By early 1933 President Roosevelt's advisors concluded that the United States Government would have to play a direct role in the Cuban economy. That nation, economically dependent upon the North American sugar market and politically dependent through the Platt amendment that gave the United States the right to intervene in its internal affairs, was economically prostrate and on the verge of civil war. The United States proceeded to abandon both the free trade and protectionist doctrines that had divided the President's advisors for a program that structurally integrated United States-Cuban trade and employed federal funds to support cooperative Cuban leaders. All of this, Professor Benjamin believes, foreshadowed the massive foreign trade and lending programs so common to American foreign policy after World War II.

The conventional distinctions between “practical” and “scientific” research and development can be misleading. The experience of Thomas Midgley, Jr., at the General Motors Corporation in the three decades before World War II, and especially his critical role in the development of “antiknock” gasoline additives, freon refrigerant, and synthetic rubber, illustrate this fact. Dr. Leslie demonstrates that the management of corporate research and development, especially as that management affects uniquely talented individuals whose interests do not necessarily reflect the immediate needs of the company as seen by management, is basic to success. To solve such problems as they arose, Charles F. Kettering, himself a sympathetic scientist as well as distinguished inventor, worked closely with chief executive Alfred P. Sloan, whose genius for solving managerial problems matched the scientific genius of the most brilliant men in the General Motors laboratories.

This article analyzes the investments in both manufacturing units and sales subsidiaries by German chemical companies in the United Kingdom prior to 1914. It extends the findings in the existing literature on the subject, as sales subsidiaries have not so far been investigated. In particular, the article focuses on the motives underlying these investments. By building sales subsidiaries, German companies hoped to improve their control over foreign distribution activities and to promote their own brand names. As for the creation of manufacturing outlets, the motives of the companies differed before and after the reform of the British patent law in 1907. Prior to patent law reform, branch plants were set up due to transport cost considerations, resource orientation, or the pursuit of monopoly. Further reasons included restrictions on the use of proprietary technology in the home country and capacity constraints in the home factory. It was only after 1907 that manufacturing units were established to safeguard the companies' British patents. Consequently, the traditionally held notion that it was solely the patent law of 1907 which sparked off German FDI in the British chemical industry needs to be modified.

The tangled purposes of national economic policy in the early decades of the twentieth century are highlighted in Professor Braisted's analysis of an episode which pledged officers and secrets of the U.S. Navy to the advancement of American business in the Far East.

One of the most durable stereotypes of recent American history is that of the 1920s as “a conservative Republican interlude between the progressive Democratic administrations of Wilson and Roosevelt.” An important feature of this stereotype is the “Mellon plan” for tax reform. Professor Murray demonstrates that there was remarkable unanimity among Republicans and Democrats on the policy issues addressed by the “Mellon plan,” and finds continuity, rather than contrast, between the tax plans of the Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge administrations. As Secretaries of the Treasury came and went between 1918 and 1921, staff assistants cultivated the plan which Mellon later adopted.

Professor Simonson casts the recent history of the American airframe industry against the Schumpeterian concept of “creative destruction” in this study of business response to technological change.

Chicago's traction king was a master of corruption and financial legerdemain, but his contempt for public opinion proved at last to be his undoing. Out of such flamboyant transgressions great reform movements grew, and the character of all big business operators was made suspect.

In the decades before World War II, U.S. antitrust law was anything but settled. Considerable pressure for antitrust revision came from the states. A perhaps unlikely leader, Edna Gleason, organized California's retail pharmacists and coordinated trade networks to monitor and enforce Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, a system of price-fixing, then known as “fair trade.” Progressive jurists, including Louis Brandeis and institutional economist E. R. A. Seligman, supported RPM as a protection to independent proprietors. The breakdown of legal and economic consensus regarding what constituted “unfair competition” allowed businesspeople to act as intermediaries between heterodox economic thought and contested antitrust law, ultimately tailoring federal policy to accommodate state regulations.

This article examines the historical emergence of the Middle East oil-pricing system. The collapse of the Gulf-plus system, combined with outstanding discoveries of new reservoirs across the Arabian Peninsula and Persia, awoke latent competitive forces within the oligopolistic oil industry. After World War II, business differences regarding vertical integration, market priorities, and global competition worsened existing fractures among the multinational oil companies generally referred to as “the seven sisters.” The conclusions underscore the role of the “fringe” companies Texaco, Standard of California–Chevron, and Gulf Oil in prompting new price equilibriums for Persian Gulf crude oil.

The “historical alternatives” approach calls for research into the role of national institutions and public policies in the resilience or decline of industrial districts. Policies in support of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were launched in various Western economies in the second half of the twentieth century. This article focuses on the paradigmatic Italian case and investigates the importance of government subsidies for SMEs on firms located in a southern and a northeastern district, between 1971 and 1991. This discussion deepens our understanding of the role of national policies in the reemergence of industrial districts in the decades of the Second Industrial Divide. It also indicates the importance of firms’ utilization of subsidies and their ecosystem as complementary to the policy's effectiveness.

