 (0.142) | ||||||
| % Mouride | 0.689 (0.482) | 1.110 (0.715) | 1.294 (0.866) | 1.420 (0.944) | ||||||||
| # Built Schools | 1.144*** (0.012) | 1.164*** (0.012) | 1.162*** (0.017) | 1.184*** (0.017) | ||||||||
| # Built Clinics | 2.010*** (0.103) | |||||||||||
| Village Elevation | 0.996 (0.001) | 0.998 (0.002) | 1.000 (0.002) | 0.998 (0.002) | 0.996 (0.002) | 0.996** (0.002) | ||||||
| Ln Dist. Waterway | 0.958 (0.022) | 0.949 (0.026) | 0.966 (0.024) | 0.994 (0.031) | 1.005 (0.031) | 1.064 (0.039) | ||||||
| Soil Fertility | 0.989 (0.009) | 0.986 (0.011) | 0.876** (0.010) | 0.967** (0.011) | 0.998 (0.013) | 0.984 (0.014) | ||||||
| Ln Dist. Road | 0.987 (0.023) | 0.975 (0.023) | 0.935** (0.024) | 0.938** (0.024) | 1.000 (0.029) | 0.997 (0.029) | ||||||
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | 0.737*** (0.029) | 0.869*** (0.032) | 0.762*** (0.033) | 0.789*** (0.035) | 1.165** (0.062) | 1.211*** (0.066) | ||||||
| Local Government Capital | 4.583*** (0.722) | 4.636*** (0.752) | 4.854*** (0.696) | 4.469*** (0.646) | 0.729 (0.195) | 0.732 (0.196) | ||||||
| N | 14,267 | 14,267 | 14,167 | 13,553 | 14,224 | 14,224 | 14,124 | 13,611 | 11,269 | 11,269 | 11,190 | 8,274 |
| Level-2 | 318 | 318 | 318 | 368 | 368 | 368 | 286 | 286 | 286 | |||
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.146 | 0.132 | 0.074 | |||||||||
| FE | Y | Y | Y | |||||||||
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.
Table A.3 Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new social services, increased buffer size
| New primary school access, odds ratios | New clinic access, odds ratios | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2009–2012 | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Institutional Congruence 25 km | 1.651** (0.266) | 1.438** (0.235) | 1.734** (0.349) | |||
| Institutional Congruence 30 km | 2.813*** (0.431) | 1.884*** (0.309) | 0.950 (0.165) | |||
| Ln Population | 1.340*** (0.036) | 1.342*** (0.036) | 1.456*** (0.044) | 1.457*** (0.044) | 1.223*** (0.042) | 1.229*** (0.042) |
| Dist. School Baseline (sqrt) | 1.040*** (0.001) | 1.041*** (0.001) | 1.039*** (0.001) | 1.039*** (0.001) | 1.025*** (0.001) | 1.025*** (0.001) |
| Population Density (3 km radius) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) |
| % Villages Schools | 1.008** (0.003) | 1.001** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | ||
| % Villages Clinics | 0.790 (0.496) | 0.749 (0.469) | ||||
| Local Economic Activity | 1.020 (0.023) | 1.021 (0.023) | 1.019 (0.020) | 1.016 (0.02) | 0.985 (0.027) | 0.984 (0.027) |
| Department Wealth Measure | 1.104 (0.073) | 1.118 (0.075) | 1.105 (0.076) | 1.109 (0.076) | 1.218 (0.143) | 1.226 (0.144) |
| % Mouride | 1.020 (0.659) | 1.028 (0.672) | 1.286 (0.854) | 1.270 (0.843) | ||
| # Built Schools | 1.164*** (0.012) | 1.166*** (0.012) | 1.184*** (0.018) | 1.185*** (0.018) | ||
| # Built Clinics | 2.008*** (0.105) | 2.004*** (0.104) | ||||
| Village Elevation | 0.998 (0.001) | 0.999 (0.001) | 1.001 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.002) | 0.997 (0.002) | 0.996 (0.002) |
| Ln Dist. Waterway | 0.954** (0.022) | 0.955** (0.022) | 0.963 (0.024) | 0.964 (0.024) | 1.006 (0.031) | 0.999 (0.031) |
