In the following essay, Dr. Schröter examines a specific case, German multinational activity in Scandinavia between the wars, and uses that information to raise more general questions about the nature of multinational enterprise. Before 1914, patterns of German foreign direct investment resembled those of the nation's competitors. After the First World War, however, having lost almost all their overseas holdings and suffering from a severe shortage of capital, German industries tried to replace foreign direct investment with other financial tools, principally cartels and long–term contracts. Using extensive German archival materials, Dr. Schröter describes the forces motivating these businesses.

Whatever economic growth and development took place in nineteenth-century China, it was by no means an expansion highlighted by a commercial and industrial revolution comparable to that which occurred in Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. While many factors accounted for these alternative paths of change, one element was clearly the differing organization of business enterprise. In this essay, Professor Chan examines the organizational structure of the traditional Chinese firm during the nineteenth century. Then he presents two case studies, one of which illustrates how an enterprise developed an innovative strategy of growth based upon traditional Chinese methods, and a second that illustrates how a company wedded western managerial practices to the Chinese model with spectacular results. While it would be dangerous to generalize about the entire Chinese managerial experience from such a limited number of firms, their successful, though divergent paths of development do indeed suggest the role that traditional Chinese organizational methods had in stifling modern development as well as the influence that western practices and techniques would have on China's growth in the early to middle years of the twentieth century.

The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.

American frozen foods were originally considered a luxury product; the industry did not develop a mass market until the late 1940s. Only a few years after achieving mass-market sales, however, frozen-food producers tried to segment the market in order to increase profits. This change was partly the result of internal factors, such as technological developments and interfirm competition. The new marketing strategy also hinged on industry executives' shifting conception of the ideal consumer. Frozen-food marketers of the early 1950s envisioned themselves as providing the good life at a low cost to “average” Americans. When profits slowed in the late 1950s, they designed a variety of new products for groups according to their race, age, and class.

In detailing the business practices of an important 19th-century retailer, Mr. Resseguie contributes new material to the history of marketing.

This article examines some major aspects of the history of the state-owned, privately operated German National Railway Company under the reparations regime of 1924 to 1932. It explores the dispute that erupted between the Reichsbahn and the government concerning whether the DRG should be used primarily to serve national economic and social ends or to earn a surplus to pay reparations. The controversies that erupted concerning tariffs, motor vehicle competition, and wages are examined against the background of the Reichsbahn's financial performance. The article argues that the political and cultural clashes caused by the introduction of Western management priorities and practices were more significant than the financial burdens that reparations imposed on the Reichsbahn.

Following some general remarks on the impact of financialization on nonfinancial sectors of the economy, this article identifies common misconceptions about the German and American varieties of capitalism. It then outlines the post-1960 U.S. experience with financialization, including the reasons for the rise of financialization and its main consequences. The article will then look at Germany, a country with a very different entry point into the world of financialization, and ask when and to what degree the concept was adopted. Finally, a detailed case study of Siemens—one of Germany's largest industrial concerns—will explore how this icon of Germany Inc. adapted to the demands of financialization and coped with the external changes caused by globalization, deregulation, and digitalization.

Business Cycles was Joseph Schumpeter's least successful book, measured by its professed aims and several other yardsticks. Yet the book has two vital aspects that have largely been overlooked. First, the prodigious research that went into its writing caused a significant change in Schumpeter's thinking about capitalism. It moved him to a more historical and empirical approach that shaped nearly all his subsequent work. And second, much of the book constitutes a preview of modern, rigorous business history. This article explores both of these elements—not in the spirit of rescuing a neglected classic, because the book is not a classic. Instead, Business Cycles is a noble failure that paid unexpected dividends both to the author and to scholarship.

The unique features of ownership patterns in the early New England textile industry have long been recognized. Hitherto it has been the interlocking or horizontal relationships that have been studied. This article deals, instead, with the vertical pattern — describing ownership in terms of occupational groupings of all the investors rather than the kinship of the dominant owners. Conclusions are drawn in respect to such important points as the principal sources of textile capital, the rate of mercantile capital reinvestment in manufacturing, the relationship between investment and industry integration, and the increasing importance of nonbusiness and institutional vested interests.

The company union movement in the United States during the 1920s cannot be understood entirely in terms of employers' efforts either to block independent unionization or to foster greater worker loyalty through the paternalistic provisions of “welfare capitalism.” Company unions were institutional mechanisms by which workers voiced their concerns about shopfloor conditions to employers instead of exiting the firm. Evidence suggests that company unions led to both enhanced shopfloor productivity and safety, and were thus mutually beneficial for labor and management. Interestingly, however, the process by which they emerged was filled with conflict, historical contingency, and unintended consequences. Company unions were neither an inevitable nor even an intentional replacement for voluntary quits as a mechanism for addressing workers' shopfloor discontent.

