This article analyses the pillar of modern central bank governance, i.e. central bank independence, from three perspectives. First, we provide a systematic review of the economics of central bank independence. Second, applying a principal agent model we design a political economy framework, which explains how politicians can shape central bank governance in addressing macroeconomic shocks, while taking into account both the wishes of the citizens and their own personal interests. This framework is then used to interpret the evolution of central bank independence from the Great Inflation (1970s), throughout the Great Moderation (1980s-2000s) and to the Great Recession (2007-14). We provide empirical evidence supporting this evolution using recently developed indices of dynamic central bank independence. Further, our findings stress the importance of macroeconomic shocks in shaping the evolution of central bank independence after the global financial crisis.

This article reinterprets the origin and evolution of the Basel Accords. We argue that the Basel I paradigm was very different from the regulatory approaches that had been applied successfully in most European countries since the Second World War. Banking systems relied on a multitude of tools including entry restrictions, liquidity rules, reserve requirements, deposit rate ceilings, lending and investment restrictions, combined with hands-on supervision and discretional interventions. By focusing exclusively on capital adequacy and credit risk, Basel I shifted attention in a very different and somewhat unexpected direction. The Basel regulations are often understood as a reaction to the bank failures of the 1970s and 1980s, but in fact their capital adequacy rules would not have prevented these failures. Indeed, even today, several of these risks are still not addressed by Basel updates, suggesting that the original and current proposals have a rather different raison d’être, placating political constituencies and banking interests.

Economists have been blamed for their inability to forecast and address crises. This article attributes this inability to intertwined factors: the lack of a coherent definition of crises, the reference-class problem, the lack of imagination regarding the nature of future crises and sample-selection biases. Specifically, economists tend to adapt their views on crises to recent episodes, and omit averted and potential crises. Threshold-based definitions of crises run the risk of being ad hoc. Using historical examples, this article highlights some epistemological shortcomings of the current approach.

In 1922, British colonial Gambia demonetized the French 5-franc coin, which had been legal tender at a fixed rate in the colony since 1843. Until World War I, this rate was close to the international rate under the gold standard. When the franc began to depreciate in 1918, however, a gap emerged between the Gambian rate and the international rate, prompting a rapid influx of the coins. The demonetization cost the colonial administration over a year's revenue, affecting the later development of the colony. The 1920s have long been a fruitful period for the study of monetary history owing to the instability of exchange rates during and after the war. This article extends the study of this period to examine the impact of these changes on dependent colonies in West Africa, highlighting the importance of local compromises and particularities in colonial monetary systems.

The financial strains of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had a significant impact on the Bank of England. In its position as banker to the state and manager of the state's debt, it experienced a significant increase in workload and thus was forced rapidly to expand its workforce. From a complement of around 300 in the mid 1780s, the number of clerks employed had increased to over 900 in 1815. Using a unique set of records preserved in the Bank's archives, this article investigates the backgrounds and skills of the men recruited during the expansion of the early nineteenth century. It finds a significant gap between the skills required by the Bank and the skills possessed by its potential workforce.

To investigate the link between monetary reforms and prices on the art market, this article focuses on the aftermath of the Gutt plan, a monetary purge implemented in Belgium just after World War II. On the basis of an original database of close on 3,000 artworks sold between 1945 and 1951, this article shows that, following the implementation of the Gutt plan, real prices on the art market experienced a massive drop suggesting that real prices on the art market are significantly influenced by money supply.

Before the Revolution American colonies issued paper money known as ‘bills of credit’. The bills issued in the Middle colonies held their value surprisingly well despite large wartime fluctuations in the quantity issued, but those issued in New England depreciated as the quantity in circulation increased. The bills' stable purchasing power in the Middle colonies has often been attributed to the redemption provisions enacted when the bills were issued. Similar provisions in New England supposedly failed because New England failed to enforce them. This article explores the comparative enforcement of redemption provisions in the two regions, and in New York in particular, and concludes that differential enforcement does not explain the disparity between the New England experience and that in the Middle colonies.

