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Special, radical, failure of reduction in psychiatry
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
Abstract
Use of network models to identify causal structure typically blocks reduction across the sciences. Entanglement of mental processes with environmental and intentional relationships, as Borsboom et al. argue, makes reduction of psychology to neuroscience particularly implausible. However, in psychiatry, a mental disorder can involve no brain disorder at all, even when the former crucially depends on aspects of brain structure. Gambling addiction constitutes an example.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
References
Horst, S. (2007) Beyond reduction: Philosophy of mind and post-reductionist philosophy of science. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kincaid, H., Daniels, E., Dellis, A., Hofmeyr, A., Rousseau, J., Sharp, C. & Ross, D. (2013) A taxometric analysis of the performance of the problem gambling severity index in a South African national urban prevalence sample. International Journal of Gambling Studies 29:377–92.Google Scholar
Ladyman, J. & Ross, D. (2007) Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ross, D., Sharp, C., Vuchinich, R. & Spurrett, D. (2008) Midbrain mutiny: The behavioral economics and neuroeconomics of disordered gambling. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Target article
Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research
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Author response
Reductionism in retreat