In this paper, we examine consultation procedures in the light of behavioural sciences. We feature consultation as a dialogue between the administration and the participants in the form of a public good game with one or more tournaments. Our focus is on the architecture of the dialogue and its design. We propose three models characterised by the varying degrees of the interaction among participants, and between participants and the administration, occurring during the consultation process. We suggest that mapping stakeholders according to homogeneity of interest influences the structure and affects the dialogue taking place during the consultation process. We then examine the levels of efforts parties would engage in, defining models that maximise efforts and adjust for different cognitive stakeholders’ capabilities, advocating an empirical approach. The paper concludes with policy recommendations on how to improve the current consultation design deployed at EU and national level.

Fake news is a symptom of deeper structural problems in our societies and media environments. To counter it, policymakers need to take into account the underlying, self-reinforcing mechanisms that make this old phenomenon so pervasive today. Only by taking a step back can we examine the vulnerabilities these fake news narratives exploit. This article provides a first taxonomy of anti-fake news approaches. It argues that proposed anti-fake news laws focus on the trees rather than the forest. As such, they will not only remain irrelevant but also aggravate the root causes fuelling the fake news phenomenon.

The question of effective law has been studied in many fields of research, such as philosophy and sociology of law, law and economics, public policy and behavioural sciences. This article aims to treat it as a genuine administrative law issue which is currently having a significant impact on administrative procedures, especially affecting the way in which rules are adopted and implemented. Furthermore, the article attempts to reconcile conflicting views in existing literature on the meaning of effective law and on which factors lead to effectiveness by proposing an integrated approach: starting from a regulatory perspective it considers both traditional determinants of effectiveness, ie compliance and enforcement, as well as the emerging aspect of outcomes, focused on the idea that a rule can be defined as effective when its desired effects have been achieved and the public interest which justifies the rule has been safeguarded without producing unwanted or disfunctional consequences.

Far from being simply a decisional problem for institutions (arising in legislative, regulatory and administrative procedures), effectiveness calls for a “steering administration” and represents a criterion for decision-making, since expected effectiveness can be used in the logic of “whether” and “how” institutions should arrive at decisions.

The purpose of this contribution is to analyse the role granted to – or assumed by – the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (“ACER”) in relation to the implementation of Regulation 1227/20111 (“REMIT”), with a specific focus on the electricity market. It ultimately calls for a clarification of the status of ACER in the European energy regulatory framework.

The technical, natural science-based approach, with a focus on the likelihood of possible consequences and damage potential, has been adapted to deal with risks, such as genetically modified organisms, or newly synthesised materials, which cannot be managed merely by existing technocratic procedures. For a number of years already, professional risk assessment and management communities have advocated for a change, claiming that major controversies, crises and scandals around food, environmental health and technological innovations have necessitated a reshaping of traditional risk regulation towards a more integrative risk governance.1 In this approach risk experts, policy-makers, stakeholders and civil society organisations (CSOs) are working together towards identifying risks, generating and evaluating options, and coming to a strategy. This is reflected, for example, in the analytic-deliberative approach embodied in the modified IRGC Risk Governance Framework2 that includes concern assessment in parallel with the more conventional risk assessment. Decision-makers need to understand the nature and strengths of societal concerns and consider them alongside more technical recommendations for action. The ideas by the IRGC have a social science basis, but more or less at the same time in the natural science oriented risk assessment community comparable ideas and concepts have been developed. From the 1990s onwards, the US-based National Research Council (NRC) published several reports on how risk assessments should remain credible and authoritative in times of scientific uncertainty and strong competing interests.3 In 2005, the “European” International Risk Governance Council published their white paper, which addressed similar challenges. In this article we focus on the IRGC risk governance framework.4

Despite the popularity of risk governance frameworks amongst scholars and policy-makers, there has been little research done that shows how major institutes for risk research and assessment try to implement the underlying risk governance principles. This is surprising, since such institutes are necessary actors in this process. New technologies show opportunities, but also raise a number of risk-related social, economic and political issues. The governance of these risks is a challenge: the stakeholders and public involved hold vested positions; values are at stake; and the science is complex, uncertain or even incomplete. Yet, the expectations of policy-makers that institutes for risk research and assessment can adequately deal with these risks are often high. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that these risks can be complex, uncertain or ambiguous and need approaches in line with risk governance principles; on the other hand these institutes are also expected to deliver clear and unambiguous answers.5 Operating within this precarious field of tension, the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) has become an important actor in the implementation of risk governance principles in the Netherlands. The institute has an open attitude towards risk governance principles and new approaches, and has been at the forefront in supporting the Dutch government in developing its national risk governance strategy.6 Moreover, RIVM has its own strategic research budget, from which projects can be funded in which risk researchers and staff members can experiment in ways to translate risk governance principles into practice.