| Soil fertility | 0.989 (0.009) | 0.992 (0.009) | 0.975** (0.010) | 0.976** (0.010) | 1.006 (0.014) | 1.006 (0.014) |
| Ln Dist. Road | 0.986 (0.023) | 0.987 (0.023) | 0.934** (0.023) | 0.934** (0.0254) | 0.990 (0.029) | 0.989 (0.029) |
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | 0.722*** (0.029) | 0.739*** (0.029) | 0.754*** (0.032) | 0.764*** (0.033) | 1.157** (0.062) | 1.124** (0.059) |
| Local Government Capital | 4.660*** (0.734) | 4.588*** (0.724) | 4.889*** (0.701) | 4.839*** (0.694) | 0.741 (0.198) | 0.747 (0.199) |
| N | 14,167 | 14,167 | 14,124 | 14,124 | 10,930 | 10,930 |
| Level-2 | 318 | 318 | 368 | 368 | 282 | 282 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.
Table A.4 Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new social services, reduced measure of access
| New primary school access in 2 km, odds ratios | New primary school access in 1 km, odds ratios | New clinic access in 3 km, odds ratios | New clinic access in 1 km, odds ratios | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2009–2012 | ||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 2.363*** (0.372) | 1.549** (0.252) | 2.157*** (0.378) | 1.171 (0.204) | 1.991*** (0.365) | 2.053** (0.511) |
| Ln Population | 1.409*** (0.039) | 1.481*** (0.046) | 1.744*** (0.057) | 1.766*** (0.062) | 1.278*** (0.047) | 1.705*** (0.086) |
| Dist. School Baseline (sqrt) | 1.037*** (0.001) | 1.035*** (0.001) | 1.033*** (0.001) | 1.031*** (0.001) | 1.023*** (0.001) | 1.019*** (0.002) |
| Population Density (3 km radius) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) |
| % Villages Schools | 1.009*** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | 1.012*** (0.003) | 1.011*** (0.003) | ||
| % Villages Clinics | 0.781 (0.446) | 1.110 (0.593) | ||||
| Local Economic Activity | 1.002 (0.022) | 1.021 (0.020) | 1.014 (0.023) | 1.001 (0.020) | 0.985 (0.027) | 1.008 (0.030) |
| Department Wealth Measure | 1.101 (0.070) | 1.105 (0.073) | 1.103 (0.067) | 1.116 (0.069) | 1.116 (0.114) | 1.106 (0.101) |
| % Mouride | 0.525 (0.347) | 1.177 (0.763) | 0.553 (0.357) | 1.807 (1.107) | ||
| # Built Schools | 1.154*** (0.011) | 1.175*** (0.017) | 1.142*** (0.010) | 1.165*** (0.015) | ||
| # Built Clinics | 1.738*** (0.076) | 1.545*** (0.058) | ||||
| Village Elevation | 0.999 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.002) | 1.000 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.002) | 0.997 (0.002) | 1.000 (0.002) |
| Ln Dist. Waterway | 0.949** (0.022) | 0.964 (0.023) | 0.958 (0.022) | 0.973 (0.023) | 0.995 (0.031) | 0.955 (0.032) |
| Soil Fertility | 0.983 (0.009) | 0.981 (0.010) | 0.982 (0.011) | 0.989 (0.011) | 0.985 (0.014) | 0.983 (0.017) |
| Ln Dist. Road | 0.969 (0.023) | 0.937** (0.024) | 0.967 (0.025) | 0.947** (0.026) | 0.969 (0.030) | 0.954 (0.038) |
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | 0.734*** (0.031) | 0.759*** (0.033) | 0.763*** (0.034) | 0.774*** (0.036) | 1.078 (0.059) | 1.046 (0.072) |
| Local Government Capital | 4.024*** (0.637) | 4.363*** (0.627) | 3.134*** (0.507) | 3.905*** (0.567) | 0.833 (0.221) | 1.032 (0.279) |
| N | 14,167 | 14,124 | 14,167 | 14,124 | 10,655 | 10,655 |
| Level-2 | 318 | 368 | 318 | 368 | 273 | 273 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.