This article analyzes the accounting treatment of sales and purchasing at the Fengshengtai Company (丰盛泰号), a salt trader from Shanxi Province. We find evidence of “dualled entry” bookkeeping in that all transactions were recorded twice. Crucially, each set of dualled entries was recorded in two distinct accounts. For example, cash transactions were recorded in a “cash flowing account” as well as a specialized flowing account. We thus argue that, in light of clues from other records, a system of indigenous Chinese double-entry bookkeeping may well have been developed at Fengshengtai and other Shanxi merchants. Our study is based on Fengshengtai's surviving account books, a collection of primary sources spanning 1854 to 1881, that have recently become available to scholars.

At the time these photographs originated in an unspecified location in late-nineteenth-century China, the Chinese had been cultivating tea (Camellia sinensis) and processing it for almost two millennia. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, after decades of false starts and ceaseless experimentation, British entrepreneurs in India and Ceylon and the Dutch in Java successfully initiated plantation cultivation, pioneered the mechanized processing of black tea, and launched vigorous advertising campaigns to foster corporate sales worldwide.

It has been widely held that the traveling salesman was a product of the railroad era. In the following paper, Professor Taylor shows that, at least in France, the commis voyageur played a role as early as the second half of the eighteenth century. These findings, important as they are for the history of marketing, pose new questions: Was France ahead of other countries in developing this form of sales organization? If France really led, did the other countries follow suit under French influence? Is it perhaps telling, for instance, that in Germany until late in the nineteenth century the Reisende was still called by its French name?

Diplomatic historians have frequently cast American foreign policy from 1890 to 1915 as handmaiden to the expansion of American enterprise in foreign markets, but the relationship between government and business was neither one-sided nor simple. Government officials had their own agenda of objectives for which they wanted business support, sometimes even trying to use specific firms as their agent. Business itself did not speak with a single voice — policies which one firm might find beneficial, another found detrimental. Moreover, business was only one among various interest groups competing for attention and influence in the policymaking process. This case study of International Harvester's efforts to gain government assistance for the development of a Russian branch factory uncovers these intertwined threads of intersecting and conflicting objectives and interest groups, revealing the tangled complexity of business-government relations in this turbulent era.

National divergencies in economic development produce variant national patterns of business organization. But the reverse is also true. In France, the legal structuring of business has been a causative factor of some importance, imparting a distinctive character to the timing and nature of French economic growth. At the same time, however, the history of organizational evolution in France has a certain universality. Here, as elsewhere, such evolution essentially has taken the form of a series of compromises between the need for greater corporate flexibility and the fear of abuse. From 1673, when the unlimited liability of partners was affirmed, the pressures of economic expansion produced a succession of devices aimed at facilitating the flow of investment funds into commerce and industry. When, however, that point was finally reached where limited investor liability, freely negotiable shares, and recognition of a corporate autonomy had been achieved, fear of fraudulent practice became a dominant factor. Legislative steps to protect the investing public introduced rigidities into French business at the very time when internal growth and international competition for markets called for a highly adaptable business system.

Many entrepreneurs have contributed to the economic growth of the Far West, from the railroad builders of the nineteenth century to the modern day pioneers in Silicon Valley. In this article, Professor Foster focuses on the career of Henry J. Kaiser—an entrepreneur who was unquestionably one of the key figures in the modernization of the region. Though Foster does not slight the economic and political factors that made possible Kaiser's achievement he stresses that Kaiser's imagination, energy, and personal commitment were key elements in the maturation of the region's industrial economy.

The economics of the American aircraft manufacturing industry have been determined in large measure by government aviation policies and the market for military airplanes. This was most apparent in the 1920s, when the industry suffered from sharply reduced military orders and an almost nonexistent demand for civilian aircraft. Struggling for survival, manufacturers singled out the Naval Aircraft Factory, a large navy-owned and run facility in Philadelphia, as at least partially responsible for the dislocation of their industry; they insisted that it and other forms of “government competition” be eliminated. Professor Trimble explores in this article how the ensuing controversy caused naval and civilian officials in the 1920s to develop policies that integrated the factory into naval aircraft procurement and helped to ameliorate the problems of private aircraft contractors.

In this article Professor Walton examines the influence of bourgeois women on industrial production in nineteenth-century Paris. She argues that women, as arbiters of taste and consumers for the family, sought art and originality in manufactured goods, and that their demands in turn fostered handicraft and less skilled hand methods of manufacturing as the best means of providing such goods. By establishing the connections between women's roles and bourgeois demand, and between bourgeois demand and hand manufacturing, this study offers a new perspective on the persistence of hand production in France.