Like many of the provisions of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law – GG) the constitutional protection of German citizenship enshrined in Article 16.1 GG is a reaction to the atrocities committed by Nazi-Germany. From early on, the Nazis had abused nationality law not only as a sanctioning device to discipline Germans living abroad but also to ostracize unwanted citizens and confiscate their property, i.e., as a means of large scale political and racial discrimination. This inhuman denaturalization practice culminated in the 11. Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz (11th ordinance of 25 November 1941, issued by virtue of the Reich's Citizenship Law), which stripped Jewish citizens living abroad of their German nationality, aiming inter alia at Jews deported to concentration camps in Eastern Europe. To prevent any kind of political abuse of denaturalization measures in the future, Article 16.1 sent. 1 GG guarantees that no German may be deprived of his nationality. There is a long-standing debate about the precise meaning of this strict ban on any “deprivation” of nationality, because at the same time Article 16.1 sent. 2 GG allows for the loss of German nationality against the will of the person affected if this loss has a statutory basis and the person does not become stateless as a result. Thus, it is unclear whether the constitution permits a revocation of German citizenship, and if so under what conditions. Further, this debate broaches the questions of whether there are, in fact, exceptions to the constitutional protection against statelessness, e.g., in cases of fraud.

Shocking news for police and intelligence agencies in Germany: the search for inland sleepers following the terrorist attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon was unconstitutional. Preventive data screening is incompatible with the fundamental right of informational self-determination according to Article 2 (I) in connection with Article 1 (I) of the Grundgesetz (GG - Basic Law). Since the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG - Federal Constitutional Court) of 4 April, 2006 (1 BvR 518/02), such numerous acquisition of data is not permitted unless a concrete threat to important objects of legal protection is existent.

On the 3rd of May 2005, the ECJ gave judgment in the Silvio Berlusconi and Others case dealing with the provisions of the First (D68/151/EEC), Fourth (D78/660/EEC) and Seventh (D83/349/EEC) Companies Directives and the transposing Italian national provisions. The case is a preliminary ruling referred to the ECJ by several Italian courts (Tribunale di Milano, Corte d'Appello di Lecce) on the basis of Art.234 EC Treaty. It has been decided by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ, which is quite indicative of a significant judgment. Furthermore, the Grand Chamber did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General Kokott. Finally, it is interesting to note that no other government except the Italian Government contributed to the case. This last fact seems very strange having regard to the highly sensitive issue. Indeed the decision deals with the criminal sanctions for false accounting.

On 7 February 2006, a chamber of the European Court of Human Rights gave judgment in the much awaited ‘Ostrava case’, which challenged the placing of disproportionate numbers of Romani children in ‘special schools’ for the learning impaired in the Czech Republic. This practice, widespread across Central and Eastern Europe, amounts in effect to racial segregation and denies Romani children access to a standard of education comparable to their non-Romani peers. The Ostrava case, taking eight months to assemble and seven years to reach judgment day in Strasbourg, represented the centre-piece of the litigation strategy of the Romani rights movement. The decision of the Strasbourg Court to ignore the evidence of indirect racial discrimination by a 6-1 majority represents not only a setback for those working for the improvement of the situation of the Roma – widely acknowledged as the most disadvantaged, discriminated and marginalised group in Europe – but also for the crystallisation of non-discrimination norms in Europe.

The Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption (KorrBekG – Anti-Corruption Act), enacted in 1997, was the last measure to improve Germany's anti-corruption criminal law that was solely initiated by German political actors. Since then all amendments originated in international legal instruments. Implementing only the minimum requirements of these international provisions has led to inconsistencies within the criminal law dealing with active and passive bribery. Further anti-corruption conventions signed by the German government require additional modifications. This opportunity should be used as a starting point for a thorough reform of Germany's anti-corruption criminal law.

What song the Syrens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among the women, although puzzling questions are not beyond all conjecture.

