These words were written by a preacher-theologian of grey hairs and very great learning: “‘In the fullness of time’ God sent forth his Son, a pre-existent divine Being, who appears on earth as a man. He dies the death of a sinner on the cross and makes atonement for the sins of men… What a primitive mythology it is, that a divine Being should become incarnate, and atone for the sins of men through his own blood” Since 1941, when those wartime words were written, Dr. Bultmann has checked his inclination to apply the term “myth” in wholesale fashion, but his demythologizing works continue to be widely quoted, and their claims can still produce annoyance in the reader and plain uncertainty over what to make of the term “myth”, with its unmistakable smell of something not wanted. In this paper I want first to look into Bultmann's use of that word, and then, by remembering some things from the history of philosophy, to replace that uncertainty if possible with a smile of recognition.

Je ferai porter ces quelques réflexions sur les difficultés et l'importance de l'enseignement de la philosophie Pour situer le rôle du philosophe, je caractériserai d'abord à larges traits le contexte culturel dans lequel se situe le problème de la crise de las philosophie et de la crise de l'enseignement de la philosophie. Ce contexte est d'abord celui de notre société québécoise. Notre société depuis quelques années est sortie d'un long sommeil qui nous gardait à l'écart de l'histoire, repliés sur nous-mêmes dans une attitude défensive de fuite de la réalité. Ce qui caractérise ce réveil, c'est la volonté d'identification de l'homme canadien-français. La donnée fondamentale de ces dernières années, c'est ce cheminement obscur vers la vérité de nous-mêmes à travers la médiation et la promotion du groupe national. Avant d'être crise constitutionnelle ou économique ou sociale, la crise qui nous secoue concerne la perception profonde de nous-mêmes. Nous cherchons à tâtons ce que nous sommes du plus profond de notre ètre historique; nous luttons contre de fausses identifications de nous-mêmes pour libérer la source créatrice de notre destin en commun.

La première grande question qui se pose au lecteur de la Critique de la Raison Dialectique est certainement celle des rapports entre les problématiques sartrienne et marxiste. Dans sa conclusion à Questions de Méthode, Sartre la forrnule clairement en écrivant que l'existentialisme « ne remet rien en question, sauf un déterminisme mécaniste qui n'est précisément pas marxiste et qu'on a introduit du dehors dans cette philosophie totale. Il veut, lui aussi, situer l'homme dans sa classe et dans les conflits qui l'opposent aux autres classes à partir du mode et des relations de production. Mais il veut tenter cette ‘situation’, à partir de l'existence, c'est-à-dire de la compréhension ». En termes plus généraux, l'existentialisme « veut dans le Savoir même et dans l'universalité des concepts réintroduire l'indépassable singularité de l'aventure humaine ». Nous sommes donc ici simultanément en présence d'une profession de foi dans le marxisme—car même la carence que Sartre reproche à celui-ci, l'élimination de l'homme, «tient à l'événement et non aux principes mêmes de la doctrine»—et d'une volonté d'introduire dans cette philosophie une méthode propre à l'idéologie de l'existence.

Professor Weinberg, in his recent Abstraction, Relation, and Induction, has critically discussed the nominalistic tradition stemming from Ockham and continuing in the work of Berkeley and Hume. In this tradition there is one fundamental principle, which however divides into two parts. The first is (α) Whatever is distinguishable is distinct, and conversely. The second is (β) Whatever is distinct is separable, and conversely. Weinberg argues that both (α) and (β) are mistaken.

In this paper I propose to explore the case against nominalism. I shall suggest that Weinberg's argument against (β), though not defective in the way some recent critics believe, depends upon a hidden premiss. I shall also suggest that the argument against (β), when the needed premiss is added, is but a special case of a more general argument. The latter in no way depends upon considerations concerning relational predicates, though Weinberg does in his discussion specifically introduce such considerations. Nor is that unreasonable on his part.

Several difficulties that accompany Plato's theory of Forms have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature in the past half century. A great deal of discussion and controversy surrounds the dialogue Parmenides and the group of considerations commonly called the “Third Man Argument”. Our purpose here is to strike out in one direction suggested by this passage (Parmenides 132 a-b, 132 d), but it can in no way be thought of as an exegesis nor a logical elucidation of the “Third Man Argument” itself. While what we shall say here has an obvious affinity and connection with the Parmenides passage, the two principal questions that concern us here are of a more general nature than the specific points in the Parmenides. The first is whether Plato's theory of Forms involves a regress which is ruinous to the theory. The second is, if a self-destructive regress is a necessary consequence of the theory, what elements of Plato's theory make the regress inescapable.

The subject of this study is an ambiguity which is deeply rooted in Berkeley's arguments against matter. By a is shift between two meanings of the term ‘sensible’, he is able to construct a simple “refutation” of matter. Berkeley then attempts to show that this argument is irrefutable. The ambiguity of the original argument is, however, contained in the train of supporting arguments. My purpose in bringing attention to this ambiguity is not just to reveal a mistake in Berkeley's arguments against matter. This particular mistake, I believe, deserves scrutiny not only because it is a mistake, but also because it explains the strategy and order of Berkeley's arguments against matter. Furthermore, if this explanation is correct, then some light can be cast on some puzzling features of Berkeley's philosophy.