State regulators played a large part in constructing the American regulatory system from the late nineteenth century to the midtwentieth. They faced an adversary relationship not only with businesses but also, beginning with passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, with national regulators. Shaping a process of “pragmatic federalism,” the state regulators forged a cooperative regulatory regime in which they and national regulators controlled the nations's railroads. In the 1930s and 1940s, state regulators extended the cooperative approach to numerous other regulated industries. These findings challenge the argument that the Shreveport case ended meaningful state regulation and suggest that the rise of big government included a continued commitment to the federalist framework of the U.S. Constitution, at least to the mid-twentieth century.

James Forten (1766–1842) was in business in Philadelphia for almost half a century. A sailmaker by trade, he invested the profits from his sail-loft in real estate, bank stock, and shares in various ventures, including railroads. He was also a money-lender. Throughout his long career in business, Forten struggled to be accepted as an astute and successful member of the business community who happened to be a man of color. As this essay demonstrates, that was how some of his white peers saw him. To others, however, he was a man of color first and a man of business second.

During the years 1918 to 1941, International Paper (IP) launched a massive product diversification effort. Engineered by three successive presidents, diversification turned the company from a newsprint producer based in the northeastern United States into an international manufacturer of southern kraft grades, Canadian newsprint, hydroelectric power, and specialty papers. With the exception of kraft paperboard and converted products, however, the new product lines failed to provide IP with a firm foothold in markets for consumer nondurables, where nimbler competitors thrived even during the 1930s. IP and firms in other “maturing industries” that clung to traditional products and stagnant markets contributed to the length and severity of the Great Depression.

The state's role in building Japan's telecommunications industry is illustrated by the history of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company (NTT) in the post–World War II period. Several factors explain the state's success in developing one of the world's most reliable and technologically advanced industries: a strong desire for technological self-sufficiency; a favorable international environment; an ability to legally reverse-engineer foreign products; and the existence of a business sector that was willing and able to invest heavily in the human resources and facilities necessary to become global players. Japan also benefited from a consensus among its state and business elite on how to use NTT for the purpose of national development.

An 1890s loan book of the Bank of A. Levy permits a detailed examination of the lending operations of a private bank in California during the National Banking Era (1864–1914). This period has been intensively analyzed at the national and state level, but there are few studies of banks at the firm level. This unregulated bank was integrated into money markets and lent to a broad cross section of the community. Although the bank appeared to adhere to the real bills doctrine, it provided businesses with medium-term, uncollateralized financing. The bank priced risk carefully, offering rates equal to the lowest in the country to its best customers while charging extraordinarily high rates to borrowers deemed risky. In the absence of modern accounting, the bank's close scrutiny of borrowers' businesses and personal lives enabled it to fulfill a special intermediary role.

Chambers of commerce were the main pressure groups serving as intermediaries between the business elite and the government in Great Britain and Brazil in the nineteenth century. The most important problem they faced in both nations was promoting a legal and institutional framework that would facilitate economic expansion. In both nations, the critical factors affecting this task were the need of the state for the expert advice that business pressure groups could offer, the traditional relationship between business and government, and especially the attitude of a historically dominant landed elite.

The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) played an important role in the emerging conservative movement in the United States, both before and after World War II, but its contribution to the increasing militarism of that movement has received little scrutiny. Between 1958 and 1975, a combination of organizational changes peculiar to NAM and political pressures from both the right and the left led NAM to adopt and maintain a militaristic posture. In the late 1950s, a decline in the organization's membership resulted in a take over by larger corporations, which purged the board of its ultraconservative leadership. The reorganized board established a National Defense Committee (NDC) in order to promote defense industry membership and, by 1962, had selected a new permanent president, Werner Gullander. Under Gullander, the NDC moved NAM in the direction of support for defense expansion during the early 1960s.

The stock market crash of 1929, a major trauma that still haunts the national memory, has received surprisingly little attention from scholars in seventy years and has produced even less agreement as to its causes and consequences. This review of the literature suggests that the disagreements and debates over the crash reveal as much about what can and cannot be known for certain about the event as they do about potential answers to the mysteries of the crash.

During the 1960s, many academics, consultants, computer vendors, and journalists promoted the “totally integrated management information system” (MIS) as the destiny of corporate computing and of management itself. This concept evolved out of the frustrated hopes of 1950s corporate “systems men” (represented by the Systems and Procedures Association) to establish themselves as powerful “generalist” staff experts in administrative techniques. By redefining the computer as a managerial “information system,” rather than a simple technical extension of punch-card “data processing,” the systems men sought to establish jurisdiction over corporate computing and to replace accountants as the primary agents of managerial control. The apparently unlimited power of the computer supported a new conception of information, defined as the exclusive domain of the systems men (assisted by operations research specialists and computer technicians). While MIS proved impossible to construct during the 1960s, both its dream of all-encompassing automated information systems and the resulting association of information with the computer endured into the twenty-first century.

International telecommunication is not only a business but also a political enterprise, the subject of great-power rivalries. In the late nineteenth century, British firms held a near monopoly, because Britain had more advanced industry, a wealthier capital market, and a merchant marine and colonial empire that provided customers for the new service. After the 1880s, they encountered increasing competition on the North Atlantic from American, German, and French firms. Elsewhere, the British conglomerate Eastern and Associated retained its hegemony until the 1920s. Following World War I, radiotelegraphy threatened the dominance of cables. In the 1930s, cable companies were almost bankrupted by the Depression and by competition from shortwave radio.

At the time these photographs originated in an unspecified location in late-nineteenth-century China, the Chinese had been cultivating tea (Camellia sinensis) and processing it for almost two millennia. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, after decades of false starts and ceaseless experimentation, British entrepreneurs in India and Ceylon and the Dutch in Java successfully initiated plantation cultivation, pioneered the mechanized processing of black tea, and launched vigorous advertising campaigns to foster corporate sales worldwide.

Robert Noyce's career at Fairchild Semiconductor sheds light on several developments that were central to the growth of Silicon Valley and the semiconductor industry: entrepreneurship, technical leadership, and the management of growth in a high-technology company. Noyce served as Fairchild Semiconductors first head of R&D and as its general manager for the six years of the company's most dramatic growth. His technical orientation, personal interest in new technologies, and hands-off management style helped establish a culture at the firm that welcomed innovations in research, process technology, manufacturing, and marketing. As Fairchild Semiconductor grew into a multidivisional mass producer, Noyce's entrepreneurial leadership proved inadequate. Communication breakdowns between divisions, coupled with a series of poor decisions by the parent company, further contributed to the decline of Fairchild Semiconductor.

In the thirteen years following the introduction of IBM's first personal computer in 1982, Microsoft rose from being a small concern to become the colossus of the PC software industry. However, Microsoft was not the only software company to profit from the PC-software boom: firms like AutoDesk, Lotus Development, WordPerfect Corp., Ashton-Tate, Novell, Borland, Adobe Systems, Aldus, Symantec, and the Santa Cruz Operation all had their time in the sun. Whereas some of these firms lost their markets to Microsoft or stumbled through strategic errors, others remained hugely successful, and their relative obscurity is largely due to the contemporary obsession with Microsoft and its billionaire founder.