This paper explores the origins of the Silicon Valley model for regional economic development, and attempts to deploy this model elsewhere in the United States and abroad. Frederick Terman, Stanford's provost, first envisioned its unique partnership of academia and industry, and trained the first generation of students who effected it. He patiently cultivated an aggressively entrepreneurial culture in what he called “the newly emerging community of technical scholars.” Beginning in the 1960s, business groups elsewhere set out to build their own versions of Silicon Valley, some enlisting the assistance of Terman and his proteges. After discussing the emergence of the Stanford-Silicon Valley effort, the paper examines in detail the New Jersey Institute of Science and Technology, an effort led by Bell Laboratories; the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest and the SMU Foundaton for Science and Engineering in Dallas, Texas; and the Korea Advanced Insitute of Science and Technology, Terman's last and arguably most successful attempt. The paper discusses the reasons for the difficulties in creating new versions, and suggests explanations for the apparent success of the Korean experiment.

There is, on an average, annually wrecked upon the Florida coast, about fifty vessels…. The great destruction of property consequent upon this state of things, and the hope of gain, have induced a settlement at Key West, where, to adjudicate upon the wrecked property, a court of admiralty has been established. A large number of vessels, from 20 to 30, are annually engaged as wreckers, lying about this coast to “help the unfortunate,” and to help themselves. These vessels are in many instances owned in whole or in part by the merchants of Key West; the same merchant frequently acts in quadruple capacity of owner of die wrecker, agent for the wreckers, consignee of the captain, and agent for the underwriters. Whose business he transacts with most assiduity, his own, or that of others, may be readily inferred.

—“Wrecks, Wrecking, and Wreckees, on Florida Reef,” Hunt's Merchants' Magazine 6 (1842): 349.

The French inter-war steel cartels were characterized by contemporaries as powerful trusts, restricting output and raising steel prices. The cartels were cited as a cause for the length of the French depression, the low productivity of the 1930s, and the rapid rise in steel prices after 1936. This paper shows that the formation and development of the French steel cartels was problematic and argues that the French industry was not structurally conducive to widespread collusion and was further harmed by governmental policies. Steel cartels were unable to police their arrangements effectively among members and were unable to stop outsiders from undercutting prices. It is not at all clear that firms in the cartel achieved higher profits. The increase in prices that did occur after 1936 was not due to firms colluding and profiting from the increased demand for steel due to the anticipation of Nazi aggression; rather, these price increases occurred because of input price increases caused by government action that raised the costs of production.

During the time period from 1870–1930, economic, social, demographic and educational forces interacted with the separation of accounting from bookkeeping. The result of this interaction was the changing genderization of the bookkeeping workforce. This paper suggests that this change process cannot be fully understood until both environmental forces and the emergence of accounting from bookkeeping are considered. Evidence of this interaction comes from Census data as well as historical documents.