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How is mindreading really like reading?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2019

Ian A. Apperly Open the ORCID record for Ian A. Apperly [Opens in a new window]
Ian A. Apperly*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom.i.a.apperly@bham.ac.ukhttp://www.ianapperly.eclipse.co.uk/index.htm
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Abstract

I suggest an alternative basis for Heyes’ analogy between cultural learning of mindreading and text reading. Unlike text reading, mindreading does not entail decoding of observable stimuli. Like text reading, mindreading requires relevant inferences. Identification of relevant inferences is a deeply challenging problem, and the most important contribution of cultural learning to mindreading may be an apprenticeship in thinking like a mindreader.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e170
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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