This article argues that the cartel party thesis is not supported by empirical evidence in the Canadian case. Even though Canadian parties at the federal level colluded to provide themselves with funding and to hinder the entry of new parties into the system, they were not transformed into cartel patties. Canadian parties have not become primarily reliant on state resources, and the specific formulas for delivery of public funding do not remove or greatly diminish parties' incentives to solicit support from the public. Parties' ties to civil society consequently remain intact. There is little evidence for the consequent diminution of party competition or increased interpenetration of state and society posited by the cartel thesis. The article argues that the cartel model is largely inapplicable to anglo-american political systems because it fails to take into account the effect of specific forms of state funding.

While prior studies have applied schema theory to belief systems in the mass public, it has yet to be used to assess attitudes held by elites in society. This article uses schema theory to suggest that justices of the Supreme Court of Canada employ an information processing model when deciding search and seizure cases. Specifically, it implies that the justices have a schema, or an organized set of attitudes, that are triggered by the factual and legal circumstances in particular search and seizure cases. The belief that justices would use such a heuristic device makes sense, given that they are expected to resolve disputes in a quick and efficient manner as well as maintain consistency in the law. The study uses factor analysis to provide evidence that there is an underlying structure to the attitudes that Canadian justices use in these cases (1984–1994). It adds to the prior research in this area, because it moves schema theory beyond the study of mass belief systems, and it represents a unique way of assessing the judicial decision-making process of Canadian justices since the adoption in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

This article reconsiders findings that emphasize the importance of governments' abilities to impose losses on powerful groups, while arguing that loss imposition is more problematic under separation of powers systems. The author argues that empirical evidence to this effect is thin, that more leverage can be obtained by comparing the policy decisions of subnational jurisdictions in the United States and Canada and that automobile insurance reform is an especially appropriate issue to study. Drawing on both aggregate analysis and case studies, the author presents findings suggesting that the Westminster-style parliamentary system in Canada indeed makes loss imposition easier than does the separation of powers system in the United States.

This article analyzes data on incumbent turnover in 103 provincial elections in Canada from 1960 to 1997. The author examines total turnover and the proportions attributable to retirement and electoral defeat. He notes that the overall rate of turnover in the provincial legislative assemblies is similar to that of the Canadian House of Commons. Further, voluntary retirement and electoral defeat comprise equal proportions of the total turnover. There are, however, important differences in the turnover rate and in its makeup, both by province and by time period. The author tests several models in an attempt to determine the correlates of turnover in Canadian provincial legislatures.