As part of my interest in the persistence of unproductive debates about the relative importance of nature and nurture, I focus here on the especially problematic relation between nature and the natural. For if the definition of nature is problematic, its semantic relation to ‘natural’ is even more so. I explore some of the problems that arise from slippage between substantive and normative conceptions of ‘natural’ (inviting collateral slippage between is and ought), from the bifurcatory structure of its negation and from changing assumptions about nature’s domain.

Regulatory activities are intended to safeguard the health of citizens by ensuring that new drug therapies meet the highest standards of safety, efficacy and quality. Recent initiatives emphasize streamlining and speeding up approval, and are intent on harmonizing standards for international competitive advantage. In Canada and the United Kingdom, a second order of evaluation is necessary in order to have the costs of a federally licensed drug covered under provincial or state health insurance programmes resulting in wider patient access to potentially cost-prohibitive products. While new therapies can get approved by federal regulatory scientists based upon acceptable evidence from data meeting the standards of safety, quality and efficacy, the determination of the formulary committees, such as the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), or the Canadian Common Drug Review (CDR), take into consideration the economic costs and benefits of the therapeutic agent. This analysis considers the technical-political-social-moral positions taken by various actors involved in legitimizing and contesting the effectiveness of cholinesterase inhibitors (ChEIs) for treating people with Alzheimer’s disease. It examines ambiguities in the ‘norms of appropriateness and legitimacy’ of clinician researchers, and the construction and legitimization of what is appropriate in clinical research and regulatory practices.

This article analyses the role of the pharmaceutical and medical device industries (‘pharma’) in the construction of scientific and medical knowledge. Pharma's activities are part of the broader dispositif of institutions, enterprises, regulations and constituencies within which medical-scientific knowledge is generated, but pharma's contributions exhibit a specific character reflecting commercial pressures. As drug development proceeds, research and marketing activities coalesce around ‘product canons’ that integrate scientific truth-claims and commercial positioning, generating knowledge with implicit commercial functionality. From this platform, pharma stamps consensus-building ‘narratives’ into medical-scientific discourse, in which ‘problems’ arise and are ‘solved’ by drugs. Concurrently, pharma modulates the structure of discourse and the social networks through which discourse proceeds. Implicit within these activities is a meta-science whose goal is to understand and technologize the operation of science to an external end. This mode of knowledge production can be viewed as a normative transformation of Kuhnian normal science, characterized by the attachment (and at times subordination) of paradigmatic tenets to extrinsic goals; exaggerated control of belief, research and consensus formation; and a capacity for infringement of traditional norms of scientific truthfulness. An International Standard of Integrity in Science would strengthen pharma's contributions to medical and scientific knowledge.

This article challenges the idea that there could be a convincing secular version of the principle that human life is sacred, and explores the significance this has for the law. A number of secular justifications for the claim that there is something intrinsically, as opposed to instrumentally, valuable about human life have been mooted, most eloquently by Ronald Dworkin. While secular explanations for the sanctity of human life are undeniably attractive, this article will maintain that they do not have logic on their side. Having argued that the ‘sanctity principle’ makes sense only as an article of religious faith, the implications this has for the law are explored. In relation to end-of-life decision-making, the sanctity principle has been invoked to justify a sharp line between deliberately ending life and failing to prolong it. This article will conclude by arguing that a rejection of the sanctity principle might, in certain circumstances, cause us to focus instead on the extent to which death harms someone.

In the article we report on the findings of an EU-funded research project, Paganini (Participatory Governance and Institutional Innovation), that investigated the question of whether ‘politics of life’ themes have led to the emergence of new forms of governance in Europe. The focus of our research was on human embryonic stem cell research, genetic testing, GM crops, and BSE in the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and on the EU level—hotly contested topics at the intersection of society, politics, nature and the human body. We argue that, in the domain of life-political issues, the notions of participation and governance have become intermingled to an unusual extent. Our case studies demonstrate that the concept of participation needs to be rethought. While ‘spontaneous’ public participation certainly still is a political fact, increasingly participation has turned into a ‘technology’ that is based on the construction of publics. Different participatory technologies are linked to a changing landscape of political subjects considered relevant to the debate. As the case studies have shown, the design of any formal participatory arrangement involves a considerable amount of ‘engineering’, including arrangements seeking to invite a ‘representative’, disinterested, ‘pure’ public. There is no such thing as ‘the public’ waiting for pure representation. Formal participatory arrangements are inevitably based on a process of active construction, involving goal setting, selection, decision making and prioritization, including the decision to prioritize the pure public at the expense of engaged publics. What seems to be occurring today is that ‘old’ definitions of social order no longer hold and various groups try to impose new (partial) definitions of a new order on others. A new, postmodernist logic seems to be spinning new relations among citizens/consumers and scientists and administrators. Thus, there is no single New Way of governing Europe.

In this article I address the interactions between biological knowledge and ideas about the kinds of entity that are suited to appropriation. I start by arguing that commodification and reductionism are closely linked, and that patenting suits entities that are discrete and isolable, such as those that are the focus of molecular biology. I then turn to the new field of systems biology, which recognizes that traditional reductionist approaches to biology are no longer adequate and attempts to provide a more integrative understanding of biological systems. In doing this, systems biology has to deal with emergent phenomena. But patenting does not suit the dynamic and interactive complexity that is the object of study in systems biology. If systems biology rejects reductionism where does that leave commodification? I examine attempts to commodify predictive computational models in systems biology. I then turn to systems biology's sister discipline, synthetic biology, which deals with emergence by reducing the complexity of biological systems. By factoring out messy contingencies, synthetic biology is, in theory, well suited to commodification. Drawing on both these examples I explore how ideas about appropriation, including open source, are influencing the nature and course of research in biology.

