This special issue of the Business History Review has as its theme the business of trade in the Atlantic World of the eighteenth century. It has as its purpose to highlight the rich and diverse work that is being accomplished by business historians, including people like the four authors—Kenneth Morgan, Silvia Marzagalli, Linda Salvucci, and Thomas Truxes—whose essays constitute the substance of this issue. The articles have a common focus but reveal very different aspects of their shared theme in delightfully instructive ways. While both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are represented and the northern and southern regions are discussed, and while France and Spain and their colonies receive nearly as much play as Great Britain and its colonies (and one-time colonies), almost by the very nature of trade, the stories told are more about links and connections than they are about the limitations imposed by national and imperial boundaries. My contribution, as editor—an otherwise unknown tract written in the 1780s by a minor but influential British civil servant, Thomas Irving, and edited and newly presented here—implicitly argues the case put forth by the other contributors: it was the limitless bounds of eighteenth-century business that defined the Atlantic World.

In his seminal 1972 essay on the “organization of industry,”G. B. Richardson argued that economists had generally viewed firms as “islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations.” Business historians, too, had focused predominantly on the firm (or entrepreneur) and the market. In drawing attention when he did to the “dense networks of co-operation and affiliation by which firms are inter-related,” Richardson was on the forefront of what would become a noticeable shift in the analysis of business organization. There were many reasons for this transition. In particular, the comparative success of the “Japanese model,” with its “intermarket” keiretsu disturbed standard assumptions. (Richardson himself pointed to Japanese firms as thriving examples of interfirm relations.) Furthermore, it was becoming clear that in many emerging industries networked relations of industrial clusters were increasingly important. Comparative research suggested that new-technology firms with tightly drawn boundaries were at a competitive disadvantage compared to firms that had developed cooperative links not only to suppliers but even to competitors. To explain such developments, economists, organizational theorists, and business historians alike looked beyond not only the conventional boundaries of the firm but also the conventional boundaries of their disciplines. In particular, they turned to theories of networks, the topic of this special issue.

Two major forces have been remaking the organizational setting of the United States in the recent past. The third industrial revolution and globalization are having a dramatic impact on the structure and process of American economic institutions and on the nation's political process. This third version of the organizational synthesis probes, with varying degrees of success, the vast literature that has accumulated around these two themes in the years since 1983, when the Business History Review published the second version of the paradigm. While much has changed in the nation's history and its historiography, bureaucratic institutions continue to dominate the society's organizational landscape. Pressed to change, to adapt to the need for greater efficiency and innovative capability, the surviving bureaucracies and the professionals who people them have experienced wrenching changes in recent years. To date, this “American solution” to global competition and technical transformation has been expensive in human terms but an overwhelming economic success for America.

The story of Dutch business in America began in the colonial period and continues into the present. The early Dutch trading companies of the seventeenth century, including the Dutch West India Company, were followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by such firms as the Holland-America Line, Unilever, Royal Dutch Shell, and NV Philips. The historical pattern of these Dutch businesses contributes to the growing literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs) and is relevant to recent debates on the historical convergence and/or divergence of living standards and productivity in national economies. An examination of the history of Dutch MNEs operating in the United States reveals some of the ways that these firms fit into the larger framework of Dutch business overall and provides a way to compare the strategies of Dutch MNEs with those of MNEs from other countries.

From 1877 to 1929 the Bell System extended its qualityassurance capabilities, a step that was critical to the company's ability to certify the reliability of its equipment and apparatus and to provide economical service. Learning in this context involved the gradual development of an organizational structure for coordinating and controlling quality-assurance activities at both the staff and line levels and between the corporate elements of the Bell System. Over the course of the initiative, innovative methods of analysis emerged that provided useful new insights into the manufacturing process. The company's adaptation of probability theory, for example, enabled it to launch a comprehensive inspection regime, which became known as “statistical quality control” (SQC). Based on this new approach, Bell succeeded in broadening its manufacturing knowledge, quantifying definitions of quality, reducing costs and risk, thus assuming the more reliable operation of its vast telephone network. Eventually this upgrading of learning led to the formation of a new profession of quality engineering, which found adherents across many industries in the United States and abroad.

