It has been suggested in this article that every shareholder does have a right to have all the provisions of the company contract enforced, but that this right is not an absolute one, and cannot be considered in isolation. For a more complete appreciation of the picture this right must be viewed in a context where the company contract constitutes the framework of a long-term relationship between the contracting parties. Thus we need to take into account the equally valid rights of the other shareholders to enforce conflicting provisions of this contract, to change those provisions, and to condone or regularise breaches of those provisions relating, inter alia, to the rules of internal procedure. We need also to consider the machinery provided by company law for the resolution of disputes concerning these conflicting rights, machinery which includes reference of the dispute to the decision of the majority, where it is appropriate to do so. Finally, it must be borne in mind that one of the aims of providing such machinery is the preservation of the long-term relationship between the participants in the company. It is only be considering such factors as these that the relative, rather than absolute, nature of any one shareholder's right to enforce the company contract can be truly understood.

In Majewski the House of Lords handed down a decision which was intended to determine, authoritatively, the position of the defendant who pleads not guilty to a criminal offence on the basis that he was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. Their Lordships unanimously accepted the existence of a rule of law to the effect that in crimes of “basic intent,” such as the assaults with which Majewski was charged, intoxication, where it was self-induced, could provide no defence; only where the crime involved required a “specific intent” could self-induced intoxication ground a plea of not guilty based on a lack of the necessary mens rea.

The Decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority raises fundamental questions concerning the nature of the legal relationship between parents and children and the role of the State in regulating decision-making within the family. Public attention has been focused on the issue of the provision of contraceptives to girls under the age of sixteen years, yet the decision has implications which go well beyond this specific matter. First, the decision invites a re-examination of the approach of English law to the concept of parental rights. Secondly, Lord Scarman's reference to “the child's right to make his own decisions” suggests that it may not be long before a coherent concept of children's rights is incorporated into the law. This would constitute a significant development since although the welfare of children is considered paramount in legal disputes concerning their custody or upbringing, references to the “rights” of children either in statute or case law are comparatively rare. On the occasions when the judiciary recognise that children have rights it is considered a matter of some note.

A decade ago the conflict between George Ward, proprietor of Grunwick Processing, and the Association of Professional, Executive Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) provided a platform for an extended debate about the role of the law in industrial relations, the right of employers to refuse to recognise trade unions for collective bargaining purposes and, in particular, the efficacy of legislation as a means of promoting such recognition. In 1986 the decision to move the printing of various newspapers within the News International Group (the chairman of which is Mr. Rupert Murdoch) from Fleet Street to a new purpose-built printing plant at Wapping in London's docklands occasioned another set-piece battle between labour and a strong-minded employer. The issues and the climate of industrial relations in which the dispute took place are very different but, like Grunwick, the Wapping dispute provides rich material for all interested in how the law can be used as part of the strategy of industrial conflict.

The recent patriation of the Canadian Constitution has been a fascinating process for constitutional lawyers. The role of the Canadian Supreme Court, in adjudicating on the legality and the constitutional propriety of the proceedings, has raised issues of great interest and importance. In accepting jurisdiction to pronounce on the existence of convention, the court removed a traditional barrier between law and convention: the former being applied and articulated in the courts, the latter being a matter of political practice, without authoritative definition. The majority judgments nevertheless place great weight on the orthodox distinction between law and convention, and the separation of legal and political principle which that distinction assumes. My purpose here is to question the court's reasoning as regards both law and convention. I shall argue that recent developments in public law cast doubt, even if only indirectly, on the utility of the orthodox distinction. The view that courts do not “enforce” conventions, though adequate for some purposes, may frustrate constructive thought. In any particular case in which convention is pleaded in aid of law, there are more useful and important questions to ask.