An expert on foreign affairs has summarized the limitation upon the right of a government to make public the diplomatic papers which it has received from another government as follows: “ … one party to a negotiation cannot, in honor and in courtesy, publish the negotiation without the consent of the other party, on pain of forfeiting that good-will upon which … ‘the peace of the world ultimately depends.’ ” This principle of consent to publication is accepted, with some reservations and exceptions, by American practice. But American practice in this matter is not generally accepted by all foreign offices and it is not precisely and definitely written into international law. It has been generally observed in normal times by the Great Powers, which have had most to gain by its application, and it has frequently been disregarded by small powers and by Great Powers in times of stress. It rests upon comity and reciprocity, not upon international legislation.

It will be remembered that notes were exchanged between the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Kussia, and the Republic of Turkey on the subject of the Turkish Straits which it was desired during the Potsdam talks to link with the general problem of peace. It is our intention to discuss the problem of the Straits in the light of these notes.

The signing of the Constitution for a World Health Organization, on 22 July 1946 in New York City, is likely to be a landmark in the history of international cooperation for public health and medicine. At this ceremony the representatives of sixty-one nations affirmed their intention of bringing all inter-governmental health action under the aegis of a single agency which, it is hoped, will soon embrace the entire family of states. The new “Magna Carta” of health envisages an organization far wider in scope and function than any previous undertaking in this sphere of international collaboration. Still more significant is the new approach to the problem of disease embodied in the WHO Constitution—an approach which takes full cognizance of the revolutionary advances of the past decade in preventive and curative medicine.

Diplomacy has developed a large amount of formalistic ritual much of which is reflected in international law. The titles and ranking of diplomats constitute the most striking example. Curiously enough this tendency is not wholly reflected in the modern law and practice of treaty-making. It is of no legal consequence, for example, whether an agreement between or among states is called a treaty, a convention, a statute, an agreement, a protocol or a covenant or charter. Certain labels are used with a degree of consistency to signify the informal or temporary character of an agreement such as modus vivendi and “exchange of notes,” while others, such as “covenant” and “charter,” have been utilized to suggest the basic and over-all importance of the instrument. The labels do not, however, indicate whether the agreement registers a boundary settlement, the conclusion of peace, a political and military alliance, provisions for the extradition of fugitive criminals, arrangements for the distribution of radio frequencies, adjustment of double taxation, respect for copyrights, or facilities for travelling salesmen. The applicable substantive law similarly fails to distinguish among such diverse subjects and covers them all with the same rules concerning conclusion, interpretation, and termination. Such uniformity is convenient for the student, the statesman, and the judge, but it is not responsive to the needs of the international community in some important respects which will be discussed in this chapter.

The prompt adoption of the Charter of the United Nations by the United States stands in bold relief against the failure to ratify, the Covenant of the League of Nations twenty-five years ago. The causes responsible for the success of the Charter and the failure of the Covenant are probably diverse in character and varying in importance. The indorsement of the Charter by a virtually unanimous vote in the Senate was probably due in no small measure to the decision of the Roosevelt Administration to place the issue of American participation in an international security organization, almost from the very beginning, on a non-partisan basis. The issue, however, was not one of joining an international organization of the Woodrow Wilson type. The vote in the Senate, accordingly, does not necessarily represent a belated conversion to the idealism of Wilson. It would seem, on the contrary, that the Roosevelt Administration, drawing on the rich experience of international cöoperation during the interwar period, and more particularly during World War II, had taken care to keep from the Charter all the important matters to which the majority of the Senate, in voting on the Covenant with the Lodge Reservations on March 19, 1920, had taken exception. It may be that this policy was merely part of an over-all strategy aiming at bringing the United States into some sort of international security organization rather than running the risk of a repetition of the 1919/1920 drama. It may be, on the other hand, that the Roosevelt Administration, together with the other sponsoring governments, had become genuinely convinced that the League Covenant represented a type of international organization which, under the prevailing circumstances, was unattainable or undesirable or unworkable in practice.