In this article, we want to shed more light on the process of applying risk governance principles in an institutional setting like the RIVM. The importance of the institutional context has already been addressed by Renn and Walker,7 but only in conceptual terms. Boholm, Corvellec, and Karlsson8 have given a more descriptive perspective on day-to-day risk governance in institutional settings. In a similar way, we investigate actual dealings with risk issues as they unfold in the RIVM context.

Although judicial decisions in tort law primarily determine the (correlative) responsibilities and liabilities of the proceeding parties, they also have regulatory effects on non-litigants. In this contribution, these regulatory consequences of tort law will be analysed in light of a court’s quest when it decides a tort claim involving (uncertain) risks. It will be argued that decisions in tort law about uncertain risks involve the possible occurrence of a false positive (eg accepting liability for a non-existing risk) and a false negative (eg denying liability for a real risk). False positives and false negatives have adverse consequences for the parties to the proceedings but, bearing in mind the regulatory effects of tort adjudication, potentially also for non-litigants. While courts might want to avoid both, scientific uncertainties and complexities make it difficult for them to assess to what extent there is a chance of either a false positive or a false negative occurring. Therefore, they necessarily need to determine which party bears the risk of the involved errors. In addition, the question arises whether courts should also take the potential regulatory consequences of their rulings into account and, if yes, how? To that purpose, they can employ a bipolar reasoning style and a multipolar reasoning style. Although tort law is about determining the applicable rights and obligations between the plaintiff and defendant (bipolar reasoning), in light of the regulatory implications of tort law and developments in several tort systems, the relevance of considerations transcending this bipolar relationship (multipolar reasoning) is increasing. However, the possibilities for courts to engage in multipolar reasoning are restrained by the bipolar nature of tort law which gives rise to information and specialism deficits. This will be illustrated by referring to issues in relation to setting the standard of care and examining causation.

The purpose of this paper is to use legal theory to clarify the nature and the components of effectiveness in legislation, in particular when it comes to choosing legislative policy, ie the legislative model used to tackle a certain issue via legislation. Part II is devoted to revealing the true meaning of the idea of effectiveness, ie as a functional link helping legislative drafters to move among three elements (ideals, situation, results) rather than as an absolute value that drafters should pursue in their work. Part III continues by investigating the problems that such confusion has produced within legislative discourse and practice, in particular by focusing upon two types of effectiveness as external and internal to the legislative process. Finally, Part IV proposes how this idea of effectiveness as a functional element of legislative work (and the consequent distinction between an external and an internal version) can (and should) affect the work of legislative drafters. This idea becomes particularly relevant in relation to the optimal location of the non-legal experts in the legislative process as a means of increasing the effectiveness of legislative policy.

The rise of sharing economy platforms is ubiquitous throughout the world.1 Their success is attributed to the fact that they directly connect supply and demand by enabling individuals to share goods and personal services, with minimal initial barriers to entry. In addition, they outsource their workforce – making it less expensive and easier to expand internationally. Similar to other global supply chains, workers are mediated by a third party and technology is fundamental to that.2

This article assesses the manner in which Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and congestion management (“CACM”) alters the legal context within which power exchanges (“PXs”) perform their activities related to market coupling. By submitting the cooperation among the newly-introduced NEMO-entities, and between these NEMOs and TSOs, regarding market coupling to a new set of rules, CACM affects the market coupling activities of PXs in different ways. This article in particular examines from the power exchanges’ perspective (1) the need for the increased regulation introduced by CACM, (2) how CACM affects their activities in the context of market coupling and (3) whether CACM contributes to a better governance of market coupling.

With the availability of cheaper technology and the rise of digitalisation, consumers can actively participate in markets and also offer their own services or self-/co-produce products and services. Active consumers are fundamental building-blocks of the European Union’s goal to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in Europe. In the energy sector active consumers play a key role in promoting competition, ensuring affordable energy prices and security of supply, as well as contributing to the EU’s environmental and climate goals. By engaging in more efficient energy use, consumers are crucial actors to manage the energy transition. However, the present legal framework does not fully facilitate this active role. The aim of this article is to answer the question how EU law conceptualises and supports the active role of consumers in the regulation of energy markets.

