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Symptoms are not the solution but the problem: Why psychiatric research should focus on processes rather than symptoms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Immanuel G. Elbau ,
Elisabeth B. Binder  and
Victor I. Spoormaker
Immanuel G. Elbau
Affiliation:
Department of Translational Research in Psychiatry, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, 80804 Munich, Germany. Immanuel_elbau@psych.mpg.debinder@psych.mpg.despoormaker@psych.mpg.dehttp://www.psych.mpg.de/1448291/binder
Elisabeth B. Binder
Affiliation:
Department of Translational Research in Psychiatry, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, 80804 Munich, Germany. Immanuel_elbau@psych.mpg.debinder@psych.mpg.despoormaker@psych.mpg.dehttp://www.psych.mpg.de/1448291/binder
Victor I. Spoormaker
Affiliation:
Department of Translational Research in Psychiatry, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, 80804 Munich, Germany. Immanuel_elbau@psych.mpg.debinder@psych.mpg.despoormaker@psych.mpg.dehttp://www.psych.mpg.de/1448291/binder
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Abstract

Progress in psychiatric research has been hindered by the use of artificial disease categories to map distinct biological substrates. Efforts to overcome this obstacle have led to the misconception that relevant psychiatric dimensions are not biologically reducible. Consequently, the return to phenomenology is once again advocated. We propose a process-centered paradigm of biological reduction compatible with non-reductive materialism.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e7
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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