The chief preoccupation with regard to the WorldCourt during the year 1946 was the reorganization required by the modifications introduced into its Statute in 1945.1 This involved chiefly the dissolution of the Permanent Court as it was constituted under the Statute of 1920, the election, of Judges to constitute the International Court of Justice, the organization of the newly-elected bench and the reestablishment of the Registry, and the adaptation ofthe Rules of Court to take account of the changes in the text of the Statute. Various administrative measures were adopted by the United Nations, in consequence of its replacing the League of Nations as the body responsible for the maintenance of the Court, and some progress was made during the year in extending the Court's jurisdiction. No contentious proceeding was instituted during 1946,2 no advisory opinion was requested, and hence no entry wasmade in the list of cases before the Court.

The American national who suffered war damage to property on territory of an enemy country during World War II is encouraged by the progress already made on the peace treaties to believe that the duty to provide compensation for his damage will be imposed directly upon the government of the enemy country. Upon the coming into force of the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, and Finland, each of those countries will be obliged to provide for damage to property of United Nations nationals in its territory compensation equal to two-thirds of the sum necessary to purchase similar property or to make good the loss suffered. If a similar pattern is followed when the treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan are written each of those countries will also be obliged to provide compensation for damage to property of United Nations nationals on its territory.

Retribution for the shocking crimes and atrocities committed by the enemy during World War II was made imperative by the overwhelming demands emanating from the public conscience throughout the civilized world. Statesmen and jurists realized that another failure to vindicate the law such as followed World War I would prove their incapacity to make progress in strengthening the international law of the future.1

The first judicial interpretation of the immunities of staff members of the United Nations is contained in the decision of the City Court of New Eochelle, New York, in the case of County of Westchester on complaint of Walter Donnelly, Complainant, v. William Banollo, Defendant. The opinion in this ease, delivered on November 8, 1946, by Acting City Judge Sol Eubin, also contains the first judicial construction of the International Organization Immunities Act of December 29, 1945, which was designed, in part, to implement the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations and any future conventions or agreements which might be concluded pursuant thereto.

The word “copyright” comes from the Latin copia, which is translated as “plenty” and which means, in general, the right to make plenty or to copy. In its specific application it means the right to multiply copies of those products of the human brain known as literature and art. It has also been defined as “the power to determine whether the work shall be published at all, the manner in which, if published, it shall be done, and to whom.”

Among the most controversial features of the Nuremberg Trial have been the repeated efforts of the Allied Powers to prove that the law created by the London Agreement and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal attached to this Agreement was but declaratory of already existing rules of general international law, and that the verdict of the Tribunal, apart from its immediate purpose of retribution, must be considered as the first attempt in history to establish a legal precedent destined to act as a powerful deterrent against possible future resort to illegal war. The Final Report on the Nuremberg Trial, submitted by the American Representative to the President of the United States, reiterates these dominant ideas by declaring: “The four nations, through their prosecutors and through their representatives on the Tribunal, have enunciated standards of conduct … by which the Germans have been condemned” and which “will become the condemnation of any nation that is faithless to them.” Moreover, this document emphasizes what is termed “the power of the precedent” by asserting that “no one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute law—and law with a sanction.”

Shortly after termination of the now historic Nuremberg trial of Nazi Germany’s arch war criminals, formal proceedings were instituted against several other classes of major offenders against the laws of war in Western Europe. This second phase of the program included war crimes committed in S.S. laboratories, in the name of medical experimentation, and the socalled “economic” war crimes. Simultaneously with these proceedings preparations were made for still a third class of offenders to be brought to international justice, and it is this group which has recently been indicted. Here the charges are predicated upon illegal activity of enemy nationals engaged in administering justice in territories under military occupation, frequently involving the execution of inhabitants after a summary hearing, or after no trial at all. For the international lawyer this third category of war crimes contains many stimulating and significant elements. It raises highly challenging questions as to the extent to which criminal responsibility may be held to exist in cases where enemy nationals performing functions of a judicial or a quasi-judicial character have participated in the pronouncement and execution of sentences, including the death penalty, against nationals of the occupied areas.