Reform spokesmen, believing that fundamental issues of social control were involved, hailed the refusal of the judiciary to intervene in the 1880's against state regulation of corporate power. The progressive triumph was short-lived. Reversing the earlier trend, the courts retreated into economic conservatism, but in so doing generated the fierce pressures that were later to explode into new outbursts of legal and social revolt.

As a notable instance of British investment in protectionist Meiji Japan, the history of the Takashima coal mine well illustrates the complications of foreign capital commitments in the Far East during the nineteenth century.

As Latin American businessmen assess their historical experience, how do they characterize their progress and future?

Present-day advocates of antitrust reform referred to as “New Brandeisians” have invoked history in pressing the case for change. The New Brandeisians bemoan the upending of a mid-twentieth-century “golden age” of antitrust by an intellectual movement known as the Chicago School. In fact, mid-twentieth-century enforcement of antitrust was uneven and large corporations exercised substantial market power. The Chicago School also was not as decisive an agent of change as the New Brandeisians suggest. Doubts about the efficacy of government regulation and concerns about foreign competition did much to foster the late twentieth-century counterrevolution that antitrust experienced.

The 1920s were important for the development of banking in the United States because new lending practices strongly favored credit expansion. Those innovations pertained to the measurement of credit risk and to new sales methods for banks. In particular, I describe the development of scientific credit analysis and so-called credit barometrics. Credit barometrics indicated credit worthiness based on statistical analysis and replaced old rules of thumb. These indicators were flawed and induced an erroneous belief in a future with rational and safe credit management. By studying the course of major New York banks as well as aggregate data, I show how the innovations in banking methods contributed to the credit boom that ended with the crash in 1929.

Historical accounts of the Internet's origins tend to emphasize U.S. government investment and university-based researchers. In contrast, this article introduces actors who have been overlooked: the entrepreneurs and private firms that developed standards, evaluated competing standards, educated consumers about the value of new products, and built products to sell. Start-up companies such as 3Com and Cisco Systems succeeded because they met rapidly rising demand from users, particularly those in large organizations, who were connecting computers into networks and networks into internetworks. We consider a relatively brief yet dynamic period, from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, when regulators attacked incumbent American firms, entrepreneurs flourished in new market niches, and engineers set industry standards for networking and internetworking. As a consequence, their combined efforts forged new processes and institutions for so-called open standards that, in turn, created the conditions favorable for the “network effects” that sustained the formative years of the digital economy.

This article explores the case of Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau (DWH)—a furniture and interior manufacturer founded in 1898—through state socialism after 1945 and reprivatization in the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that the firm's survival through multiple systemic disruptions was partly due to the preservation of a unique identity despite heavy institutional pressures for conformity. DWH adopted a “mixed conformity” strategy that attempted to pitch multiple concerns (cultural-aesthetic, ideological, economic) of political authorities against one another to buffer sociopolitical pressures, thus ultimately conforming to some (identity-consistent) demands, while violating other (identity-threatening) ones. This allowed DWH to successfully navigate tensions between sociopolitical expectations and the need to preserve a collective sense of distinctiveness and continuity over time.

The safety of workers and the costs to employers and the economy as a whole became a serious problem in industrializing nations. Workplace safety in the Ontario manufacturing industry deteriorated at the end of the nineteenth century. In response, the province legislated to regulate safety standards and factory inspection. However, this strategy failed to reduce accident rates. As in the United States, it was the enactment of workers' compensation legislation that generated the economic incentives for Ontario's employers to invest in safety. Yet in contrast to the United States, where safety was predominantly organized inside firms, employers in Ontario developed a comprehensive institutional framework to organize a range of safety actions.

The disposition of the estate of the merchant A. T. Stewart, and the interplay of personalities, social mores, and the changing structure of merchandising in America provide the focus for this fascinating and neglected story.

Master craftsmen played a critical role in launching the Industrial Revolution in America. In this case study of artisan entrepreneurship, Professor Kornblith analyzes the career of Jonas Chickering (1798–1853), the foremost American piano manufacturer before the emergence of the Steinways. By revolutionizing the way in which pianos were made, Chickering—with the help of others—turned a modest craft operation into a major industrial enterprise. Yet, Kornblith contends, he remained true to the craftsman's goal of artistic excellence and won the respect of his employees as well as of the public at large. By the force of his example, Chickering contributed to the acceptance of technological change within the trade and, more broadly, to the legitimation of industrial capitalism within American culture.

Enrique C. Creel was Mexico's leading banker, an innovative industralist, venture capitlist, and representative of the nation's largest land and cattle owner; he was also the political boss of the state of Chihuahua and the key conciliator of the conflicting intersts of the north and the national regime of dictator Porfirio Díaz. In this essay, Professor Wasserman describes Creel's activities, showing how he and his family built the greatest business empire in Mexico before 1910, survived the decade-long destruction of the revolution (1910–20), and rebuilt their empire in the 1920s. Better than any of his contemporaries, Creel combined managerial talent and vision with a mastery of the interplay of politics, regional interests, and foreign capital that comprised his economic entrepreneurship and the special nature of economic entrepreneurship and the intimate relationship between business and politics in pre-and post-revolutionary Mexico.

To the literature on social mobility and the question of earned versus inherited fortunes, Professor Jaher and Dr. Ghent add findings for the city of Chicago in the late nineteenth century that are in strong contrast to simuar studies for other cities. From the Civil War to the turn of the century, Chicago's rate of economic growth far exceeded the national average, and out of 1186 members of the Chicago business elite whose careers were embraced by the years 1830 to 1930, fully two-thirds made their own fortunes. This phenomenon was especially strong in manufacturing and the aggressive young industries of meatpacking and railroading.

This study reveals distinct cycles directly related to the major military conflicts of the twentieth century which had an important impact on the quantity and quality of British aircraft production. The author also suggests that these cycles may have relevance for other countries and other industries.

Canadian history has traditionally received relatively little study outside Canada itself, despite the fact that the Canadian past is a fascinating and rich story indeed, one which has generated an admirable body of historical literature. And, as those interested in the history of business and the historical interaction of business and society would expect, within Canadian historiography there has traditionally been relatively little emphasis on business history The publication of the present collection of essays has a twofold purpose – to increase, however modestly, non-Canadians' knowledge of Canadian history, and to extend the body of scholarly work devoted to Canadian business and economic history.

Jay Gould's image is stamped heavily upon the picture historians have drawn of the “Gilded Age” of American economic development. Our lack of knowledge of the man, and our meager efforts to understand him, account in large measure for the fatuous traditional interpretation of the era. Professor Klein explains how the work of recent historians has made the hackneyed view of both the man and his age obsolete. He reviews the constructive role that Gould played in the rise of modern America, and offers an explanation of why the man was singled out for extraordinary condemnation in his own time.

Seville was the first and, for most of the sixteenth century, the only European community permitted to trade directly with the New World. That members of her nobility, who were traditionally aloof from trade, were intimately involved testifies to the wealth to be gained and its revolutionary economic and social effects.

In this note, Dr. Ville expands upon an analysis of the English coal trade in the eighteenth century made by William J. Hausman in the Winter 1977 issue of the Business History Review. Drawing upon the recently discovered papers of Michael Henley and Son, London shipowners between 1775 and 1830, Ville contends that Hausman underestimated both the underlying level of the trade's profitability and its highly volatile nature. Central to Ville's argument is his claim that the high degree of vertical integration in the coal trade pushed up profit levels. These high profits, Ville suggests, played an important role in British industrialization.