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Kantian indifference about moral reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Adam J. Roberts Open the ORCID record for Adam J. Roberts [Opens in a new window]
Adam J. Roberts*
Affiliation:
Holywell Manor, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UH, United Kingdom.adam.roberts@oxon.org
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Abstract

The pessimistic arguments May challenges depend on an anti-Kantian philosophical assumption. That assumption is that what I call philosophical optimists about moral reason are also committed to empirical optimism, or what May calls “optimistic rationalism.” I place May's book in the literature by explaining how that assumption is resisted by Christine Korsgaard, one of May's examples of a contemporary Kantian.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e164
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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