Euclidean geometry, as presented by Euclid, consists of straightedge-and-compass constructions and rigorous reasoning about the results of those constructions. We show that Euclidean geometry can be developed using only intuitionistic logic. This involves finding “uniform” constructions where normally a case distinction is used. For example, in finding a perpendicular to line L through point p, one usually uses two different constructions, “erecting” a perpendicular when p is on L, and “dropping” a perpendicular when p is not on L, but in constructive geometry, it must be done without a case distinction. Classically, the models of Euclidean (straightedge-and-compass) geometry are planes over Euclidean fields. We prove a similar theorem for constructive Euclidean geometry, by showing how to define addition and multiplication without a case distinction about the sign of the arguments. With intuitionistic logic, there are two possible definitions of Euclidean fields, which turn out to correspond to different versions of the parallel postulate.

We consider three versions of Euclid’s parallel postulate. The two most important are Euclid’s own formulation in his Postulate 5, which says that under certain conditions two lines meet, and Playfair’s axiom (dating from 1795), which says there cannot be two distinct parallels to line L through the same point p. These differ in that Euclid 5 makes an existence assertion, while Playfair’s axiom does not. The third variant, which we call the strong parallel postulate, isolates the existence assertion from the geometry: it amounts to Playfair’s axiom plus the principle that two distinct lines that are not parallel do intersect. The first main result of this paper is that Euclid 5 suffices to define coordinates, addition, multiplication, and square roots geometrically.

We completely settle the questions about implications between the three versions of the parallel postulate. The strong parallel postulate easily implies Euclid 5, and Euclid 5 also implies the strong parallel postulate, as a corollary of coordinatization and definability of arithmetic. We show that Playfair does not imply Euclid 5, and we also give some other independence results. Our independence proofs are given without discussing the exact choice of the other axioms of geometry; all we need is that one can interpret the geometric axioms in Euclidean field theory. The independence proofs use Kripke models of Euclidean field theories based on carefully constructed rings of real-valued functions. “Field elements” in these models are real-valued functions.

We study algorithmic randomness notions via effective versions of almost-everywhere theorems from analysis and ergodic theory. The effectivization is in terms of objects described by a computably enumerable set, such as lower semicomputable functions. The corresponding randomness notions are slightly stronger than Martin–Löf (ML) randomness.

We establish several equivalences. Given a ML-random real z, the additional randomness strengths needed for the following are equivalent.

1. (1) all effectively closed classes containing z have density 1 at z.

2. (2) all nondecreasing functions with uniformly left-c.e. increments are differentiable at z.

3. (3) z is a Lebesgue point of each lower semicomputable integrable function.

We also consider convergence of left-c.e. martingales, and convergence in the sense of Birkhoff’s pointwise ergodic theorem. Lastly, we study randomness notions related to density of ${\rm{\Pi }}_n^0$ and ${\rm{\Sigma }}_1^1$ classes at a real.

A computability structure on a metric space is a set of sequences which satisfy certain conditions. Of a particular interest are those computability structures which contain a dense sequence, so called separable computability structures. In this paper we observe maximal computability structures which are more general than separable computability structures and we examine their properties. In particular, we examine maximal computability structures on subspaces of Euclidean space, we give their characterization and we investigate conditions under which a maximal computability structure on such a space is unique. We also give a characterization of separable computability structures on a segment.

Ramsey’s theorem states that for any coloring of the n-element subsets of ℕ with finitely many colors, there is an infinite set H such that all n-element subsets of H have the same color. The strength of consequences of Ramsey’s theorem has been extensively studied in reverse mathematics and under various reducibilities, namely, computable reducibility and uniform reducibility. Our understanding of the combinatorics of Ramsey’s theorem and its consequences has been greatly improved over the past decades. In this paper, we state some questions which naturally arose during this study. The inability to answer those questions reveals some gaps in our understanding of the combinatorics of Ramsey’s theorem.

We introduce a way of relativizing operational set theory that also takes care of application. After presenting the basic approach and proving some essential properties of this new form of relativization we turn to the notion of relativized regularity and to the system OST (LR) that extends OST by a limit axiom claiming that any set is element of a relativized regular set. Finally we show that OST (LR) is proof-theoretically equivalent to the well-known theory KPi for a recursively inaccessible universe.

This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled “Gödel’s natural deduction,” which presented and made comments about the natural deduction system in Gödel’s unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave at the University of Notre Dame in 1939. In that earlier paper, which was itself a companion to a paper that examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to Gödel and general proof theory, one can find a brief summary of Gödel’s notes for the Notre Dame course. In order to put the earlier paper in proper perspective, a more complete summary of these interesting notes, with comments concerning them, is given here.

