Recent developments in both evolutionary theory and in our ideas about development suggest that genetic assimilation of environmental regularities may occur on shorter timescales than those considered by Shepard. The nervous system is more plastic and for longer periods than previously thought. Hence, the internal basis of cognitive-perceptual skills is likely to blend ontogenetic and phylogenetic learning. This blend is made more rich and interactive by the special cultural scaffolding that surrounds human development. This being so, the regularities of the environment which have been genetically assimilated during the emergence of modern human beings may themselves be the products of human action. [Shepard]

Recent computational models of motor planning have relied heavily on anticipating the consequences of motor acts. Such anticipation is vital for dealing with the redundancy problem of motor control (i.e., the problem of selecting a particular motor solution when more than one is possible to achieve a goal). Computational approaches to motor planning support the Theory of Event Coding (TEC).

Developmental constraints presumably had a major role in channeling evolution. In particular, developmental mechanisms may have coordinated the evolution of neocortex with that of other brain structures. However, the rules determining the differential expansion of different cortical territories remain to be determined as well as the adaptive role of cortical expansion versus that of the structures it is connected to. The high degree of developmental plasticity of neocortex was probably the key to its successful evolution.

Shepard's theoretical analysis of generalization is assumed to enable an objective measure of the relation between objects, an assumption taken on board by Tenenbaum & Griffiths. I argue that context effects apply to generalization in the same way as they apply to similarity. Thus, the need to extend Shepard's formalism in a way that incorporates context effects should be acknowledged. [Shepard; Tenenbaum & Griffiths]

Humphreys and Forde (H&F) propose that greater within- category structural similarity makes living things more difficult to name. However, recent studies show that normal subjects find it easier to name living than nonliving things when these are matched across category for potential artefacts. Additionally, at the level of single pixels, visual overlap appears to be greater for nonliving things.

Bloom's theory of word learning has difficulty accounting for children's verb acquisition. There is no predominant preverbal event concept, akin to the preverbal object concept, to direct children's early event-verb mappings. Children may take advantage of grammatical and linguistic information in verb acquisition earlier than Bloom allows. A distinction between lexical and grammatical learning is difficult to maintain for verb acquisition.

A physiological model for short-term memory (STM) based on dual theta (5–10 Hz) and gamma (20–60 Hz) oscillation was proposed by Lisman and Idiart (1995). In this model a memory is represented by groups of neurons that fire in the same gamma cycle. According to this model, capacity is determined by the number of gamma cycles that occur within the slower theta cycle. We will discuss here the implications of recent reports on theta oscillations recorded in humans performing the Sternberg task. Assuming that the oscillatory memory models are correct, these findings can help determine STM capacity.

This commentary addresses three points. First, it is argued that the common coding principles, as developed in the target article, may supplement rather than replace stage views of human information processing. Second, the issue of the properties of an event code is briefly discussed. It is concluded that much remains to be specified so as to allow critical tests. Finally, the question of the limits of common coding is raised. It may be particularly relevant to direct perception and action coupling but less useful for the analysis of cognitive skills.

Although we agree with Hommel et al. that perception and action refer to one another, we disagree that they do so via a code. Gibson (1966; 1979) attempted to frame perception-action as a field phenomenon rather than as a particle phenomenon. From such a perspective, perception and action are adjoint, mutually interacting through an information field, and codes are unnecessary.

What aspects of the data from studies of acquired category- specific impairments are relevant to theories of knowledge representation? Discussion in the target article focuses on the living/nonliving dichotomy. However, many case studies reveal considerably more complex patterns of impaired and preserved performance that undermine this distinction. We consider this evidence and discuss its implications for theories of knowledge representation.

Despite the ontogenetic allometric size effects that explain much of phyletic variation in brain components, the residuals of some structures indicates that mosaic brain evolution was an important factor in hominid evolution, and that reorganization of the hominid brain may have occurred as early as 3+ MY. Finlay et al.'s allometric technique masks residual variation around allometric trends, and the patterns of residuals relevant to species-specific departures from strict allometric trends.

The theoretical framework of Bloom's account of child word learning is here assessed only for initial plausibility and neural plausibility. The verdict on both dimensions is low, largely due to the size and character of knowledge it is claimed that the child brings to the task. It is suggested that elements of constructivist accounts could profitably be drawn from to reduce this implausibility.

Cowan's concept of a pure short-term memory (STM) capacity limit is equivalent to that of memory subitizing. However, a robust phenomenon well known in the Sternberg paradigm, that is, the linear increase of RT as a function of memory set size is not consistent with this concept. Cowan's STM capacity theory will remain incomplete until it can account for this phenomenon.

Having seen the development of Shepard's program at close hand, I have been inspired by the sophistication of his results. However, his program deals with only half of what is needed: Shepard's research tells what the perception/cognitive process is about, it does not tell how that process is implemented. True, Shepard has recourse to the “how” of process in evolution, but that is not the “how” of everyday implementation. For that we need to know the brain processes with which we can implement Shepard's insights. [Shepard]

At first, Bloom's theory appears inimical to empiricism, since he credits very young children with highly sophisticated cognitive resources (e.g., a theory of mind and a belief that real kinds have essences), and he also attacks the empiricist's favoured learning theory, namely, associationism. We suggest that, on the contrary, the empiricist can embrace much of what Bloom says.

One of our recent studies has revealed that a numerically trained chimpanzee can memorize a correct sequence of five numbers shown on a monitor. Comparative investigations with humans show very similar patterns of errors in the two species, suggesting humans and chimpanzee share homologous memory processes. Whether or not 5 is a pure capacity limit for the chimpanzee remains an empirical question.

The HIT model explains the existence of semantic category-specific deficits by assuming that sensory knowledge is crucially important in processing living things, while functional knowledge is crucially important in processing nonliving things – the sensory/functional assumption. Here we argue that the sensory/functional assumption as implemented in HIT is neither theoretically nor empirically grounded and that, in any case, there is neuropsychological evidence which invalidates this assumption, thereby undermining the HIT model as a whole.

We share the authors' general approach to the study of perception and action, but rather than singling out a particular level of “late perceptual” and “early motor” processing for sensorimotor interactions, we argue that these can arise at multiple levels during action preparation and execution. Recent data on action-perception transfer are used to illustrate this perspective.

Barlow's concept of the exploitation of environmental statistical regularities may be more plausibly related to brain mechanisms than Shepard's notion of internalisation. In our view, Barlow endorses a bottom-up approach to neural coding and processing, whereas we suggest that feedback interactions in the visual system, as well as chaotic correlation dynamics in the brain, are crucial in exploiting and assimilating environmental regularities. We also discuss the “conceptual tension” between Shepard's ideas of law internalisation and evolutionary adaptation. [Barlow; Shepard]

Finlay et al. describe a method of examining brain evolution, but it has limits that may hinder extrapolation to all vertebrate taxa or the understanding of how brains work. For example, members of different orders have brain and behavioral organization that are fundamentally different. Future investigations should incorporate a phylogenetic approach and more attention to behavior to further test their conclusions.