Most studies of the early-modern Atlantic world give its emergence a sense of inevitability. Historians who have tried to understand networks in the early-modern Atlantic have focused solely on their successes, which skews our understanding. This analysis of the role played by Scottish networks in the production, distribution, and consumption of Madeira wine during that product's golden age, which lasted from 1640 to 1815, attempts to correct the record. Networks succeeded when they led to profitable sharing of information, goods, and services, and they failed when individuals were unable to get networks to function for them. Problems arose among the parties in the course of negotiating terms for sharing, monitoring the agreements, responding to disasters, and estimating the costs of transactions. At times, networks worked so well that they metamorphosed into other social and commercial forms, helping to establish critical nonmetropolitan links within and between the British and Portuguese empires.

This consideration of how innovation was exploited in primary processing industries during the period of the second industrial revolution draws on case material from frozen-meat and dairy-processing industries in New Zealand between 1880 and 1910, examining how entrepreneurial networks successfully created commodity chains for the exportation of produce to U.K. markets. Latin American commodity chains are considered as a counterpoint. What is suggested is that despite the absence of large-scale firms and significant foreign capital, New Zealand producers, relying on network-based organizational forms, successfully entered overseas markets, capitalizing on information sharing, rapid diffusion of technology, and loose alliances that exploited complementary skills and assets.

This article considers the changing nature of remittance procedures in the eighteenth-century British slave trade. It explains why bills of exchange became the preferred form of making payment for slave sales, rather than specie or produce. It also indicates the legal and institutional practices that informed the circulation of bills of exchange in a notoriously risky form of long-distance trade. The growth and complexity of the British slave trade, which was conducted mainly by private merchants, led to procedures such as remitting bills “in the bottom” of ships that had supplied slaves to North American and Caribbean markets and the extension of lengthy credit periods to purchasers. Colonial factors played a role as well, acting as the agents for coordinating remittances, and secure British merchant houses were deployed as “guarantees” for payment by bills. The development of credit practices associated with the slave trade, including remittance procedures, helped to strengthen the British economy by providing sound, complex intermediary instruments for the realization of profits from international trade.

Rare materials recently released by the Zigong City Archives shed light on the accounting system that was created by saltmining businesses in Zigong. The materials include forty-seven accounting books prepared by eight firms in the industry from 1908 to 1930. In this study, the materials are used to reveal how the Zigong salt-mining firms used the double-entry system. The study draws on the archival documents to reveal how the firms' innovative reporting methods enabled them to calculate profit and loss, and it explores the ways in which improved accounting information guided the decisions of Chinese proprietors who were operating in a business environment characterized by inadequate financing, considerable risk, and long intervals between investment and return.

To what extent did the search for solutions to problems of labor management mold the development of large-scale business? The history of the Imperial Tobacco Company (ITC) is instructive, because its managerial structures have been heavily criticized. Yet many of the organizational improvements that were implemented after the company's founding in 1901 have been overlooked, particularly in the realm of labor management, which emerged as an important component of the company's increasing capabilities and growth. In contrast to U.S. tobacco firms, ITC implemented labor policies that responded to arising difficulties in size, legislation, trade unionism, and social attitudes. Its development reveals how the variety of factors influencing the management of labor stretch beyond the narrow concern for models of internal administrative structures.

Diversified trading networks have recently drawn a great deal of attention. In the process, the importance of diversity has perhaps been overemphasized. Using the trade in port wine from Portugal to Britain as an example, this essay attempts to show how a market once dominated by general, diversified traders was taken over by dedicated specialists whose success might almost be measured by the degree to which they rejected diversification to form a dedicated “commodity chain.” The essay suggests that this strategy was better able to handle matters of quality and the specialized knowledge that port wine required. The essay also highlights the question of power in such a chain. Endemic commodity-chain struggles are clearest in the vertical brand war that broke out in the nineteenth century, which, by concentrating power, marked the final stage in the transformation of the trade from network to vertical integration.