Table A.5a Effect of alternative explanations on village access to new primary schools, odds ratios (Figure 5.3a and b)
| Panel A: Electoral variables | Panel B: Civic associations | Panel C: Ethnicity | Panel D: Central gov. relations | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | ||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | |
| Vote Gap | 0.652 (0.315) | 0.939 (0.445) | |||||||||||||
| Vote Gap × Ln Population | 1.015 (0.088) | 1.000 (0.083) | |||||||||||||
| Logged Population | 1.369*** (0.055) | 1.477*** (0.145) | 1.570*** (0.069) | 1.579*** (0.153) | |||||||||||
| Winning % Votes | 1.119 (0.917) | 0.803 (0.649) | |||||||||||||
| Winning % Votes × Ln Population | 0.896 (0.131) | 0.989 (0.140) | |||||||||||||
| Nationally Aligned | 1.013 (0.105) | 1.036 (0.111) | |||||||||||||
| # Civic Associations | 0.992 (0.022) | 1.036 (0.024) | |||||||||||||
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.999 (0.003) | 0.988 (0.003) | |||||||||||||
| Wolof Dominant | 0.976 (0.123) | 1.136 (0.142) | |||||||||||||
| % Change Teachers per Student/Region | 0.317*** (0.098) | 1.409 (0.257) | |||||||||||||
| Average CG Transfer ($) | 0.9999** (0.000) | ||||||||||||||
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 2.833*** (0.421) | 2.837*** (0.422) | 2.552*** (0.362) | 2.148*** (0.337) | 2.146*** (0.337) | 2.021*** (0.309) | 2.774*** (0.404) | 2.019*** (0.309) | 2.774*** (0.404) | 2.776*** (0.405) | 2.023*** (0.309) | 2.019*** (0.308) | 2.794*** (0.408) | 2.019*** (0.309) | 2.018*** (0.308) |
| N | 13,568 | 13,568 | 14,267 | 13,364 | 13,362 | 14,224 | 14,267 | 14,224 | 14,267 | 14,267 | 14,224 | 14,224 | 14,267 | 14,224 | 14,224 |
| Level-2 | 313 | 313 | 318 | 358 | 358 | 368 | 318 | 368 | 318 | 318 | 368 | 368 | 318 | 368 | 368 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.
Table A.5b Effect of alternative explanations on village access to new clinics, odds ratios (Figure 5.3c)
| Panel A: Electoral variables | Panel B: Civic associations | Panel C: Ethnicity | Panel D: Central gov. relations | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | |
| Vote Gap | 1.599 (0.903) | ||||||
| Vote Gap × Ln Population | 0.924 (0.093) | ||||||
| Logged Population | 1.239*** (0.063) | 1.456** (0.178) | |||||
| Winning % Votes | 8.422** (8.275) | ||||||
| Winning % Votes × Ln Population | 0.742 (0.132) | ||||||
| Nationally Aligned | 1.029 (0.186) | ||||||
| # Civic Associations | 1.005 (0.028) | ||||||
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.999 (0.004) | ||||||
| Wolof Dominant | 0.882 (0.169) | ||||||
| Average CG Transfer ($) | 0.999 (0.000) | ||||||
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 1.592** (0.263) | 1.599** (0.264) | 1.665** (0.271) | 1.654** (0.271) | 1.656** (0.271) | 1.665** (0.271) | 1.655** (0.271) |
| N | 10,596 | 10,594 | 11,269 | 11,269 | 11,268 | 11,268 | 11,268 |
| Level-2 | 278 | 278 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.
