“The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy” by T. H. Marshall was published by this Journal twenty years ago. It has since become a classic; and may be fittingly celebrated in this anniversary issue. Its classic quality lies in the skill with which Marshall worked enduring themes with current trends and problems into a common web. He defines professions as, in effect and with some other characteristics, those occupations in which caveat emptor cannot be allowed to prevail and which, while they are not pursued for gain, must bring their practitioners income of such a level that they will be respected and such a manner of living that they may pursue the life of the mind. There are certain problems which surround such occupations in all times.

The current changes noted by Marshall are the ever greater dependence of modern society upon professional services, an increase in the variety of such services and in the number of the professions, and the tendency for many practitioners of the older professions and for most or all of some newer professions to work in organizations with an employer, rather than to set up a shop to which clients come, one by one, are served, and pay for the service. He also noted that while the community at large is in all times and places concerned with the manner in which professional services are performed, this is especially so in our times; indeed, the community at large is the client of some new professions and, in increasing measure, of older ones.

The phenomenon of inter-establishment variation in occupational wage rates is of considerable significance not only to the economist concerned with wage theory but also to the unionist, the employer and those government agencies concerned with wage policy. In view of its importance it is unfortunate that in Canada there has been virtually no analysis of questions of inter-establishment wage diversity. In this vast and neglected field, it is difficult to choose a specific plot for cultivation or to know what size to make it. Since inter-regional differences are of great interest and significance to Canadians, it was decided, for a start, to attack the problem first by comparing the extent of dispersion in Ontario and Quebec. Further, the study is concerned with an examination of the factors which might explain the relatively greater dispersion found in Quebec. These factors include both inter- and intra-industry variation in rates, the “economic geography” of the two provinces, the effects of differences in plant size on plant wage rates, and the influence of unionism.

The data consist of more than 1,250 establishment rates for hourly rated male common labour in the manufacturing industries of Ontario and Quebec for the year 1957. Common labour was chosen as a measure for comparing wages in different plants not only because it is a fairly homogeneous occupational group but also because it is the one occupation for which extensive cross-industry rate data are presently available in Canada. There is no doubt that some variation in the rates for any occupation will arise because of differences in ability—and effort—within the occupational group. A perfectly homogeneous group of workers is a textbook abstraction which can only be approximated in the real world in a very crude fashion.

The recent reissue of the classic study of Middletown by Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd should serve as a suitable occasion for a partial re-examination of a great landmark in community research. It is not necessary to elaborate on the significance of the Middletown studies. Although more than twenty years have elapsed since they were completed, they are still widely cited in contemporary writing. Moreover, a closer examination of the Lynds' treatment of power distributions in Middletown discloses striking similarities between this early study and the most recent work in the field. Modern writers might disclaim the openly Marxist position espoused by the Lynds, but in fact many of them continue to be strongly influenced by the scheme of analysis employed in the Middletown books. In this paper I propose to examine the Lynds' discussion of community power in both its normative and descriptive aspects, not simply because it seems valuable from time to time to return for curiosity's sake to the wellsprings of modern social science, but also because many of the issues discussed by the Lynds, and many of their findings, have contemporary relevance to the study of community power.

Scattered through two large and meaty books, one can find at least two approaches to this subject. One approach suggests in unmistakable terms what the Lynds believe ought to be true of power in the community; the other describes what they believe is true. I refer to these incorrectly, but for convenience, as “theories” of community power.

The purpose of this article is to discuss some aspects of forest management; its justification is the undoubted importance of forest-based industries to the Canadian economy, particularly Canada's foreign trade. Economists and those who administer forests are not agreed on the fundamentals of forest management. Nor have administrators agreed on the way in which forests should be utilized. We will, however, describe only one rule for forest management formulated by those responsible for administering forests—maximum sustained yield—and compare that rule with the results of capital theory.

In order to keep the analysis clear and to the point, a simplified example, based on an actual study, will be used throughout this paper. This example allows the divergent conclusions of capital theory to be illustrated and compared with the results of adopting maximum sustained yield, the rule recommended by the forester in the study from which the example is drawn.