Although taxes were raised substantially in the United States during World War I, recourse was had to five bond issues, the famous Liberty loans, to finance the bulk of war expenditures. The Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, hoped to create a broad market for the Liberty bonds and to limit their yields by following an aggressive policy of ‘capitalizing patriotism’. He called on everyone from Wall Street bankers to the Boy Scouts to volunteer for campaigns to sell the bonds. The campaigns have become legendary. Some of the nation's best-known artists were recruited to draw posters depicting the contribution to the war effort to be made by buying bonds, and giant bond rallies featuring Hollywood stars were organized. These efforts, however, enjoyed limited success. The yields on the Liberty bonds were kept low mainly by making the bonds tax exempt and by making sure that a large proportion of them were purchased directly or indirectly by the Federal Reserve, turning the Federal Reserve into an engine of inflation. Patriotism proved to be a weak, although not powerless, offset to normal market forces.

This article studies the relationship between Bank and Treasury during the War of the Spanish Succession. It examines two new series of Exchequer bills implemented in 1707 and 1709. Far from being loans-for-rents contracts, the principal aim was to accommodate war-related pressures on the nation's monetary system by manufacturing a substitute for scarce specie. The article also shows there was a covert struggle within the financial community for access to the specie flows associated with the nation's system of public finance.

In this article we use put-call parity to show that ambiguity about ownership played a role in medieval businessmen's efforts to circumvent the Catholic Church's usury restrictions. That ambiguity created fertile ground for a financial innovation, the triple contract, that allowed some merchants to accomplish a kind of regulatory arbitrage. We also show that medieval clerics and merchants appear to have had at least an intuitive grasp of put-call parity, and that this insight shaped the Catholic Church's approach to medieval business contracts, and usury, nearly five centuries before put-call parity was described in the scholarly literature.

The international banking crisis that began in 2007 has brought the relationship between international banking activities and financial crises to the forefront. The growing reliance on foreign interbank funding by domestic banks has been recognized as a crucial factor in explaining the banking and sovereign debt crisis currently affecting several peripheral European countries. This article shows that the link between financial crisis and international interbank lending is not a new phenomenon; a similar trend can be observed in the Mexican banking sector during the run-up to its 1982 debt crisis. I explore the international activities of Mexican commercial banks in the years preceding the country's default and demonstrate that they became involved in international lending which was funded largely through heavy short-term interbank foreign borrowing. I provide new archival evidence which shows that in intermediating foreign finance with local public and private borrowers, Mexican banks incurred maturity, interest rate and currency mismatches and dangerously increased their risk position. This article provides insights for understanding the Mexican debt crisis as closely intertwined with problems in the domestic banking sector, which were, in turn, linked to its involvement in the international financial system.

This article discusses the use of private promissory notes in the sixteenth-century commercial metropolis of Antwerp. Students of financial history tend to look for first instances of financial techniques and institutions such as bills of exchange, share trading, sovereign debt and banks. However, financial innovation can also be found in the piecemeal adaptation of an older, existing technique, institution or instrument as the result of changes in the market and of demands exerted by particular groups within that economy. The outcome of this process is determined by the structure of the economy in question, its institutional arrangements and the willingness of authorities to adapt the rules.

The Bank of England's ‘consultative document’ on Competition and Credit Control (C&CC) was published on 14 May 1971. It was a landmark occasion, representing a decisive break with the prior system of maintaining direct controls over bank lending to the private sector; the intention was now to achieve the monetary authorities’ objectives of policy via the operation of market mechanisms, notably adjustments in interest rates and open market operations. Although the ‘credit control’ aspect was, over the next few years, notably less successful than the encouragement of competition amongst the banks (where the London clearing banks previously had maintained a restrictive cartel with the support of the authorities), nevertheless the direction of travel towards a more liberal, market-based system, remained, despite a partial reversion towards a direct control system in the guise of the ‘corset’, introduced at the end of 1973, and finally laid to rest in June 1980.

An economic setting of ancient Jewish law is analyzed and reinterpreted in light of a modern formal financial model. Certain real estate transactions in ancient Israel, as stipulated in the Bible, involved embedded financial options that seem to have been overlooked by the commentators. This article interprets, utilizing modern financial theory, the biblical text and sheds light on a phrase used in stipulating these rules that has puzzled some commentators. The option's value and the complexity of the pricing system that would have been needed in order to capture true market prices of these assets are demonstrated.