The end of the twentieth century is marked by tensions between universalism and particularism which are particularly glaring in plurinational and pluriethnic countries. This article attempts first to demonstrate the importance and the difficulty in reaching a balance between unity and diversity in pluralistic countries. Even in the cases of Canada and Belgium, where conditions are among the most favourable, federal solutions adopted since the 1960s have not achieved the desired balance. A comparison of the evolution of federalism and collective identities in both Canada and Belgium reveals that opposing federal solutions have led to a similar fragmentation of identities. Pierre Trudeau's pancanadianism and the constitutional linguistic and cultural cloisonnement in Belgium have inhibited the realization of balance between unity and diversity. These choices have further contributed to the fragmentation process already in progress, the first through excessive universalism, the second through excessive particularism. The last part of the article seeks to evaluate the implications of these results for the debates on citizenship in political philosophy.

The disclosure in 1987 that dioxins were present in pulp mill effluents prompted governments throughout the world to revise their environmental standards for the pulp and paper industry. This article uses the pulp and paper case to examine the dynamics of environmental standard setting within the Canadian federal state. Provincial regulatory incentives are analyzed using two-player games as a heuristic. The article then considers the federal government's role in establishing national standards. Many authors have emphasized the importance of federal involvement to overcome provincial reluctance to regulate unilaterally, lest jobs be lost to jurisdictions with weaker environmental standards. However, few have considered whether the federal government has incentives to do just that. It is argued that those incentives are weak at best, in light of resistance from both the regulated industry and jurisdictionally defensive provinces. In environmental regulation of the Canadian pulp and paper industry, federal reluctance resulted in a two-tier system of environmental standards with strict standards for the largest provinces, and weaker ones for smaller provinces that rely more on the federal government.

Previous literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.

One of the most challenging developments for students of international relations is the resurgence of ethnic strife. While it may be true that there have been few recent interstate wars, it would be incorrect to assume that ethnic turmoil will remain an isolated domestic problem. Recent interventions by individual states, either in support of, or opposition to, ethnic challenges, raise important questions about the validity of conventional perspectives on interstate conflict: Why do some states intervene in ethnic strife while others do not? Why do some third-party states rely on violence to support ethnic conflicts while others support norms of peaceful mediation? This investigation uses Putnam's two-level game to examine the impact of ethnicity on third-party intervention. Evidence from the Balkans war and Indo-Sri Lankan conflict show how heads of state must coordinate actions at two bargaining “tables,” which correspond to domestic politics and international negotiation. By monitoring strategies and tactics at each, it becomes possible to understand superficially puzzling developments. More specifically, initiatives in one domain may be a function of constraints or opportunities imposed by the other. These insights appear as propositions related to commitment, autonomy, domestic costs and manipulation of perceptions

This research note considers the complex relationship between the electoral and party systems in Canada from 1921 to 1993. By drawing on Douglas Rae's theoretical model, the note demonstrates that the electoral system exerts a powerful influence on the party system and makes the case that important regional information is often washed out in national-level results. Furthermore, a novel approach is taken to the measurement of regional data in a federal election—a comparison of the indices of fragmentation of the regions and the country provide an interesting explanation for some of the stunning changes in parliamentary representation in 1993. In interpreting the 1993 Canadian general election in this framework, the author argues that although the results in parliament seem to indicate momentous changes in Canadian politics, the voting patterns are, nonetheless, consistent with Canadian political history.