Table A.6 Trust estimates (Figure 5.4)
| Panel B. Nunn and Wantchenkon replication | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relatives | Acquaintances | Local government | Neighbors | Other Senegalese | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Slave Exports per Area | 0.011 (0.017) | 0.053 (0.050) | 0.038 (0.077) | −0.047 (0.052) | 0.013 (0.081) |
| Age | −0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.004) |
| Age2 | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.071 (0.066) | 0.115 (0.077) | −0.043 (0.073) | −0.029 (0.113) |
| % Co-ethnic | 0.027 (0.036) | −0.005 (0.129) | −0.146 (0.167) | 0.193 (0.103) | 0.206 (0.165) |
| Went w/o Cooking Oil | −0.006 (0.012) | −0.045 (0.027) | 0.018 (0.035) | 0.024 (0.026) | −0.072 (0.042) |
| Went w/o Cash Income | 0.009 (0.009) | 0.031 (0.036) | 0.059 (0.042) | 0.003 (0.029) | −0.037 (0.052) |
| Went w/o Medical | 0.006 (0.012) | 0.042 (0.033) | −0.037 (0.045) | 0.023 (0.021) | −0.052 (0.043) |
| Went w/o Water | −0.002 (0.009) | 0.030 (0.025) | −0.051 (0.031) | −0.024 (0.021) | 0.036 (0.034) |
| Went w/o Enough Food | −0.001 (0.006) | −0.006 (0.028) | −0.00 (0.032) | 0.001 (0.022) | 0.009 (0.046) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.000 (0.001) | −0.002 (0.004) | −0.001 (0.004) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.000 (0.003) |
| Education FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Religion FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Employment FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Department FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Round FE | Y | Y | Y | Rd 5 Only | Rd 5 Only |
| N | 1,232 | 1,217 | 1,085 | 585 | 610 |
| R2 | 0.129 | 0.251 | 0.121 | 0.170 | 0.128 |
| Panel C. Afrobarometer data | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relatives | Acquaintances | Local government | Neighbors | Other Senegalese | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Inst. Congruence 20 km | 0.004 (0.024) | −0.185 (0.118) | −0.265 (0.262) | −0.211** (0.079) | −0.239 (0.231) |
| Age | −0.001 (0.001) | 0.002 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.004) |
| Age2 | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.021 (0.024) | 0.075 (0.065) | 0.119 (0.077) | −0.034 (0.071) | −0.021 (0.0117) |
| % Co-ethnic | 0.033 (0.035) | 0.002 (0.124) | −0.141 (0.168) | 0.163 (0.103) | 0.215 (0.166) |
| Went w/o Cooking Oil | −0.006 (0.012) | −0.045 (0.027) | 0.017 (0.036) | 0.026 (0.026) | −0.070 (0.043) |
| Went w/o Cash Income | 0.009 (0.009) | 0.029 (0.036) | 0.056 (0.042) | 0.002 (0.029) | −0.041 (0.053) |
| Went w/o Medical | 0.005 (0.012) | 0.041 (0.033) | −0.039 (0.046) | 0.025 (0.022) | −0.053 (0.043) |
| Went w/o Water | −0.003 (0.009) | 0.030 (0.025) | −0.048 (0.031) | −0.025 (0.021) | 0.038 (0.033) |
| Went w/o Enough Food | −0.001 (0.006) | −0.006 (0.028) | −0.004 (0.031) | 0.001 (0.021) | 0.008 (0.046) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.000 (0.001) | −0.001 (0.004) | −0.000 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Education FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Religion FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Employment FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Department FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Round FE | Y | Y | Y | Rd 5 Only | Rd 5 Only |
| N | 1,238 | 1,223 | 1,090 | 587 | 614 |
| R2 | 0.127 | 0.251 | 0.126 | 0.173 | 0.133 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report results and standard errors clustered by Department, in parentheses, from OLS models.
