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The faces of pessimism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2019
Abstract
In this commentary on May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, I argue that many of the interdisciplinary moral psychologists whom May terms “pessimists” are often considerably more optimistic about the prospects for progress in moral inquiry than he contends.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
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Target article
Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
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Author response
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