We argue that an advance directive (AD) is not invalidated by personality changes in dementia, as is claimed by Rebecca Dresser. The claim is that a new person results under such personality changes, and that the former person cannot write an AD for the new person. After stating the argument against ADs in cases of dementia, we provide a detailed examination of empirical studies of personality changes in dementia. This evidence, though not strong due mainly to low sample sizes and different notions of personal identity, does not support Dresser’s position. Given the weakness in the empirical evidence, we turn to a philosophical defense of ADs based on a social contract view supporting the current interests of those writing ADs. Additionally, we argue that personality change is not equivalent to change in personal identity, as would be required by the argument against ADs in cases of dementia.

Surgical advances have allowed for the development of split liver transplantation, providing two recipients with the opportunity to potentially benefit from one donated liver by splitting the liver into two usable parts. Although current data suggest that the splitting of livers provides overall benefit to the liver-recipient population, relatively low numbers of livers are actually split in the United Kingdom. This article addresses the question of whether ethical concerns are posing an unnecessary barrier to further increasing the number of life-saving transplantations. Recognizing that an important aspect of exploring these concerns is gaining insight into how transplant staff and patients regard splitting livers, the article presents the findings of a qualitative study examining the views of senior transplant staff and liver transplant patients in the UK and uses these to inform a commentary on the ethical issues relating to split liver transplantation.

Most theories of parenthood assume, at least implicitly, that a child will grow up to be an independent, autonomous adult. However, some children with cognitive limitations or psychiatric illness are unable to do so. For this reason, these accounts do not accommodate the circumstances and responsibilities of parents of such adult children. Our article attempts to correct this deficiency. In particular, we describe some of the common characteristics and experiences of this population of parents and children, examine the unique aspects of their relationships, review several philosophical accounts of parental obligations, consider how these accounts might be extrapolated to semiautonomous adult children, and provide suggestions about parental obligations to promote autonomy and independence in adult children with cognitive limitations or psychiatric illness. In extending accounts of parental responsibilities to the case of semiautonomous adults, we find that the parental role includes the duty to continue to provide care—indefinitely if necessary—while cultivating autonomy and independence.

It seems natural to think that the same prudential and ethical reasons for mutual respect and tolerance that one has vis-à-vis other human persons would hold toward newly encountered paradigmatic but nonhuman biological persons. One also tends to think that they would have similar reasons for treating we humans as creatures that count morally in our own right. This line of thought transcends biological boundaries—namely, with regard to artificially (super)intelligent persons—but is this a safe assumption? The issue concerns ultimate moral significance: the significance possessed by human persons, persons from other planets, and hypothetical nonorganic persons in the form of artificial intelligence (AI). This article investigates why our possible relations to AI persons could be more complicated than they first might appear, given that they might possess a radically different nature to us, to the point that civilized or peaceful coexistence in a determinate geographical space could be impossible to achieve.

This article explicates two approaches to the basis of moral worth and status: Eva Kittay’s relational view and Jeff McMahan’s psychological personhood view. It is argued that these theories alone do not provide adequate support for the conclusions Kittay and McMahan want to draw concerning individuals whose entitlement to fundamental protections can be challenged—infants with severe cognitive disabilities and infants without the support of their families and social environments. The real justification can in each case be found in deeply held convictions regarding entities that must and entities that must not be included in the core community of moral equals. Philosophical discussions about these convictions would be more useful for the advancement of our moral thinking than vain attempts to show that the absolute truth lies on either side of the ongoing debate.

This article examines current trends and prospects in Finnish healthcare literature and discussion. The Finnish healthcare system was long considered to manifest an equal, universal, and solidaristic welfare scheme. However, recent data reveals structural inequalities in access to healthcare that result in health differences among socioeconomic groups. The political will aims at tackling these inequalities, but the ideological trend toward responsibilization of the individual taking place across political spheres elsewhere in Europe creates potential challenges to this goal. The applications of this trend have a theoretical background in the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian—or luck egalitarian—tradition. The theory, which is unfit for real-life policy applications, has explicit appeal in considerations aiming at the responsibilization of the individual within the healthcare sector. It remains to be seen in which direction the Finnish welfare schemes will continue to develop.

