This report examines what has come to be known as “vaccine nationalism” through the lens of the early experience with the COVID-19 vaccination process. After explaining the meaning of the term, this report investigates how this phenomenon has manifested during the COVID-19 pandemic, identifying its epidemiological, economical, ethical and legal aspects. It also looks at the different international initiatives that have been adopted to deal with it, concentrating in this context on the COVAX project. The report concludes that the success of these initiatives has been limited. It also observes that COVID-19 vaccine nationalism appears to be a phenomenon that is characteristic of the high-income Western countries, while in aspiring non-Western powers the vaccine crisis is primarily seen as a way to advance their geopolitical goals.

Digital vaccination certification involves making many promises, few of which can realistically be kept. In this paper, we demonstrate how this phenomenon constitutes various forms of theatre – immunity theatre, border theatre, behavioural theatre and equality theatre – doing so by drawing on perspectives from technology regulation, migration studies and critical geopolitics. Technological theatre and political theatre often serve valid functions, but these forms are problematic for several reasons. First, they involve real-world infrastructures that, while unlikely to accomplish the task at hand, will nevertheless last a long time and be repurposed. They therefore constitute governance by data infrastructure, diverting action and control away from elected legislators to for-profit contractors. Second, vaccine certification effectively legitimises inequalities between countries and people by formalising ways to distinguish between the vaccinated and non-vaccinated and to exclude the latter, thus reinforcing both mobility and connectivity divides. It serves as a way to (further) close borders and to regulate, through code and infrastructure, access to public goods such as employment and public space. Finally, the project of certification displaces a more important action, namely addressing the radical inequality in countries’ ability to combat the pandemic.

This article takes issue with the legitimacy of EU soft law instruments issued to deal with the COVID-19 crisis. Up to August 2020, we identified a total of 197 such instruments, and analysed the procedures for their adoption. We found little evidence of parliamentary involvement or stakeholder consultation, with COVID-19 soft law replicating decision-making patterns which have been constantly criticised in the literature as illegitimate and opaque. Giving due consideration to the exceptional nature of these measures, the article suggests some quick fixes which might increase, ex post factum, the legitimacy of these instruments.

The extensive disruption to and digital transformation of travel administration across borders largely due to COVID-19 mean that digital vaccine passports are being developed to resume international travel and kick-start the global economy. Currently, a wide range of actors are using a variety of different approaches and technologies to develop such a system. This paper considers the techno-ethical issues raised by the digital nature of vaccine passports and the application of leading-edge technologies such as blockchain in developing and deploying them. We briefly analyse four of the most advanced systems – IBM’s Digital Health Passport “Common Pass,” the International Air Transport Association’s Travel Pass, the Linux Foundation Public Health’s COVID-19 Credentials Initiative and the Vaccination Credential Initiative (Microsoft and Oracle) – and then consider the approach being taken for the EU Digital COVID Certificate. Each of these raises a range of issues, particularly relating to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the need for standards and due diligence in the application of innovative technologies (eg blockchain) that will directly challenge policymakers when attempting to regulate within the network of networks.

Despite robust evidence on the benefits of gum mastication as compared to its risks, places such as Singapore still outlaw chewing gum outside of medicinal purposes. Chewing gum has therapeutic and cognitive benefits such as reduced stress and increased attention, and its associated costs such as littering are disproportionately upheld and still prosecuted against in Singapore. This is a clear example of a policy implemented based on perception rather than cost–benefit analysis. Policies, even as minor as those related to gum mastication, must be entrenched in evidence, and any accompanying costs (eg littering) can and should be deterred through evidence-based communication efforts.

This article discusses the role of European Union (EU) State aid law in the COVID-19 crisis. It contends that different Treaty derogations have played unique roles in addressing the core determinants of the economic risk linked to the pandemic (ie the “exposure” to lockdown measures and the “vulnerability” of certain sectors to them), and in increasing the resilience of national economies. Moreover, this article examines the extent to which EU State aid law has been used to manage and mitigate health risks, by allowing Member States to enhance the preparedness and capacity of their healthcare sector (broadly conceived) to respond to the pandemic. On the whole, this article maintains that State aid control has been used by the European Commission as an important “risk management tool”, and it highlights the role of the Commission as the crisis management authority.

More than 40 years after Cassis de Dijon, the mutual recognition in the field of goods is still a failure. The promise of this principle for ensuring both market access and regulatory diversity has not been kept. Therefore, today, businesses rarely rely on mutual recognition to sell their products in another Member State. In an attempt to stimulate this procedure further, the European Union legislator tried to simplify the procedures to be followed by businesses and public administrations through Regulation 2019/515. This article argues that, although the Regulation creates more legal certainty, it fundamentally fails to address the underlying problem of lack of trust that has stalled mutual recognition in the past.