The analysis here makes no pretence at originality and provides no new rule for managing forests. But it might serve to bring divergent groups closer to mutual understanding, and set the stage for some discussion of forest management by economists in Canada. It has been suggested, particularly by Professor Keirstead and Professor Scott, that no new theory of resources is needed because existing theory is adequate. On the other hand, Dr. Lamontagne and Dr. Keenleyside have suggested that economists have been remiss because they have neglected resources. These conflicting views indicate a need for an appraisal of existing theory concerning the administration of resources.

In the study of consumer spending a wide variety of factors, ranging from age, sex, and family size, through occupation, religion, and class background, to future expectations, advertising and personal influence, and compulsiveness, have been shown to have some influence on consumer taste and demand. Yet the precise influence these factors have, and the value which they should be assigned are still largely unknown. This paper offers a theoretical framework as one possible way of treating factors involved in consumer spending in a systematic manner. The approach is still in the process of formulation so that only the general structure of the theory can be presented.

Two assumptions are made about factors which influence consumer spending. First, it is assumed that factors may be treated as aspects of social systems or sub-systems. They may be viewed as contributing to one or other of the problems which all social systems must solve, to what have been called the adaptive, the goal attainment, the integrative, and the pattern-maintenance-tension-management problems. Thus factors are related to one another, in the first instance, by means of their functioning for the solution of system problems. Secondly, it is assumed that all factors do not have the same order of influence on consumer spending. Rather, factors are related to one another in a hierarchical way so that some can be treated as more general in their influence than others, and as unifying the more specific factors in some way. This view is derived from the more general assumption that social systems are composed of a number of distinct levels of structural organization.

Since the outbreak of the Second World War the Commonwealth has passed through profound and rapid changes and does not cease to change. Its nature may seem more difficult than ever to define and classify with precision, its conscious purpose as a group of states more elusive, and its role in the world more mysterious and imponderable. To some unfriendly observers its positive influence in matters that count now appears nebulous, almost to the point of non-existence. To those keenly interested and deeply devoted, it presents difficulties. It has no formal constitution, few political organs of its own except of an ad hoc and inchoate kind, and little on paper that explains aims and prescribes procedures. Polished generalities from the Balfour Report, which before 1939 passed muster in describing its ethos, may not be irrelevant, but need careful scrutiny to determine whether under contemporary circumstances they retain much meaning.

When all this is said, the fact remains that the Commonwealth continues to live as an active, global, free association. Its members at any rate recognize its existence and the Queen as its head; they are confident of being attached, not to a phantom or mirage, but to an association unique in character, which to an indefinable degree influences their formulations of policy. For them Commonwealth relations are a part of foreign or external relations, but a special part, governed by attitudes and procedures peculiar to itself. In political ideas and traditions, moreover, the Commonwealth has substance. This fact is really fundamental to everything else, for in history and logic it is prior to everything else, and determines everything else. With it this paper must begin.

One of the most fundamental of democratic rights is the right to representation in a free parliament. A legislature which is in a position to prolong its own life indefinitely can nullify that right.

That is why the United States Constitution lays it down that there must be a general election for the House of Representatives, and for one-third of the Senate, every two years. Nothing except a constitutional amendment can change this; and the process of amendment is so elaborate and difficult, and takes so long, that we can be certain that there will never be any lengthening of the term of either House of Congress unless American public opinion emphatically and overwhelmingly desires it. The same is true of the individual states. If Congress or any state legislature tried to prolong its own life, the “act” would be void, and any citizen could have it annulled by appealing to the courts.

In Canada, the Dominion Parliament can prolong its own life, but only “in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection” and only “if such continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members” of the House of Commons. In other words, one-third plus one of the members of the House of Commons can prevent prolongation even in the midst of war, invasion, or insurrection. Any extension “act” passed contrary to these provisions would be void, and any citizen could have it annulled by appealing to the courts.

