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Externalization is common to all value judgments, and norms are motivating because of their intersubjective grounding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Carme Isern-Mas  and
Antoni Gomila
Carme Isern-Mas
Affiliation:
Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands (UIB), Institute for Cross-Disciplinary Physics and Complex Systems (IFISC), Associated Unit to Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Campus Carretera Valldemossa, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain. Isernmas.carme@gmail.comtoni.gomila@uib.cathttp://evocog.org/carme-isern/https://antonigomila.wordpress.com/
Antoni Gomila
Affiliation:
Human Evolution and Cognition Group (EvoCog), University of the Balearic Islands (UIB), Institute for Cross-Disciplinary Physics and Complex Systems (IFISC), Associated Unit to Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Campus Carretera Valldemossa, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain. Isernmas.carme@gmail.comtoni.gomila@uib.cathttp://evocog.org/carme-isern/https://antonigomila.wordpress.com/
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Abstract

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e104
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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