The Digital Green Certificate (DGC) proposed by the European Commission on the basis of facilitating the free movement rights of European Union (EU) citizens will be capable of effectively serving as a COVID-19 passport. In this contribution, we cast doubt on whether the DGC is fit for purpose, highlighting in particular the potential for the DGC to in fact facilitate greater free movement restrictions for a large number of EU citizens, in particular those who have received non- European Medicines Agency (EMA)-approved vaccines such as Sputnik V in compliance with EU law. Under the proposal as amended by the European Parliament, any destination Member State that accepts proof of vaccination “in order to waive restrictions to free movement” must apply the same waiver to any DGC-holder that has received an EMA-approved vaccine and has the option of doing so for vaccines added to the World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing; however, such equal treatment is not available for DGC-holders who have received non-EMA/WHO vaccines. While this measure was alleged to be taken on grounds of public health, a convincing public health case has not been put forward. Instead, the DGC proposal as it stands disregards the promise of the internal market and sets the stage for its fragmentation through geopolitics and bilateralism.

Personalised nutrition, the tailoring of nutrition products, services or advice to individual characteristics such as genetics, phenotype, nutritional intake and/or exercise routine, is increasingly attracting the interest of industry, consumers and researchers. This article provides an overview of the current European Union (EU) regulatory framework as applying to personalised nutrition and draws attention to the important role of EU food law in the regulation of this innovative approach to nutrition. It is argued that personalised nutrition challenges the regulatory borderline between health and lifestyle products or services and, furthermore, also pushes the boundaries of current food safety and health claims legislation.

On 23 October 2019 the European Union enacted the Whistleblower Protection Directive. The directive introduces important common standards of protection for whistleblowers reporting on breaches of EU law and significantly increases the level of protection afforded to whistleblowers in many EU Member States. Many of the features of the directive go further than pre-existing national whistleblower protection regimes, particularly in relation to the categories of persons who may benefit from the protections under the directive and in terms of the flexibility of the prescribed reporting procedures. Nevertheless, the directive's effectiveness may be limited by certain grey-areas and missed opportunities in the final text of the instrument.

While, historically, alcohol production and sale were local matters, commercialised and industrialised alcohol has supervened, globalised initially through European empires, transforming alcohol’s place in everyday life. But alcohol was not included in the current international drug control system, initiated in 1912. In the current “UN system” of 35 intergovernmental agencies, alcohol has been a recurrent concern in the work only of the World Health Organization (WHO). Examples are given of the sporadic involvement in alcohol issues of other agencies, and the history of WHO’s involvement between 1950 and early 2020 is briefly described. At WHO, the place of alcohol programming in its structure and which other topics it is linked with have been recurrent issues. Civil society support for alcohol initiatives has been comparatively weak, and alcohol industry counter-pressure has been strong. Alcohol issues have thus received less attention at the intergovernmental level than the harm would justify. Constraining factors have included not only lobbying by industry interests, but also the multi-sectoral nature of alcohol problems and the international cultural position of alcohol as a luxury good served at gatherings of political and media elites.

This article proposes and discusses the text of a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control, which would serve public health and welfare interests. The history of alcohol’s omission from current drug treaties is briefly discussed. The paper spells out what should be covered in the treaty, using text adapted primarily from the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, but for the control of trade from the 1961 narcotic drugs treaty. While the draft provides for the treaty to be negotiated under the auspices of the World Health Organization, other auspices are possible. Excluding alcohol industry interests from the negotiation of the treaty is noted as an important precondition. The articles in the draft treaty and their purposes are briefly described, and the divergences from the tobacco treaty are described and justified. The text of the draft treaty is provided as Supplementary Material. Specification of concrete provisions in a draft convention points the way towards more effective global actions and agreements on alcohol control, whatever form they take.

Evolving consumer tastes and competing food trends have made the modern foodscape ever more complex for food and beverage companies to navigate. Not only must food companies deliver products that are safe to consume, but they must also be wary of consumer perceptions of risk, which can undermine new foods and established brands. Risk communication refers to the collection and analysis of real-time information through social listening and other avenues to provide advice to organisations and individuals facing threats to their economic or social well-being. Companies use a range of tools in this area, including polling and social media monitoring, in addition to social listening; however, these tools often fail to get at the sentiments that underlie the concerns identified. Behavioural science is particularly relevant to companies working in controversial sectors to anticipate issues and to respond before they become problems. For this reason, companies are establishing behavioural science teams in order to improve strategic decision-making and enhance the effectiveness of marketing campaigns.