In nearly every recent commentary on Canadian political parties one observation has been repeatedly emphasized. It is that the Canadian electorate has shown an inclination to put in power at the provincial level parties which stand in opposition to the party which has been entrusted with power at Ottawa. The writers who have stressed this phenomenon have been impressed by the fact that during the latter years of their national ascendancy the Liberals were in control of only a few of the smaller provinces (by 1957 only Prince Edward Island, New Rrunswick, and, through a coalition, Manitoba), while in the other and larger provinces the Progressive Conservatives, C.C.F., Social Credit, or Union Nationale were firmly entrenched. From this observation three conclusions, either explicit or implicit, have generally been deduced. The first is that during the latter years of the Liberal régime the real opposition to the Government was not to be found at the Speaker's left in Ottawa, but rather in the provincial capitals. The second is that the individual Canadian voter has alternated his party choice at provincial and federal elections, and by so doing has demonstrated a type of voting behaviour which is not usually to be found in federations. The third conclusion is that in favouring one party provincially and another party nationally the Canadian voter is motivated by a calculated desire to balance the power of the one against the other. The purpose of this article is to examine the pattern of provincial and federal election results and to determine the extent to which these conclusions are supported by the available evidence.

Several investigations dealing with provincial-local relations in particular jurisdictions in Canada have been undertaken in recent years. The prevailing emphasis has been on the distribution of taxation sources and the revenues derived from these sources between the two levels of government and, to a lesser degree, on the related question of the allocation of responsibilities for particular services between the provincial and local governments. The clear implications of most of this discussion are that all would be well with our local authorities if they were assured of revenues commensurate with their responsibilities and that local officials and their representatives admit to few ailments which more generous subventions from the senior governments would not cure.

This paper attempts to focus attention on another aspect of central-local relations as strategic in determining the welfare of our local institutions as is the scale of central financial assistance. Characteristically, central governments not only provide a portion of the revenues expended by the local authorities within their boundaries but also engage in an extensive and varied range of activities to regulate, supervise, educate, and otherwise influence the conduct of elected and appointed local officials. Control, viewed broadly as any exercise of central influence, can take these forms: (1) legislative control, in which central influence is exerted through legislative enactments, and subordinate legislation issued under them, enjoining or requiring certain local activities or procedures; (2) judicial control, in which the central government requests a court of law to order particular local authorities or local officials to do or refrain from doing certain things as are allegedly required by law; (3) administrative control, in which elected or appointed officials of the central executive, acting within the authority conferred on. them by law, influence or attempt to influence the conduct of local governments.

Judging the accomplishments of the past by the standards of the present, perhaps each generation must make its own attempt at understanding the great masters. It has been said that “Ricardo was the first to present a complete model—one which, for all its faults, was self-consistent and displayed the whole economy as a single interdependent system.” The present paper is an attempt to isolate that self-consistent model and to set it out rigorously. Anyone trying to isolate it must be painfully aware of the possibility that what he is removing may be more valuable than what he is preserving. However, the criterion of consistency leaves him little choice. Having isolated the self-consistent model, he must relate it to our own thinking. The latter emphasizes aggregation, occupies itself increasingly with the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world, and sees no “law” of diminishing returns outside agriculture. In these three senses it is becoming more Ricardian.

Consider three sectors, each producing a homogeneous product or service, that is, a consumers' goods industry, a producers' goods industry, and a labour household sector. The subscripts used to designate the three sectors are c, p, and l, respectively. The consumers' goods industry is facing a production function having one output and three inputs in it. The output consists of consumers' goods, the inputs consist of labour services, services rendered by durable man-made producers' goods, and services rendered by indestructible nature-given land.

Our subject concerns the dialogue held between English financiers and Canadian politicians and the response of Lombard Street to the calls of the Province of Canada over the last ten or fifteen years of its existence. Its scope is limited because of the limited array of materials surveyed. The intention is to review some of the correspondence between the financial agents in London and the Canadian ministers or other officials entrusted with English money through the agents. The materials comprise some two hundred letters, a few duplicates of which can be found in the Baring collection at the Public Archives in Ottawa, which the author was fortunate enough to peruse at Glyn, Mills & Co., Lombard Street, London.

These fragmentary materials have been marshalled back into the conventional framework of Canadian economic history, where in the author's estimation they belong, in order that they might shed some more light on matters already known. The role of the agents in money matters exerted a remarkable influence on Canada's political affairs, to the extent that the presence of the English investor implied some kind of participation in the decision-making process of the Province of Canada. The English press may have exerted a similar influence, since it reflected the attitude of those financially interested in Canada, whether directly or indirectly.

