In book I of the Treatise Hume argues that we have no reason to believe what we do about matters of fact (139, 265); these beliefs are not “just conclusions” (89), nor are they “built on solid reasoning” (90). Therefore, all such beliefs are equally unjustified no matter how they are acquired. One might suppose, then, that he would hold that no ranking of ways of acquiring beliefs is possible; all are on a par, since all the resulting beliefs are unreasonable.

Language theorists have recently come to have an increasing appreciation for the fact that context contributes heavily in determining our interpretation of what is said. Indeed, it now seems clear that no complete understanding of a natural language is possible without some account of the way in which context affects our interpretation of discourse. In this paper, I will attempt to explore one facet of the language – context relationship, namely, the relation between conditionals and context. The first part of the paper develops an account of truth for conditionals which allows them to depend on momentary features of the context in which they are uttered. In the second half of the paper, comparisons with other recent theories of the conditional will be considered. Particular attention will be given to the problem of whether the conditional really violates classical inferences such as Hypothetical Syllogism and Contraposition as has often been claimed in recent years.

If we accept the traditional definition of knowledge according to which S knows that P provided that (i) P is true, (ii) S accepts P and (iii) S is justified in believing that P, the Gettier's counter-examples will prompt us to look for a fourth condition to complete the analyses of knowledge. Before we determine whether such a fourth condition is, indeed, needed and, if so, how it is to be formulated, we may do well to examine with some care the situations which, according to Gettier, are counter to the traditional definition of knowledge. There are two reasons why this course of action is to be recommended. First, it may enable us to expose the presuppositions, other than those involved in the traditional definition of knowledge itself, which Gettier appeals to in order to construct his counter-examples. Second, this may provide us with an insight into exactly what it is that is supposed to be wrong with that definition.

Chapter fifteen of Leviathan is concerned with what Hobbes calls “the laws of nature”; however, it is evident from the start that justice is the central problem of the chapter. Hobbes demonstrates a rather subtle sensitivity to a possible misunderstanding of his views on the state of nature and the function of natural reason by inventing the character of the fool who purports to use Hobbes' own principle of self-interest to deny the existence of justice. The fool may finally be a “straw man” who proposes precisely that argument which Hobbes can quickly refute, but even if this is so, the straw man has Hobbes' face, or one like it, because the line between the views of the fool and those of Hobbes himself is very fine indeed. This section of Leviathan is more significant than it would seem at first glance because it provides an avenue by means of which one can distinguish the political philosophy of Hobbes from that of classical “individualists” such as Callicles and Thrasymachus. It is all too easy to read Hobbes as an elaborate restatement of the sophistic position of Socrates' famous opponents; the example of the fool belies this facile identity and to a certain extent constitutes a refutation of the classical power theorists.

In a recent review David Gauthier presents two arguments designed to support the eminently comforting belief that, while recognizing aboriginal rights in Canada will entail some costs for the dominant European community, these costs will be of a comparatively modest nature, and certainly far less than the sort of compensation currently claimed by the indigenous peoples themselves. Unfortunately for the Europeans, but fortunately for the indigenes, there seems to be no moral justification whatsoever for the arguments he adduces. In fact, the only way his arguments can be made to work is by assuming that radically different sets of moral principles operate for different peoples. As usually happens in such cases, the Europeans get better protection from the moral principles designed for them, than the aborigines do from the principles designed (as it happens, by the Europeans) for them.

La relation d'identité est-elle univoque, ou est-elle au contraire relative au concept sous lequel le jugement est énoncé? Depuis quelques années, parmi les philosophes anglo-américains, partisans et adversaires de la thèse que l'on a appelée « la relativité de l'identité », se sont affrontés sur ce point.

Entre deux philosophes on n'établit de confrontation radicale et, éventuellement, de filiation effective que du point de vue des principes de l'intelligibilité. Or, ce n'est pas du tout de ce point de vue central que l'on s'est géneralement placé pour apprécier l'influence de Hobbes sur Spinoza. Presque toujours, on s'est restreint à la sphère de la théorie politique. En première apparence, les textes de Spinoza lui-même cautionnent ce parti-pris, puisqu'on n'y trouve explicitement cité le nom de Hobbes qu'en deux endroits, le Théologico-politique, note XXXIII au chapitre XVI et la lettre L à Jarig Jelles, du 2 juin 1674, qui ont en commun de prétendre l'un comme l'autre s'opposer à la pensée politique de Hobbes. Quant à la litterature critique, on peut se référer à l'exemple d'un ouvrage particulièrement attentif aux problèmes de sources et d'influences: The Philosophy of Spinoza de H.A. Wolson, dans ses chapitres consacrés à la méthode, évoque beaucoup d'anciens et de modemes, sans dire un seul mot de Hobbes.

Lorsqu'on pense au rapport qu'entretient la théorie révolutionnaire de Marx avec la philosophie allemande, et plus particulièrement avec l'ldéalisme allemand, on ne s'interroge, le plus souvent, que sur le problème de la Dialectique: l'Idéalisme allemand est réduit « depuis Kant » à la conclusion de ce mouvement philosophique qu'est la philosophie hégélienne. Mais comment critiquer l'Idéalisme de la philosophie hégélienne, tout en conservant le contenu à savoir la dialectique, ou comment faire passer la dialectique du camp de l'ldéalisme à celui du matérialisme? Tel serait l'intérêt d'une étude sur la relation de Marx et de l'Idéalisme allemand, tel pourrait être l'enjeu d'une critique de la philosophie hégélienne.

This book should be of interest to philosophers because it shows how important empiricist/rationalist debates are to a large range of issues. Sampson is a defender of empiricism, of liberalism, and of a tie between them. He has produced a sustained attack on Chomsky's Cartesianism and on his political views. He tells us that “the central aim of this book has been to show that Chomsky's fine-sounding words about human nature actually mean something close to the opposite of what they appear to say” (210). This suggests that Chomsky has written in an Aesopian language which Sampson has generously agreed to translate for us. It also makes Sampson's interpretation difficult to attack. Given his interpretive principle, there would appear to be no way of demonstrating that he has misinterpreted, misunderstood, or falsified the text he purports to be criticizing. Accordingly, I shall content myself with suggesting a few ways in which he seems to be in error. There can, however, be no doubt that Sampson seeks to make evident the philosophical foundations of the “principled liberalism of Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph” (39).

Space (better: space-time) is a particular, the particular thing structuring our world. It has shape. And size. And reference to space and its properties is fundamental to physical explanation. This, in a nutshell, is Nerlich's position. Espousing it Nerlich marches against the tide of philosophical opinion which dominated the first half or more of this century.

His arguments are laid out in a wholly enjoyable book: clearly and simply written, ‘meaty’ in argument and lucid in explanation. The book does not have the same technical scope in theoretical physics as do its relevant companions (e.g., Earman et al. [2], Grunbaum [3], Sklar [16], Winnie [18]). Rather, the book is a sustained argument aimed at establishing the theses with which I began and its content has been selected accordingly. But the clarity of presentation and consistency of argument recommend it as a major contribution to the field. It is especially to be recommended to the non-technical philosopher. And there is another important reason for commending it: much of the argumentation of the book is not to be found elsewhere, it fills an important gap in the field. I need hardly add that I find myself in sympathy with Nerlich's position.