Generalizations are always difficult, especially in the context of varied national experiences. But by looking at the evolution of oil company activity in the 1920s in South America and by examining the range of relevant business functions — marketing, refining, production, exploration, transportation — the author throws light on the development of business-government relations in that part of the world, where the hostility of host nations to multinational enterprises was to grow so strong.

Dynastic family businesses pursue a double aim. They strive for economic success and attempt to shield the family's longterm influence against outsiders. As a consequence, their choice of governance reflects an idiosyncratic balance between remaining independent and tapping into the opportunities of the market. Autonomy-oriented “closed” governance can lead to problems in integrating external capital and knowledge. More market-oriented “open” governance can make a firm more vulnerable to outside influence. German family firms have struck a balance between the two models since the mid-nineteenth century. Their choice of governance is a response to the challenges and opportunities of the environment, and at various times they are influenced by corporate law, alternative finance options, and inheritance law.

A great deal of attention has recently been focused on the extent of Japanese direct investment in the United States. In the following historical survey, Professor Wilkins details the size and scope of these investments from the late nineteenth century, showing that Japanese involvements in America have deep historical roots. At the same time, she analyzes the ways in which late twentieth century Japanese direct investment differs from the earlier phenomenon and attempts to explain why it has aroused such concern among both business leaders and the general public.

Although the American contribution to business education is well-known, that of other nations has been largely overlooked. In this article, Professor Locke reviews the very different history of business education in Germany, which he traces from its early twentieth-century origins to the present. He concludes that, while the German model no longer has the international reputation it did before World War II, it continues to promote solid economic growth.

Contrasting with the resentment of other power structures, especially corporate business, that democratic governments display is the obvious need of the powerful and the productive for each other in times of stress. Professor McQuaid follows the activities of a group of “corporate liberals” (i.e., big business leaders who believed that intelligent collaboration between business, government, and organized labor was an attainable goal) from World War I through the prosperous 1920s, the despondent 1930s, and the busy and prosperous years of World War II. He concludes that corporate liberal opinion grew more influential in both corporate and governmental circles during and after the period.

In this survey of the trajectory of Latin American business history, the focus is on its development over the course of the past twenty years, when the discipline began to be recognized as a field of specialization within historical studies. The first section is a consideration of the origins of business history in Latin America, from the 1960s to 1985. The second section, covering 1985 to the present, is an analysis of the institutionalization of Latin American business history as research expanded and practitioners in the field began to adopt a more professional approach to their work. In the third section, the focus is on the topics that have attracted the most attention during the previous two decades, identifying research trends that have transcended national differences as well as some notable traits of Latin American business. The last section, a consideration of how Latin America can contribute both to business history and to comparative studies, concludes with proposals for a new research agenda.

Because of a scarcity of economically informed and managerially experienced personnel within the government, a large share of American mobilization during World War I was planned and executed by businessmen in temporary federal service. By focusing on the crucial question of military procurement, Professor Koistinen illuminates the war's legacy for government-business relationships.

Trademarks have traditionally been viewed as assets that, although intangible, nevertheless contribute to the success of firms. This study, based on a compilation of national trademark data, corrects existing distortions of the historical role of brands and their—often unsuccessful—use as business tools by countries, sectors, or firms. Legislation on, and the profuse use of, trademarks in the Western world was pioneered by Spain, rather than by France, the United States, or the United Kingdom, and was initiated in unusual sectors, such as papermaking and textiles, rather than in the more usual ones of food and beverages. Analysis of the applicants of Catalan trademarks, across sectors, during almost a century, reveals that the legal possession of a brand cannot in itself guarantee a firm's success.

This article supplies a missing piece in the story of the growth of managerial technology—the development of discounted cash flow techniques for projecting the profitability of capital budgeting alternatives. The article traces the origins of these methods in the industrial sector to the early work of railroad locating engineers and describes the refinement of DCF practices by AT&T and chemical firms. It concludes with a discussion of the diffusion of this analytic tool through the interaction of practicing engineers, consultants, professional associations, and scholarly publications.

How do we measure Alfred Chandler's achievement? What forces shaped his vision? What is his place in the pantheon of historians and social scientists? Might he rank with sociologists such as Talcott Parsons or even Max Weber? Economists such as Kenneth Arrow or even Joseph Schumpeter? With political scientists such as Louis Hartz, Robert Dahl, and Seymour Martin Lipset? It's too early to make these kinds of judgments, but some answers are certainly possible about his place among historians.