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Do we really externalize or objectivize moral demands?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Stephen Stich
Stephen Stich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901. stich@philosophy.rutgers.eduhttp://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/
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Abstract

Stanford's goal is to explain the uniquely human tendency to externalize or objectify “distinctively moral” demands, norms, and obligations. I maintain that there is no clear phenomenon to explain. Stanford's account of which norms are distinctively moral relies on Turiel's problematic work. Stanford's justification of the claim that we “objectify” moral demands ignores recent studies indicating that often we do not.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e113
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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