In 2012, the FDA approved for the differential diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease a brain-imaging technology, Amyvid-PET (aka florbetapir-PET), capable of non-invasively estimating the burden of amyloid plaques; this approval for one indication renders the technology a candidate for off-label use for another indication according to a physician’s judgment. What should a physician do if an educated, pro-active, and concerned patient requests off-label use of Amyvid-PET to help her estimate the likelihood that her mild memory complaints are “just normal aging” or are likely to profoundly worsen? I consider reasons that a physician might justify denial of such a request, including concerns of safety, uncertain benefit, and fair resource allocation, but cautiously conclude that there may be certain cases where off-label bioprediction would be permissible.

The ethical principle of autonomy requires physicians to respect patient autonomy when present, and to protect the patient who lacks autonomy. Fulfilling this ethical obligation when a patient has a communication impairment presents considerable challenges. Standard methods for evaluating decision-making capacity require a semistructured interview. Some patients with communication impairments are unable to engage in a semistructured interview and are at risk of the wrongful loss of autonomy. In this article, we present a general strategy for assessing decision-making capacity in patients with communication impairments. We derive this strategy by reflecting on a particular case. The strategy involves three steps: (1) determining the reliability of communication, (2) widening the bandwidth of communication, and (3) using compensatory measures of decision-making capacity. We argue that this strategy may be useful for assessing decision-making capacity and preserving autonomy in some patients with communication impairments.

In 1996, Sandra Jensen became the first person with Down syndrome to receive a heart-lung transplant. Although it took place almost 20 years ago, her experience continues to shed light on contemporary challenges that individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders face in securing access to transplantation. While overt discrimination has decreased, barriers persist in physician referrals, center-specific decisionmaking regarding wait-listing, and the provision of accommodations for optimizing the assessment and medical management of these individuals. These issues arise from the persistent biases and assumptions of individuals as well as those of a healthcare system that is inadequately positioned to optimally serve the medical needs of the growing number of individuals with functional impairments. More data and greater transparency are needed to understand the nature and extent of ongoing access problems; however, long-term solutions will require changes at the healthcare professional, regional transplant center, and national levels.

In 2014, the Japanese government amended the laws concerning regenerative medicine. This reform aimed to contribute to the appropriate promotion of regenerative medicine and new drug discovery for intractable diseases using stem cells. It also helped restrict stem cell tourism, that is, provision of stem cell therapy of unclear efficacy and safety to tourists from abroad, and its relaxed regulations may even lead to the resolution of the drug lag problem. Stem cell medicine is positioned as a part of a national growth strategy that requires cooperation among the industry, government, healthcare field, and academia. It can be characterized as a “mesoscopic strategy,” in that it aims to achieve high-level technological developments that would allow results from human-induced pluripotent stem cell and traditional stem cell research to contribute to regenerative medicine and drug development for intractable diseases, while attempting to strike a balance with commercialization and improved access of citizens to cutting-edge medical care.

This article is intended to highlight the unique vulnerability associated with a severe medical illness. It outlines important considerations that are relevant to patients but perhaps especially relevant to medical providers. There are many factors that contribute to recovery from a life-threatening illness. Essential, but underestimated, factors include (1) a vision for what the meaning of your life can be; (2) simple and unexpected acts of kindness that underscore the commitment of your providers to your well-being; and (3) the character of providers and the culture of the institution, which vary tremendously and are palpable to the patient.

In the contemporary debate on the use of the neurosciences in ethics and law, numerous arguments have been bandied about among scientists and philosophers looking to uphold or reject the reliability and validity of scientific findings obtained by brain imaging technologies. Among the most vexing questions is, Can we trust that technology? One point of disagreement is whether brain scans offer a window through which to observe the functioning of the mind, in such a way as to enable lawyers, judges, physicians, and lawmakers to detect anomalies in brain function that may account for criminal unconscious behavior. Those who stand behind brain imaging believe that this can indeed be achieved, whereas those in opposition stress that brain scans are highly open to interpretation and that the data they provide is insufficient to establish causal connections. The question essentially comes down to whether technology can reliably be used to determine the intentions of the individual, thus establishing mens rea, for example, and hence responsibility. This article focuses on the latter notion and explores whether we can rely on the neurosciences to shed light on a complex form of moral and legal reasoning, as well as the role of the neurosciences in reawakening a philosophical and legal interest in trying to set responsibility on an empirical basis.