Table A.7 Effect of institutional congruence on location-allocation choices (Figure 5.6)
| Maximize attendance | Maximize coverage | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Schools, 2002–2009 | Schools, 2009–2012 | Clinics, 2009–2012 | Schools, 2002–2009 | Schools, 2009–2012 | Clinics, 2009–2012 | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | −75.53 (52.86) | −27.54 (86.57) | 714.01 (599.32) | −567.45*** (110.69) | −167.27** (74.55) | −685.89** (292.06) |
| Ln Population (LG) | 267.63** (57.82) | 221.65** (84.42) | 1,957.9*** (466.29) | 630.08** (188.13) | 306.73** (118.35) | 556.71** (208.05) |
| Population Density (LG) | −29.66 (20.01) | 165.18** (56.58) | 356.05 (287.78) | −228.69** (93.11) | −134.14** (48.64) | −135.52** (40.39) |
| # Built Schools | 5.49 (8.17) | 96.29*** (20.61) | −5.63 (17.36) | 24.02 (11.82) | ||
| % Villages Schools | −392.57** (110.48) | 369.13 (247.9) | −1,203.04** (291.29) | −776.42*** (146.32) | ||
| % Mouride | 502.39** (223.01) | −26.18 (235.90) | 1,872.2 (885.75) | 674.31 (329.39) | ||
| # Built Clinics | 506.98** (139.86) | −3.21 (53.49) | ||||
| % Villages Clinics | 980.44 (2,757.59) | −2,214.51** (771.46) | ||||
| N | 283 | 318 | 183 | 283 | 318 | 183 |
| R2 | 0.22 | 0.44 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.15 | 0.22 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report results and standard errors, in parentheses, from OLS models. Unit of observation is the local government.
Table A.8 Placebo models – effect of institutional congruence on central state allocated goods, odds ratios (Figure 5.7)
| New high schools | Electrification | New roads | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | Full | Base | Full | Base | Full | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 0.998 (0.574) | 1.284 (0.884) | 1.070 (0.282) | 0.644 (0.191) | 0.775** (0.099) | 0.742 (0.115) |
| Ln Population | 12.484*** (4.74) | 11.534*** (6.379) | 2.133*** (0.239) | 1.804*** (0.169) | 1.639*** (0.085) | 1.556*** (0.074) |
| Population Density 5 km | 0.999** (0.000) | 0.999** (0.000) | 1.000*** (0.000) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) |
| Department Wealth Measure | 0.864 (0.334) | 2.324*** (0.544) | 1.135 (0.093) | |||
| Village Elevation | 1.005 (0.022) | 1.010** (0.004) | 0.999 (0.003) | |||
| Ln Dist. Waterway | 1.002 (0.118) | 1.061 (0.093) | 0.876*** (0.031) | |||
| Soil fertility | 0.933 (0.073) | 1.052 (0.049) | 0.969 (0.016) | |||
| Ln Dist. Road | 1.001 (0.306) | 0.738*** (0.049) | 0.705*** (0.030) | |||
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | 1.211 (0.615) | 0.583*** (0.072) | 0.849*** (0.052) | |||
| Local Government Capital | 21.13*** (16.516) | 16.021*** (4.052) | 3.644*** (0.922) | |||
| Electric Grid within 5 km | 1.984** (0.505) | 1.361 (0.344) | ||||
| N | 1,504 | 1,503 | 11,441 | 11,421 | 11,863 | 11,763 |
| R2 | 0.324 | 0.441 | 0.084 | 0.213 | 0.042 | 0.086 |
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report results and standard errors clustered at the local government level, in parentheses, from OLS models. Models of new high school access are limited to villages with a population of 1,000 residents or higher. Models for electrification and new road access do not include villages with baseline access. Full models include a village’s latitude, longitude, and their interaction term.
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