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Moral principles in May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Colin Marshall Open the ORCID record for Colin Marshall [Opens in a new window]
Colin Marshall*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195. crmarsh@uw.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/colinmarshallphilosophy/
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Abstract

Joshua May offers four principles that might serve as the rational foundations of moral judgments. I argue that these principles, if they are independent of affect, are too weak to be the basis of any substantive moral judgment and do not fit with the idea that morality is categorical.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e160
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

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