This article takes up a game-theoretic perspective on California’s recently passed bill (SB 277) that closes all nonmedical exemptions for school-mandated vaccination. Such a perspective characterizes parental decisions to vaccinate their children as a collective action problem and reveals the presence of an incentive to free ride—to enjoy the benefits of others’ efforts to vaccinate their children without vaccinating one’s own. This article defends California’s legislation as a reasonable means of overcoming the free rider problem and of ensuring that the burdens of vaccination are shared equally.

An integrated and principled neuroethics offers ethical guidelines able to transcend conventional and medical reliance on normality standards. Elsewhere we have proposed four principles for wise guidance on human transformations. Principles like these are already urgently needed, as bio- and cyberenhancements are rapidly emerging. Context matters. Neither “treatments” nor “enhancements” are objectively identifiable apart from performance expectations, social contexts, and civic orders. Lessons learned from disability studies about enablement and inclusion suggest a fresh way to categorize modifications to the body and its performance. The term “enhancement” should be broken apart to permit recognition of enablements and augmentations, and kinds of radical augmentation for specialized performance. Augmentations affecting the self, self-worth, and self-identity of persons require heightened ethical scrutiny. Reversibility becomes the core problem, not the easy answer, as augmented persons may not cooperate with either decommissioning or displacement into unaccommodating societies. We conclude by indicating how our four principles of self-creativity, nonobsolescence, empowerment, and citizenship establish a neuroethics beyond normal that is better prepared for a future in which humans and their societies are going so far beyond normal.

Although recent literature on professionalism in healthcare abounds in recommended character traits, attitudes, or behaviors, with a few exceptions, the recommendations are untethered to any serious consideration of the contours and ethical demands of the healing relationship. This article offers an approach based on the professional’s commitment to trustworthiness in response to the vulnerability of those seeking professional help. Because our willingness and ability to trust health professionals or healthcare institutions are affected by our personality, culture, race, age, prior experiences with illness and healthcare, and socioeconomic and political circumstances—“the social determinants of trust”—the attitudes and behaviors that actually do gain trust are patient and context specific. Therefore, in addition to the commitment to cultivating attitudes and behaviors that embody trustworthiness, professionalism also includes the commitment to actually gaining a patient’s or family’s trust by learning, through individualized dialogue, which conditions would win their justified trust, given their particular history and social situation.

Ongoing developments in neuroscientific techniques and technologies—such as neuroimaging—offer potential for greater insight into human behavior and have fostered temptation to use these approaches in legal contexts. Neuroscientists are increasingly called on to provide expert testimony, interpret brain images, and thereby inform judges and juries who are tasked with determining the guilt or innocence of an individual. In this essay, we draw attention to the actual capabilities and limitations of currently available assessment neurotechnologies and examine whether neuroscientific evidence presents unique challenges to existing frameworks of evidence law. In particular, we focus on (1) fundamental questions of relevance and admissibility that can and should be posed before the tests afforded in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals or Frye v. U.S. are applied and (2) how these considerations fit into the broader contexts of criminal law. We contend that neuroscientific evidence must first be scrutinized more heavily for its relevance, within Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to ensure that the right questions are asked of neuroscientists, so as to enable expert interpretation of neuroscientific evidence within the limits of their knowledge and discipline that allows the judge or jury to determine the facts at issue in the case. We use the analogy provided by the Daubert court of an expert on the phases of the moon testifying to an individual’s behavior on a particular night to ensure that we are, in fact, asking the neuroscientific expert the appropriate question.

The question of whether there is justification for physicians to participate in state-sanctioned corporal punishment has prompted long and heated debates around the world. Several recent and high-profile sentences requiring physician assistance have brought the conversation to Saudi Arabia. Whether a physician is asked to participate actively or to assess prisoners’ ability to withstand this form of punishment, can there be an ethical justification for medical training and skills being put toward these purposes? The aim of this article is to examine aspects of Islamic law along with the different professional and religious obligations of Saudi Arabian physicians, and how these elements may inform the debate.