The voyage of a small ocean-going trading vessel, of a type known as a snow, provides a window into the world of wartime commerce in the late colonial period. In March 1760, the snow Recovery, which was owned by a consortium of North American and Irish businessmen, traveled from New York City to Belfast, Ireland, and from there to the tiny Dutch island of Curaçao. From Curaçao, the snow sailed north to the Bay of Monte Cristi in Spanish Santo Domingo, where it loaded French sugar and coffee, mostly purchased through Spanish intermediaries, for sale at the German port of Hamburg. Upon leaving the bay for a brief stopover in New York, the Recovery was seized by a British warship and carried to Jamaica for condemnation in the court of vice-admiralty. This trading venture tells us much about mid-eighteenth-century Atlantic markets, their fluidity, adaptability, and responsiveness to change, as well as their integration into a single system of production, commerce, and finance.

An Atlantic approach to the history of early American trade challenges traditional British opinions and, indeed, much Anglo-American scholarship regarding the commercial prospects of the new United States. Contemporary Spanish observations, in contrast to the more familiar and widely cited ones in English, correctly predicted the post-Revolutionary War integration of American and Spanish imperial markets. As political, diplomatic, and economic upheavals broke down the old mercantilist system, U.S. merchants quickly succeeded in exploiting their comparative advantage in the expanding Atlantic economy. The debate over the “decline” of the British West Indies is amplified by examining the concurrent “rise” of the Spanish West Indies, particularly Cuba, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Very different commodity chains had been established over the centuries in France to produce and sell wines as diverse as champagne, fine old clarets, or ordinary table wines. The major shortages caused by the vine disease phylloxera after 1875 forced merchants to search for new sources of supply, often in foreign countries or through the production of artificial wines. When domestic production revived, however, the recovery was not accompanied by a noticeable reduction in these new supplies, with the result that prices, as well as growers' profitability, fell sharply after the turn of the twentieth century, strengthening the merchants' power in the various commodity chains. To overcome this situation, growers in three very different wine-producing areas, namely the Midi, Bordeaux, and Champagne, used their political influence to achieve government intervention in order to control fraud and establish regional appellations or producer cooperatives, which helped them win back some of their market power from merchants.

U.S. shipping to Bordeaux, France, once minimal, increased dramatically after 1793, the year that marked the beginning of the French Wars. The conflicts compelled merchants to adopt new patterns of trade, as the policies of the belligerent parties increasingly determined the evolution of neutral shipping. Merchants on both sides of the Atlantic strove for closer connections across political boundaries and tried to bypass the difficulties created by warfare. This examination of U.S. commerce with Bordeaux explores the impact of war on transatlantic trade and analyzes the strategies adopted by merchants of that period to minimize the impact of new risks. These merchants tended to rely on personal acquaintances, and they traveled frequently across the Atlantic in order to build and fortify relations of trust. Turning to older, established modes of doing business enabled them to respond rapidly to changes that occurred in the international situation and to anticipate the sudden shifts in policy that were inevitable in times of war.

This study looks at the formation of multinationals and relates that process to the emergence of institutions favorable to economic growth. It compares the development of such institutions from 1960 in four European countries: the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The focus of the study is a global industry—alcoholic beverages—in which brands, marketing knowledge, and distribution channels have been critical. In order to understand why some nations succeed in developing multinationals and others do not, different views of the determinants of national wealth, such as trade, institutions and organizations, and corporate governance, are examined. Whereas three of the countries developed leading multinationals in alcoholic beverages, Portugal did not succeed in doing so. The study concludes that, in marketingbased industries, both the type of product and the institutional environment influence the ability of firms to become leading multinationals.