In this paper I wish to examine the claim that it would be possible for us now to do something which would be the posterior efficient cause of some past event. I am not prepared to discuss the physics of elementary particles, and I will not consider what is sometimes called time reversal. Rather my analysis will be limited to cases in which it is alleged that we, in a world of middle-sized physical objects where most causes precede or are simultaneous with their effects, could conceivably do something so that something else should have happened. I will argue that some of the cases which meet this description are indeed backwards causation if one is prepared to make certain (not uncommon) assumptions about time. I will not evaluate these assumptions; rather I will try to clarify them and to make plain their implications for causality. For the argument about backwards causation is most fundamentally, or so I will try to show, an argument about the nature of time.

By an incomplete sentence we shall understand a declarative sentence that can be used, without variation in its meaning, to make different statements in different contexts. Although the point deserves supporting argument, which we will not provide, sentences whose grammatical subjects are indexical expressions or demonstratives are obvious, plausible examples of incomplete sentences. Uttered in one context the sentence ‘He is ill’ may be used to make one statement, for example, that George is ill, while in another context the very same sentence may be used to make a quite different statement, for example, that Paul is ill.

One of the most significant discoveries of early twentieth century mathematical logic was a workable definition of ‘ordered pair’ totally within set theory. Norbert Wiener, and independently Casimir Kuratowski, are usually credited with this discovery. A definition of ‘ordered pair’ held the key to the precise formulation of the notions of ‘relation’ and ‘function’ — both of which are probably indispensable for an understanding of the foundations of mathematics. The set-theoretic definition of ‘ordered pair’ thus turned out to be a key victory for logicism, providing one admits set theory is logic. The definition also was instrumental in achieving the appearance of ontological economy — since it seemed only sets were needed — although this feature was emphasized only later.

Epistemological foundationalism has typically been thought to hold that in order to account for human knowledge we must countenance the direct Justification of some specific kind of beliefs, such as one's beliefs to the effect that one is having a certain sensation. How else, it may be thought, can one analyse Justification without confronting an infinite regress or a vicious circle? I believe that this conception of foundationalism has been so influential that most foundationalists and nearly all their critics have failed to appreciate that foundationalism may be plausibly construed as a thesis mainly about the structure of a body of Justified beliefs. Central to the thesis, so interpreted, is that one's Justified beliefs divide into foundations and superstructure; but no particular content on the part of either set of beliefs need be required. This latitude regarding content is altogether appropriate; for if we use, as a guide to understanding foundationalism, the famous regress argument, from which the thesis derives much of its plausibility, then the only foundations required by the thesis are beliefs whose Justification does not depend on that of other beliefs. Precisely what beliefs these are is a controversial matter on which foundationalists may differ.

Jürger Habermas has been attempting to develop a critical theory of society with a practical intent, on the basis of communication and a theory of the evolution of practical and moral social competence. He thinks that the studies of language rules (or capacities) and language learning (or acquisition) from Piaget, Searle, Chomsky and others have and continue to provide models elsewhere - from productive activity to moral activity. Moreover, the models are said to extend to social learning, which will be exhibited in the development of society.

Furthermore, speech acts, which are to be described by a theory of pragmatics, anticipate the establishment of ideal speech situations, which are the avenue to ‘truth, freedom, and Justice.'

More and more frequently, the general question whether there is an identifiable feminist methodology for investigating historical and philosophical writings about ‘the problem of women’ is raised. As of yet, there is no general, let alone systematic answer to this question, and many would claim it to be unanswerable. Ultimately, indeed, nothing short of the creation of an entirely new form of rationality would seem to be required, if the issue is to replace the so-called phallocentric grammar of our culture.

My suggestion here is that a significant way to provide elements of answers to this general question is to analyze works already done in this field with the view of delineating some of the conditions under which an adequate treatment of the women issue can be made. One such condition will be discussed here. It will be claimed that unless one is clear about the issue of equality, one cannot address the central issue raised by most writings on women.