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Article contents
Reductionism – simplified and scientific
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Abstract
In this commentary on Borsboom et al.’s target article, I address an inadequate, simplified use of the idea of “reductionism” in clinical psychology and psychiatry. This is important because reductionism is a fundamental methodology of science. Explaining mental states and processes in terms of biological and brain states and processes is fundamental for the science of psychology. I also briefly address a fundamental methodology of the goal of psychology as a hard science.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
References
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Target article
Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
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Author response
Reductionism in retreat