I begin by recounting the market demands that created an opportunity for me to teach business ethics in the College of Business at St. Cloud State University. The AACSB and my educational institution focused amorphous social demands for better business practices into a specific demand for a philosophy Ph.D. to teach business ethics. I felt frustrated teaching business ethics because of my inexperience and the eclectic nature of the field. I, and many others, searched for something to unify the many topics of the field. This search was one of the factors that led to BEQ’s appearance in 1991. The first issue marked a milestone in the continuing search for theory and the legitimization of the field. It focused previous discussions and was remarkably prescient. While it is unlikely that we will reach a consensus about how to understand the field, if consensus ever comes close to occurring, I argue that it will not coalesce over stakeholder theory. I examine two theories that could be used as a grand unified theory (GUT) of business ethics: Integrated Social Contracts Theory and my own institutional theory that expands on the work of Douglass North’s view of economic institutions. I use the discussion of these GUTs to develop criteria of what a successful GUT might look like. Based on these criteria, I argue that the institutional theory has a better chance of succeeding, but recognize that business ethics GUTs are primarily heuristic; many different types of theories can be helpful. Lastly, I discuss whether it is pretentious and overbearing to argue for a GUT. I argue that it need not be.

This paper examines economic arguments employers sometimes use to justify restricting or excluding from employment those workers who are likely to incur high costs in health care insurance. We argue that, although profit-making is a legitimate goal for businesses, hiring practices based on non-job-related criteria violate principles of self determination, autonomy, discrimination, justice, and privacy. We conclude that hiring practices based on liability-driven ethics are not morally justified, but that as long as health care insurance and employment are linked, businesses will continue to have an incentive to use liability-driven arguments.

This article reviews and criticizes Joseph Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics. Our criticism is organized into three sections. First, we argue that, even under the ideal assumptions of perfect competition, when markets generate Pareto-efficient distributions, Heath’s approach does not rule out significant harms. Second, we show that, under nonideal conditions, the MFA is either too demanding, if efficiency is to be attained, or not sufficiently demanding, if the goal of Pareto efficiency is abandoned. Finally, we argue that Heath’s appeal to regulations and specific moral requirements as a remedy for market failures is unlikely to safeguard efficiency and exposes a number of general worries regarding the moral force of the MFA. We end this article with a constructive suggestion on how to adjust the MFA to avoid these problems while preserving its contractualist and Paretian spirit.