Not all of the difficulties that the Province had been through in the last decade of its existence can be traced back, however, to its financial connection with the English money market. Indeed, several problems arose from its commercial structure, its precarious trade pattern upon which the neighbouring states exerted a continuous pull, the deflated expectations of Canadian traders as regards the western trade, and the over-all modification of trade channels which accompanied the cotton revolution. Yet we have chosen here to single out one factor—the opinion of Lombard Street—by way of suggesting the importance of market forces in the shaping of Canadian economic policies.

Much attention has been devoted by sociologists and social psychologists to the question of the introduction of new members into a group or society. Preoccupation with this broad problem is visible, for instance, in studies of conversion to a religion, of movement from one social class to another, and of change of residence from one community or country to another. Not all studies, however, deal with the same aspects of the problem. Some focus on the factors which bring about such movement from one group to another. Others are concerned with the effects the movement has on both the group of origin and the group of destination. Finally, a good proportion of the studies purport to answer the following questions: What changes occur in the basic values, sentiments, and ways of behaving of the individual? To what extent are there such changes, and through what processes do they take place? This latter group of studies centres on concepts such as acculturation, integration, assimilation, adaptation, or absorption.

These concepts all refer to the same phenomenon, although perhaps from different angles. Park and Burgess, for instance, present the following general notion of “assimilation”: “A process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” Blau has a very similar conception of the integration of the socially mobile into a new class. So does Eisenstadt with the concept of “adaptation,” although his definition is stated in terms of the final result rather than in terms of the process whereby it is achieved.

It is far from easy to decide, at any given moment, whether the state of a particular branch of intellectual inquiry is to be described as healthy or unhealthy, as full of promise or stagnant and moribund. The criteria of advance are not clear and personal bias may distort judgment. Development seems to take place not in a smooth upward trend but in a series of discontinuous steps. What seems at first sight to be a period of inactivity or even decline may on a longer view turn out to be merely a necessary pause preparatory to further growth. Anyone undertaking to appraise the present state of an intellectual discipline such as economic history must therefore be aware that his task is a hazardous one.

There is no scarcity of evidence to suggest that economic history is at present in critical condition, at least in the United States. Traditionally tied to both history and economics and called upon to meet the expectations of each, it has always led a somewhat precarious existence. At least since the First World War its relationship to economic theory, always debatable, has become tenuous, until today it is a common experience to find in the same university department economic historians who know little economic theory and find no use for what they do know, and economic theorists who know little history and have no interest in learning more. This alienation has proceeded far beyond the normal differences of emphasis that might be expected to exist between specialists in the inductive and the deductive methods. Economic theory today, in most of its branches, neither draws on economic history for its data nor goes to economic history for empirical verification. Economic history, for its part, commonly uses only the crudest of the tools in the economist's tool-box, and displays almost complete indifference to the refinements in analytical methods that occupy the theorist's working time. The consequences of this divorce have been unfortunate for economic history. Some would say they have been unfortunate for economic theory also.

The public face of events is often very different from their true inward nature. Sometimes it is possible so to arrange things that the real facts have been wholly concealed and a harmless but false conclusion is drawn from events. The appointment of John Buchan as Governor General of Canada in 1935 is a case in point. MacGregor Dawson, like everybody else, drew a conclusion from that appointment which can now be shown to differ from the actual constitutional lesson which emerges from the evidence. He said: “Mr. Bennett stated in 1936 that when Lord Tweedsmuir's name was being considered, he, as Prime Minister, first discussed the matter with Mr. Mackenzie King, the Leader of the Opposition, so that the Governor's appointment was in effect quite non-partisan in character inasmuch as it carried the approval of the leaders of both major parties.”

This arrangement of bi-partisan recommendation, he said, “may prove to be an accepted practice.” Whatever its practical advantages, a moment's reflection will show that it is hardly in accord with the theory of responsible government. Furthermore, the events which led up to this particular appointment were far more complex, and lead inescapably to a rather different set of conclusions.