Because of the ominous implications of a showdown in the United Nations over South West Africa, and in view of its uncertain outcome, it is of the highest importance that U.S. policy be actively directed to averting such a confrontation (Nielsen, 1965: 123).

A perennial of international diplomacy—the question of Namibia (South West Africa—remains unresolved. South Africa maintains military and political control while diplomats come and go. United Nations' resolutions go unheeded, and war devastates northern Namibia and adjacent southern Angola. A substantial body of literature on the international legal dispute over the territory has existed for some time. In recent years there has also been much research on Namibia's political economy and on the dominant role of foreign investment there. A few works also have appeared on internal political developments and on the liberation movement, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

Observers familiar with the issue have repeatedly noted the main features of Western policy: the Western powers, including United Nations Security Council members Great Britain, France, and the United States, have often concurred in stronger and stronger international condemnations of South African rule, but those same countries have consistently balked at agreeing to sanctions on South Africa. Western representatives again and again have rebuffed African pleas for effective action to compel compliance with UN resolutions. Such a contrast between rhetoric and practice is not unusual in foreign policy, of course. In the Namibian case, however, the contradiction is unusually explicit.

Many observers and analysts of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement have noted factionalism and suggested ethnicity as a dominant factor (Dumbuchena, 1975; Breytenbach, 1977; Nyangoni, 1978; Ranger, 1979). This author (Sithole, 1979; 1980) has made a similar argument elsewhere. Yet, others have observed the same factionalism but suggested a different explanation—the class factor.

The purpose of this paper is not to repeat nor repent from the ethnic factor argument but rather to examine and assess the class factor argument. The task for this paper is twofold. The first is to examine the frequent argument of Marxist colleagues engaged in the profession of analyzing society that factionalism and its ethnic manifestations are caused by “petty-bourgeois” politicians in the nationalist movement. The second task is to attempt to show that, to date, there is no clearly denned class basis for the factionalization in the Zimbabwe nationalist movement.

There has been a proliferation of factionalism in Zimbabwe politics from 1963 to the present. While some analysts have suggested ethnicity as the explaining factor, others sought to employ class analysis to explain the same phenomenon. Ostensibly, most of these analyses were the work of intellectuals and activists external to Zimbabwe but sympathetic to the cause of liberation. More recently, interest in this analytic tool seems to be gaining momentum among locals.

Attempts to increase food productivity, make the agricultural sector more cost efficient, improve diets of lower income people, and increase net incomes of farmers and livestock owners are receiving considerable interest on a worldwide basis. In many areas, however, these goals are not being met. In particular, livestock development programs in arid and semi-arid pastoral and sedentary regions in Africa have been especially discouraging. The general problem confronted in this article is to determine why the livestock industry is not developing, and to analyze alternatives related to one major source of concern: communally grazed areas.

Africa warrants a special place in development planning due to a multitude of non-economic factors. Political instability, language differences, and tribal and racial tensions have often tended to overshadow economic considerations (Bates, 1981). Perhaps most striking has been the heavy emphasis on equity considerations, possibly because many nations have recently emerged from colonial rule. The relatively short post emergence period (two to three decades in most cases) combined with the continent's economic and natural resource diversity, and a host of other factors such as trade policies, make analysis of economic development potential very difficult (World Bank, 1981).

It is evident that there is no one problem and no unique solution in denning policies related to Sub-Saharan Africa's livestock sector. Perhaps most important is to recognize that the various kinds of livestock systems themselves, as well as associated social institutions, are dynamic forces.

Africa has considerable potential for developing its fishery resources. Some of the world's richest fishing grounds lie off the coasts of Mauritania, Angola, Morocco, Nigeria, and Senegal. At present, these fisheries are exploited mostly (sometimes almost exclusively) by foreign fishing fleets from Japan, South Korea, the USSR, and several European countries. Official statistics indicate that foreign fishing off West Africa accounted for 1.2 million metric tons in 1976, or roughly 2 percent of the total worldwide marine catch. A Senegalese official claimed (quite plausibly) that those figures were too conservative and that foreign fishing amounted to “at least three times” the official foreign catch (United States Department of Commerce [hereafter USDOC], 1976). In response to this dependence on foreign fishing, several African countries are attempting to develop their own fishing fleets. Nigeria, in particular, has been rapidly expanding its fleet during the last decade (Marine Fisheries Review, 1982). The Organization of African Unity emphasized fisheries development in its 1980 Plan of Action (South, 1983a: 68). African nations are attempting to challenge the Foreign fishing companies' dominant position. As this paper will show, these efforts are likely to increase indigenous participation in the fishing industry.

The issue of economic nationalism in the Third World has been widely discussed. It is frequently noted that Third World countries are now adopting aggressive policies toward foreign investors. Many countries require foreign investors to establish joint ventures in certain industries, to employ indigenous personnel, to share technology, and to construct local manufacturing and processing facilities.