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What sentimentalists should say about emotion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Charlie Kurth Open the ORCID record for Charlie Kurth [Opens in a new window]
Charlie Kurth*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5328. charles.kurth@wmich.eduwww.charliekurth.com
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Abstract

Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e158
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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