What is so fundamental in terms of the protection of human rights in Europe that it requires the same standards for all countries and what, by contrast, would be better dealt with by each State's organs in line with verbigratia Michael Walzer's-related notion of “thick morality”?. Where should the line be drawn between unity and diversity notwithstanding the resulting risk of human rights cultural relativism associated to the latter?. On what grounds could the axiomatic universality of human rights possibly be connoted in a continent which prides itself on possessing the most developed regional system for the protection of human rights world-wide in view of the resulting risk of legal contagion to other systems for the protection of human rights and, even, to general international law that such a practice can trigger?. At the end of the day, these are the sort of questions that the study of the margin-of- appreciation doctrine raises. The Trojan Horse-like character of the Strasbourg's judge-made margin-of-appreciation doctrine within the European human rights protection system has long since bothered human rights lawyers. Cases of reliance on this review doctrine have been generally criticised as denials of justice for individuals, abdications by the Court of its duty of adjudication in difficult or sensitive issues or as a judicial diluting technique of the strict conditions laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights. This line of criticism, aimed at what from the viewpoint of some occupants of the bench is seen as “a well established and legitimate part of the convention's jurisprudence”, has been reinforced by the entry of 21 new Eastern and Central European contracting parties to the Council of Europe following the 1989-1991 events. With a current membership of 46 States, all of which have ratified the 1950 Rome Convention, it is further feared that the doctrine will increasingly become an open door for abusive limitations in the exercise of human rights in states who traditionally leaned towards human rights cultural relativism. Against this background, I will briefly look into the technical criteria used by Strasbourg's judicial interpreters to factually implement this “much maligned notion” or, as one commentator has put it, this “manière pseudo-technique d'évoquer le pouvoir discrétionnaire que les organes de Strasbourg ont estimé reconnu aux Etats par la Convention dans certains cas”. I will, secondly, provide a basic overview of the general doctrinal positions one can adopt regarding this long debated question.

In the July 8, 2004 case of Vo v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) dealt with the question of whether the embryo/fetus (“the fetus”) enjoys the protection of the right to life provided by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). Below, a pregnant woman lost her fetus due to an error made by the attending doctor, and the Cour de Cassation, the French court of last instance, acquitted the doctor of involuntary homicide on the grounds that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the French Criminal Code. Claiming a violation of her child's right to life within the meaning of the Convention, the woman appealed to the ECtHR. The ECtHR left open the question whether or not a fetus falls within the scope of Article 2; declaring that, even assuming Article 2 was applicable to a fetus, there had been no failure by France to comply with its obligations under Article 2, because the ECtHR deemed the institution of criminal proceedings unnecessary. Rather, it considered the possibility for the applicant to bring an action for damages as sufficient and therefore found that there had been no violation of the fetus's right to life.

On March 5, 2003, the Council of the European Union (hereafter the ‘Council’) submitted a request for an opinion to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 300 (6) EC. This request was intended to clarify whether the Community had an exclusive or shared competence to conclude a new convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters intended to replace the existing Lugano Convention (hereafter the ‘new Lugano Convention’ or the ‘envisaged agreement’).

From Apology to Utopia is a disturbing reading experience. I first came across Martti Koskenniemi's book of 1989 during research for my thesis on Hans Kelsen. In his monograph “Das Problem der Souveränität”, published immediately after the First World War, Kelsen attempted to destroy the central doctrinal pillars of the nineteenth century German international law discourse by exposing the ideological nature of its central doctrines, such as the concept of the sovereign will of the state, autolimitation and consent. 70 years later, the analytical programme of From Apology to Utopia deconstructed international law by exposing the inherent “political” nature of international legal discourse, interpreted as an argumentative practice. Exposing the unstable discursive boundaries between politics and international law is the central objective of this monograph. Martti Koskenniemi portrays international legal doctrine as an inherently contradictory and repetitive argumentative routine that is incapable of producing meaningful “legal” results. International lawyers somewhat tragically feel compelled to engage in this Sisyphean routine in order to maintain their professional identity.