In China ideology has played an important role in the research and teaching of the biological sciences since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After the 1978 reforms, it was recognized that the discontinuation of political interference with the sciences was essential for their survival and development. However, not much later, when the fields of genetics and molecular biology became redefined as life sciences, internationally, bioethical regulation became an essential element of research regulation. The evolution of medical textbooks in the PRC reflects this. Using the cases of human cloning and human embryonic stem cell research, this article shows how science regulation incorporates cultural and political ideologies. These, on the one hand, form a continuation of modes of state propaganda and, on the other hand, embody newly formulated notions of Chinese society. This article provides a historical background of the role of ideology during the first decades of the PRC, after which it discusses the evolution of bioethical discussion of human cloning and human embryonic stem cell research in 17 medical textbooks over nine years (1996–2005). It concludes with a discussion on the changing role of ideology in bioethical policy-making for the life sciences.

Post-genomic research relies on blood samples and health information from great numbers of individuals as well as on access to medical records. Studies of collecting and banking bio-resources have increasingly focused on the policy and commodification issues that arise when human DNA enters the information economy. Yet, what has been given much less attention is the process through which citizens are recruited to contribute to post-genomic research. This article analyses practices of recruiting psychiatric patients to a pharmacogenomic research centre in Denmark. It argues that recruitment activities may be conceived as interpellation practices that ‘hail’ individual patients and ask them to place themselves in relationships to other citizens and state institutions by giving researchers access to blood samples, medical records and sensitive life-and-illness information. The interpellation practices studied demonstrate a tension between techniques that operate through distance (sending out letters with information and consent forms) and techniques that operate through presence (making phone calls to patients). These techniques are not simply seen as contrasting ethical conducts, but as complementary and coexisting ways of constituting spatial and social state–citizen relationships.

Herbal medicine has long been contrasted to modern medicine in terms of a holistic approach to healing, vitalistic theories of health and illness, and an emphasis on the body’s innate self-healing capacities. At the same time, since the early twentieth century, the cultivation, preparation and mass production of herbal medicines have become increasingly industrialized, scientificized and commercialized. What is more, phytochemical efforts to identify and isolate particular ‘active ingredients’ from whole-plant extracts have intensified, often in response to increasing regulatory scrutiny of the safety and quality of herbal medicinal products. In this article, I examine whether describing these developments in terms of a biomedical ‘colonization’ of herbal medicine, as has been common, allows us to sufficiently account for the mundane collaborative efforts of herbalists, botanists, phytochemists, pharmacologists, toxicologists and clinicians to standardize and develop certain herbal remedies. By focusing on recent efforts to industrialize and scientifically develop a ‘Western’ (St John’s Wort) and a Vietnamese (Heantos) herbal remedy, I suggest that herbal medicine has come to be not so much colonized as normalized, with herbalists, phytochemists and pharmacologists working to develop standardized production procedures, as well as to identify ‘plausible’ explanations for the efficacy of these remedies.

M.H. Pappworth's 1967 book, Human guinea pigs, was a major catalyst for change in the ethics and regulation of human research in the 1970s. Many of Pappworth's ethical concerns about the threats posed to human subjects are still valid today, yet the source of those threats has shifted from universities to industry sponsors.

Many factors, including the increasing commercialization of biomedicine, have caused medical practice to be increasingly divorced from the practice of caregiving. In this article, the authors argue that the two must be reunited in multiple ways if we are to have a just and compassionate healthcare and medical practice.

‘Molecular biology’ emerged in the first half of the twentieth century as a fundamentally novel type of biology. Its coming into being was by no means simply a linear continuation of classical genetics, the biological Leitwissenschaft of the time, and it took much more than new methods and technologies for the new discipline to arise. In this article I outline the development of molecular biology—from its beginnings to its zenith and dissolution as a discipline in its own right—in its historical context and from an epistemological perspective.

Currently influential accounts of research use of human tissue depict biomedical science as operating in opposition to the norms and values of ‘the public’. Using historical analysis and empirical data from a qualitative study of 79 family members of a child with cancer, this article challenges such accounts of ‘the public’. Families of a child with cancer generally reported that they considered themselves to be members of a community united by a sense of common purpose, in which values and interests are shared and members of the community are to be trusted. The value of tissue for patients and families lay not so much in the way it embodied some essence of the self, as in the way it embedded them within the childhood cancer community. Historical analysis demonstrates that science and its broader ‘public’ are interdependent, mutually constitutive components of a culture, interacting and exchanging rhetoric and imagery relating to research and research materials, as well as the material itself. Rather than separate social worlds of ‘bioscience’ and ‘the public’, our evidence suggests that the childhood cancer community, in respect of the area of tissue banking for research, is much better conceived of as a hybrid. Understanding ‘the public’ and ‘science’ as a multiplicities helps clarify the existence of often competing views of tissue use.

This article draws on ethnographic research conducted at a number of brain imaging sites to examine investigations into emotion, and specifically the experience of pleasure. Using a small set of healthy volunteers, the experiments are designed to observe reactions in the brain when people are subjected to carefully chosen stimuli. But as these studies shift from structural to functional aspects, the imperative to establish a material basis for complex abstract experiences is compelling the scientists to revise previous descriptions of the brain. In order to generate a single model that can satisfactorily associate the experimental stimuli with observed responses, intricate interactions relating to both time and space have to be disentangled and reorganized into a singular linear narrative. As a result, only those elements that can be localized and delimited emerge as components of the pathways and maps used to represent the experience. Wider issues, such as the social context of the experiment, the meaning of the experience for the volunteer, or acknowledgement that different things might be happening at the same time, cannot be reconciled with this process. Consequently, the final neuroscientific accounts inevitably ignore or circumvent aspects that cannot be described in a very particular way.