The field of robotics is remarkably wide, with many social settings now entailing and increasingly requiring the use of robots to support a variety of human activities. Unsurprisingly, robots’ form and shape, their level of intelligence and intended purpose can vary significantly depending on the relevant industry.1 Domestic robots are already a reality in a growing number of family homes. They include both humanoid robots which support those in need (such as the elderly, people with disabilities or children) and robots for household consumer markets, including domestic vacuum cleaners and grass-trimmers. Humanoid robots only account for a small fraction of the industry, with robotic arms for industrial automation being instead widespread.2

Tort cases apply particular standards of behaviour to defendants and society, often using common-sense sounding benchmarks such as “reasonableness”. This article explores the ways in which courts establish facts, for the purpose of making a decision on appropriate standards of behaviour, by using sources of authority from the world beyond tort. Facts, rather than being separate from and prior to the application of the legal norms, are often inseparably bound with legal judgment in any particular decision. Two areas of tort law are assessed: some of the English asbestos cases, and the Dutch Urgenda climate change case. The facts required for the setting of, and compliance with, the standard of negligence in these cases are found in a range of external sources, including standards, rules and understandings from scientific bodies, regulators, legal and non-legal documents.

This article, initially discussed at a conference organised in March 2017 by the Belgian Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation (CREG) on the new governance structures in the EU energy sector, deals with energy governance structures in the EU energy and climate diplomacy and in development cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries.

It is understood that, at large, the existing tools of EU energy and climate diplomacy create governance structures: bilateral partnerships, trade agreements, regional and multilateral orders are per se instruments to govern the underlying relationship between the EU, its member states and third countries. The focus in this paper revolves around those instruments of EU energy and climate diplomacy which aim at reinforcing energy governance structures (referred to also as institutional and normative energy frameworks) and promoting solid transparent frameworks in the field of energy in partner countries.

In particular, the paper aims at identifying – among the existing tools of the energy and climate diplomacy –instruments and opportunities in favour of African countries which contribute to strengthening those institutional and normative energy frameworks and facilitate investment towards universal energy access and energy transition. To do so, the paper reviews the existing policy and legal instruments of EU external energy action in general and in Africa and concludes proposing policy recommendations on further development cooperation and energy diplomacy initiatives in favour of African countries.

The first section reviews the principles of EU energy and climate diplomacy and their alignment with development objectives, including the emphasis on strengthening institutional and normative frameworks in the energy sector. The second section considers the internal coordination between the EU and its member states which is necessary to carry out the external energy and climate diplomacy as well as development cooperation. The third section describes the existing tools of the EU energy diplomacy that aim to strengthen energy institutions and frameworks in partner countries. The fourth section reviews a selection of existing EU initiatives in favour of African countries and brings forward a proposal for EU action to reinforce energy governance structures of partner countries in Africa.

The article provides an inclusive outlook on artificial intelligence by introducing a three-legged design perspective that includes, but also moves beyond, ethical artificial systems design to stress the role of moral habituation of professionals and the general public. It is held that an inclusive ethical design perspective is essential for a flourishing future with artificial intelligence.

Against the backdrop of contemporary climate change lawsuits, this article presents preliminary research findings regarding a remarkable and underappreciated moment in the common law pre-history of modern environmental, health, and safety regulation. The findings complicate the conventional academic story about the limited capabilities of tort law and its inevitable displacement by more institutionally robust and sophisticated forms of regulation. Section I offers a brief introduction, followed in Section II by a review of existing academic literature on the pros and cons of utilising tort law as a regulatory device. As will be seen, the consensus view seems to be that tort law is a clumsy and imperfect mechanism for addressing most environmental, health, and safety risks. Section III argues that the debate over tort law’s potential as a risk regulation mechanism ignores the distinctively private law history and character of that body of law, essentially asking tort to serve a purpose for which it was neither intended nor designed. Section IV then presents a case study of nuisance litigation in which the tort system achieves a remarkable and underappreciated risk regulation effect precisely by focusing narrowly on the traditional task of adjudicating alleged wrongs between private parties. Section V concludes.

The importance of effectiveness in lawmaking is acknowledged by scholars and practitioners alike. Yet the concept remains one of the most vague terms in legal vocabulary. The article maintains that effectiveness has concrete content that reflects the systemic coherence and alignment between four fundamental elements of legislation: objectives, content, context and results. From this perspective effective legislation is the result of complex mechanics in the conceptualisation, design and drafting of the law and cannot materialise unless it is a clear concern in the early phases of lawmaking. The article takes a closer look at the fundamental elements of effectiveness and articulates the specific challenges that lawmakers are facing when attempting to design and draft effective rules. The “effectiveness test”, a conceptual tools that adds “effectiveness lenses” to the existing lawmaking toolkit, is developed in more depth to a set of critical questions that lawmakers need to address in order to make conscious decisions on effective drafts.