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Elimination, not reduction: Lessons from the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and multiple realisation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Tuomas K. Pernu
Tuomas K. Pernu*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom. tuomas.pernu@kcl.ac.ukhttp://www.tuomaspernu.london Molecular and Integrative Biosciences Research Programme, Faculty of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of Helsinki, 00014 Helsinki, Finland.
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Abstract

The thesis of multiple realisation that Borsboom et al. are relying on should not be taken for granted. In dissolving the apparent multiple realisation, the reductionist research strategies in psychopathology research (the Research Domain Criteria [RDoC] framework, in particular) are bound to lead to eliminativism rather than reductionism. Therefore, Borsboom et al. seem to be aiming at a wrong target.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e22
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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