Frege’s theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume’s Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume’s Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege’s Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence relations in a weak background second-order logic. We show that this predicative Fregean theory interprets second-order Peano arithmetic (cf. Theorem 3.2).

We establish, generalizing Di Nola and Lettieri’s categorical equivalence, a Morita-equivalence between the theory of lattice-ordered abelian groups and that of perfect MV-algebras. Further, after observing that the two theories are not bi-interpretable in the classical sense, we identify, by considering appropriate topos-theoretic invariants on their common classifying topos, three levels of bi-interpretability holding for particular classes of formulas: irreducible formulas, geometric sentences, and imaginaries. Lastly, by investigating the classifying topos of the theory of perfect MV-algebras, we obtain various results on its syntax and semantics also in relation to the cartesian theory of the variety generated by Chang’s MV-algebra, including a concrete representation for the finitely presentable models of the latter theory as finite products of finitely presentable perfect MV-algebras. Among the results established on the way, we mention a Morita-equivalence between the theory of lattice-ordered abelian groups and that of cancellative lattice-ordered abelian monoids with bottom element.

In his early Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics (1810) Bernard Bolzano tries to characterize rigorous proofs (strenge Beweise). Rigorous is, prima facie, any proof that indicates the grounds for its conclusion. Bolzano lists a number of methodological constraints all rigorous proofs should comply with, and tests them systematically against a specific collection of elementary inference schemata that, according to him, are evidently of ground-consequence-kind. This paper intends to give a detailed and critical account of the fragmentary logic of the Contributions, and to point out as well some difficulties Bolzano’s attempt runs into, notably as to his methodological ban on ‘kind crossing’.

Hypersequent calculus (HC), developed by A. Avron, is one of the most interesting proof systems suitable for nonclassical logics. Although HC has rather simple form, it increases significantly the expressive power of standard sequent calculi (SC). In particular, HC proved to be very useful in the field of proof theory of various nonclassical logics. It may seem surprising that it was not applied to temporal logics so far. In what follows, we discuss different approaches to formalization of logics of linear frames and provide a cut-free HC formalization of Kt4.3, the minimal temporal logic of linear frames, and some of its extensions. The novelty of our approach is that hypersequents are defined not as finite (multi)sets but as finite lists of ordinary sequents. Such a solution allows both linearity of time flow, and symmetry of past and future, to be incorporated by means of six temporal rules (three for future-necessity and three dual rules for past-necessity). Extensions of the basic calculus with simple structural rules cover logics of serial and dense frames. Completeness is proved by Schütte/Hintikka-style argument using models built from saturated hypersequents.

The isomorphism invariance criterion of logical nature has much to commend it. It can be philosophically motivated by the thought that logic is distinctively general or topic neutral. It is capable of precise set-theoretic formulation. And it delivers an extension of ‘logical constant’ which respects the intuitively clear cases. Despite its attractions, the criterion has recently come under attack. Critics such as Feferman, MacFarlane and Bonnay argue that the criterion overgenerates by incorrectly judging mathematical notions as logical. We consider five possible precisifications of the overgeneration argument and find them all unconvincing.

This paper surveys the interactions between Russell and Gödel, both personal and intellectual. After a description of Russell’s influence on Gödel, it concludes with a discussion of Russell’s reaction to the incompleteness theorems.

The Connes Embedding Problem (CEP) asks whether every separable II1 factor embeds into an ultrapower of the hyperfinite II1 factor. We show that the CEP is equivalent to the statement that every type II1 tracial von Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory.

A set of infinite binary sequences ${\cal C} \subseteq 2$ℕ is negligible if there is no partial probabilistic algorithm that produces an element of this set with positive probability. The study of negligibility is of particular interest in the context of ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0 $ classes. In this paper, we introduce the notion of depth for ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0 $ classes, which is a stronger form of negligibility. Whereas a negligible ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0 $ class ${\cal C}$ has the property that one cannot probabilistically compute a member of ${\cal C}$ with positive probability, a deep ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0 $ class ${\cal C}$ has the property that one cannot probabilistically compute an initial segment of a member of ${\cal C}$ with high probability. That is, the probability of computing a length n initial segment of a deep ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0 $ class converges to 0 effectively in n.

We prove a number of basic results about depth, negligibility, and a variant of negligibility that we call tt-negligibility. We provide a number of examples of deep ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^0 $ classes that occur naturally in computability theory and algorithmic randomness. We also study deep classes in the context of mass problems, examine the relationship between deep classes and certain lowness notions in algorithmic randomness, and establish a relationship between members of deep classes and the amount of mutual information with Chaitin’s Ω.