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Defending optimistic rationalism: A reply to commentators

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Joshua May Open the ORCID record for Joshua May [Opens in a new window]
Joshua May*
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Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260. joshmay@uab.eduhttps://www.joshdmay.com
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Abstract

In response, I elaborate on my conception of moral reasoning, as well as clarify the structure of debunking arguments and how my cautious optimism is only of the “glass half full” sort. I also explain how rationalism can capture insights purportedly only explained by sentimentalist and Humean views. The reply concludes by clarifying and admitting some limits of the book's scope.

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Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e168
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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