Business enterprise in a market setting is the principal institutional artifact of capitalism, while capitalism itself is the creation of powerful evolutionary forces that were present in the culture of Europe. Those evolutionary forces continue their play into the present, working within the distinctive cultural context determined by an evolving capitalism. Every type and style of history dealing with European society and its offshoots must ultimately face and accommodate this central historical fact if it is to generalize its findings and acquire real intellectual weight and significance.

As production workers in late-nineteenth-century American heavy industry moved towards regular use of concerted action, including the strike, to gain their demands, employers generally adopted rigid policies of opposition. That it was a frightening period for manufacturers, with prices for their goods steadily falling and widespread business failure, has been emphasized by Edward C. Kirkland and others. But lack of scholarship in business archives has improverished labor-management history on this point. Professors Skaggs and Ehrlich offer one case history, based on a study of the “inner truth” of such a conflict in the 1880s. It confirms the suspicion that it was not practical economic imperatives but a long-run policy to maintain the principles of paternalism that often accounted for the intransigence of management.

As the end of the era of abundant natural petroleum oils approaches, the United States finds itself heavily committed to a way of life based on cheap liquid hydrocarbon fuels. Whether such fuels will be available at any price in adequate quantities in the future, is the question today. Professor Vietor shows that it was also a serious question for some years after World War II, and that the United States carried a long way towards definitive demonstration a program for the development of high-volume synthetic liquid fuels production techniques. What that program accomplished; how the interests, public and private, who were responsible for the American fuel supply reacted to it; and why it was shelved for 25 years are among the points Vietor covers. The reader is left to weigh for himself the several reasons why this program was sidetracked, but he can hardly fail to conclude that where such fundamental matters as energy policy are concerned, American planning has been distressingly short range.

In our day, when the question of how and to what extent and by whom economic activity should be regulated is wide open as between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and a galaxy of highly developed private interest groups, the traditional Progressive idea of the just and all-wise commission as final arbiter seems dated. Mr. Ritchie shows that it was an idea to which James M. Landis clung enthusiastically, largely as a result of his experience on the Securities and Exchange Commission, until his later experience as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board and finally as a lawyer representing one of the parties at interest before the Board. From the mounting evidence that a successful regulatory function grows, if at all, out of an appreciation of the economic realities of the particular activity being regulated, may yet come a national policy to which all may repair. Piling up such evidence is one of the most valuable public services the historian can render.

Students of planning may profitably ponder the myriad difficulties faced by the British aircraft industry in the decade before the outbreak of World War II. On a small civilian aircraft industry, provided with hardly any opportunity to gain military aircraft experience between World War I and the early 1930s, the Air Ministry tried to impose a nearly anarchic system of strategic military planning in which the very philosophy of the use of aircraft in war was at issue. Forced to work under conditions that included a “shadow industry” of civilian plant space that was theoretically capable of quick conversion to military aircraft production and that in the meantime turned out automobiles, the aircraft industry somehow ended up with two superb heavy bombers, the Halifax and the Lancaster, and a highly dependable prime contractor, A. V. Roe. Basing his narrative on both government and industry sources, Dr. Smith concludes that this was an outstanding example of British wartime “muddling through.”

This is a classic case history in entrepreneurship — the successful introduction of innovation — in which a conservative, contented chief executive of a richly successful AM broadcasting station, a manager whose real talents and interests lay entirely outside the field of “show business,” is pitted against another executive whose knowledge of electronic entertainment was profound. If any name can be given to the one trait that the former did not have and that the latter had in abundance and which, as Dean Pusateri shows, led on to victory, it was an enlightened enthusiasm of the kind that is not readily expressed in logical terms nor subjected to cost-benefit analysis. For WWL-TV, enthusiasm won, and the rest is history.

Students of the efforts of western maritime nations to improve conditions aboard their merchant ships, and to tighten regulations in general, are aware that one result was the emergence of the “flag of convenience,” whereunder a nation exploits the need of operators for a haven from high standards. One such nation was Panama, but by the end of World War II its officials had come to demand such private tribute that a new flag of convenience was needed. Providing such a registry under the flag of Liberia became a major service of the development company formed by former U. S. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in the late 1940s.

“The telegraph system in America is eminently characteristic of the national mind. At its very birth, it became the handmaiden of commerce.” So wrote the editor of a telegraph trade journal in 1853. Professor Du Boff describes an antebellum American business community that was as ready for a “revolution” in its size and structure as the dawning science of electricity was ready to make it happen. The result was the telegraph and its enthusiastic adoption in a few short years by a business system that quickly became national in scope and outlook. The railroad may ultimately have changed America even more than the telegraph but, as Du Boff shows, the railroad was originally conceived as a local and regional facility whereas the telegraph was interregional in its impact from its very beginnings.

Dominated as it is by the powerful personality of Frederick W. Taylor, the history of scientific management thought has neglected important figures like Alexander Hamilton Church. Professor Jelinek shows that whereas Taylor's contribution was to move thinking down one “level of abstraction” to concrete shop operations, Church moved it up one level to construct a pattern of observations useful for management planning and evaluation.

The concerted actions of giant companies operating on the international stage, notably in mining and petroleum, rival the Schleswig-Holstein question in complexity. In the absence of any clear understanding of the reasons for huge mergers such as that which took place in the southern African copper mining industry at the depth of the Great Depression, rationalizations that reflect Marxist-Leninist simplism and populist paranoia have been popular. Messrs. Alford and Harvey undertake to unravel the reasons for the copper merger, concluding that this merger defies modern, formal merger theory and teaches that there is no substitute for a close study of the motives of “corporate insiders.”

As the American economy, for the second time since the end of World War II, seemed about to falter in late 1953, the nation watched closely to see what economic policy the first Republican administration in twenty years would adopt. A new factor was the Council of Economic Advisers, whose professional economists, mild conservatives though they were, had long since adopted Keynesian compensatory spending as the new orthodoxy. Government spending was increased very moderately and once again the severe postwar downturn that Americans had been expecting for nearly a decade failed to develop. The credit went to Keynesianism and the Council but, as Professor Engelbourg emphasizes, whether another policy or no policy at all would have produced different results, is beyond our knowing.

The conventional distinctions between “practical” and “scientific” research and development can be misleading. The experience of Thomas Midgley, Jr., at the General Motors Corporation in the three decades before World War II, and especially his critical role in the development of “antiknock” gasoline additives, freon refrigerant, and synthetic rubber, illustrate this fact. Dr. Leslie demonstrates that the management of corporate research and development, especially as that management affects uniquely talented individuals whose interests do not necessarily reflect the immediate needs of the company as seen by management, is basic to success. To solve such problems as they arose, Charles F. Kettering, himself a sympathetic scientist as well as distinguished inventor, worked closely with chief executive Alfred P. Sloan, whose genius for solving managerial problems matched the scientific genius of the most brilliant men in the General Motors laboratories.

Those who in the past twenty years have examined the historiography of industrial Italy cannot help but recognize its “backwardness” when compared to similar studies in other countries, particularly those of American entrepreneurial history. Various reasons have been given to justify this “backwardness,” such as the excessive humanistic tradition of Italian historical studies, the relatively scarce statistical data available on Italian industry, and the poor condition of industrial archives. But, above all, it has been observed that “enterprise,” “entrepreneurs,” and “entrepreneurship” are concepts not especially sympathetic to Italian historiographical culture. First, there is an ideological suspicion, which suggests that to investigate these topics implies per se a favorable attitude. Second, there is a diffuse conviction according to which it is necessary to utilize explanations other than free initiative, and, particularly to stress the role of the State, in order to understand Italian economic development.

It has been a long time since clichés like “cotton was king” have satisfied historians as an answer to the question of why the American South did not develop a manufacturing industry at least as vigorous as that of the Midwest in the antebellum years. Professor Cohn thinks that the South may well have done just that, and presents an analysis based on location theory that supports such a conclusion.

Among the industries that owe their existence to technological innovation, voice communication by wire and by radio is an outstanding example. Professor Reich explains that during its first quarter century, however, the telephone enterprise developed a “business-technology mind-set” (he credits Reese Jenkins with the term) that held back further progress until after the thoroughgoing reorganization of American Telephone & Telegraph in 1907. Thereafter, an initial strong focus on applied science was gradually modified as the company sought to solve problems that stood in the way of important new services, such as long-distance telephony; to stay in the vanguard of major innovations, such as radio, that threatened the dominance of wired telephone systems; and to extend new capabilities into as many alternative techniques as necessary to “box the compass” of the patent laws. In the process, AT&T developed a highly structured research and development facility that pushed businessmen's respect for science and technology to new heights.

Will the lack of hard data forever preclude firm conclusions about the impact of industrialization upon antebellum America? Whether it does or not, it seems unlikely to prevent continuation of one of the liveliest debates in American economic history. Professors Vedder and Gallaway contribute their findings to the controversy, and conclude that the rate of profit on manufacturing capital before 1860 was much lower than recent work has suggested.