Food law in the European Community is a touchy subject. One of the big ongoing debates in this area centres on the question of what names we call our foodstuffs by. In an internal market where local supermarket shelves are stocked with products coming from all around the EC and beyond, how can we be sure that the contents of the packets conform to our connotations of the name on the label? For example, if it says “chocolate” on the label, how can we be sure that it really is “chocolate” within our understanding of the word? The question of what names can or should go on labels is, sadly, very complicated. This article therefore intends to look at only one aspect of this problem: when a Member State is allowed to insist that the name of an imported “generic” product be changed. We will begin by briefly looking at the case law and one of the major pieces of legislation in this area – the Labelling Directive – before going on to discuss application of the law to the recent Chocolate Cases, handed down by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “Court”) at the beginning of this year. This discussion will give some (hopefully) interesting insights into the way in which primary law, as interpreted by the Court, and secondary legislation interact and into the balancing of consumer protection and free trade performed by the Court.

According to Article 48 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the founding treaties of the Union can only be amended through a three-step procedure. First, the Council calls an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), after having consulted the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission. Second, within the framework of the IGC, representatives of the governments of the Member States negotiate and sign the amendments to the treaties by common accord. Third, the agreement is submitted to national ratification procedures. When all three steps are concluded, each Member State having ratified the amendments to the treaty, the changes enter into force.

Americans usually start a presentation with a joke, Germans usually with an apology, Russians with a complaint, and Middle Easterners often with a conspiracy theory. There are many reasons why Middle Easterners have been more prone to conspiracies than others. The psychology of conspiracy is complex, and merits a separate treatment. But part of the answer must lie in the fact that for much of its modern history the Middle East has been at the mercy of external forces whose decisions were not only beyond the control of indigenous populations and elites, but moreover appeared unfathomable to those unfamiliar with the way political and strategic decisions are made in the West.

[Editors’ Comment: As is well known, opposition to a possible war against Iraq has been, within the Western world, among the strongest in Germany. Accurately sensing an overwhelming rejection of any armed intervention in Iraq among the German populace, the Social-Democrat / Green coalition government led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer began to take a stance against the forcible disarmament of Iraq and the toppling of the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during their reelection campaign in the fall of 2002. Since then, and in the face of an ever more undisguised intention on part of the Bush administration to go ahead with a war under all circumstances, Schröder and Fischer have reiterated and reinforced their position, going as far as to rule out any active German participation in an armed intervention even if such was eventually called for by the Security Council. The German government's position has been complicated by the fact that Germany is currently an elected member of the Security Council, and held its rotating presidency in the month of February. Its relations with the United States have been strained on account of the incompatibility of views on how to resolve the Iraq crisis, and Germany has increasingly found itself in an isolated position on the international plane, though it has recently been joined by France and Russia in its attempts to yet avoid a war. The Christian-Democratic and Liberal opposition have alleged that the Schröder government has internationally isolated the country, and, worse, alienated it from its traditionally strongest ally, the United States, in order to distract from its current domestic unpopularity. Be this as it may, it is probably true to say that the great majority of Germans across all sections of society are genuinely strongly opposed to a war. Such pacifist sentiments link back to the peace movement of the late 1970s and 1980s which saw an equally broad cross-section of society march side by side to protest against the military build-up of the Cold War, and which, among others, brought about the Green party itself. Critics have alleged then and now that such radical pacifism is both naive and the wrong lesson to be learned from Germany's omnipresent Nazi-past. Interestingly, the non UN-sanctioned intervention in Kosovo had the strong support of both this just re-elected government, as well as the general public, although the more mainstream adherents of a German ‘no’ to an Iraq intervention point to the very different circumstances in that case.

On April 9th, the entire world watched as American troops threw a noose round the neck of the dictator and, surrounded by jubilant throngs of Iraqis, pulled him off his pedestal. The apparently unshakeable monument tottered, and then finally fell. But before it crashed satisfyingly to the ground, there was a momentary pause before the force of gravity could overcome the statue's grotesquely unnatural, horizontal posture. Bobbing gently up and down, the massive figure clung, for one last moment, to its horror.

On 31 July 2003 Peru submitted an extradition request to the Japanese authorities requesting the extradition of former President Alberto Fujimori. Along with the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, and the numerous penal proceedings against the former presidential councilor and head of the secret service Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, the extradition request is another important effort of the Peruvian government to bring human rights violators to justice. Since Peru's legal system does not allow trials in absentia, Fujimori will escape prosecution if he is not extradited or tried in Japan.

The above question was raised by Ewoud Hondius a few years ago in his regularly held lectures on the state of consumer law in Europe at the University of Utrecht. The European consumer programme in its basic structure dates from the years 1975 respectively 1981. It is rooted in President Kennedy's message to the consumers from the year 1962. Substantial variations cannot be recognised regarding both consumer programmes. Notifications, programmatic declarations and new impulses adopted after 1981 – the titles of the messages were changing constantly – did not alter the fundamental statement of the original programme. If President Kennedy's message is proceeded from, then it could be formulated, with some exaggeration, that European consumer law in its fundamental ideas is 40 years old.

In its most recent judicature the European Court of Justice (ECJ) continued its tendency of deciding in favor of the freedom of establishment by holding that rules submitting pseudo-foreign companies to the company law of the host state were inadmissible. It clarified that a foreign company is not only to be respected as a legal entity having the right to be a party to legal proceedings, but rather has to be respected as such, i.e. as a foreign company that is subject to the company law of its state of incorporation. Any adjustment to the company law of the host state is, hence, not compatible with European law. In addition to commenting on the decision and its effects, this article points out potential for corporate restructuring in the field of codetermination.

The legal term “mental retardation” can be a life-saver since the summer of 2002. The possibility that had been announced in an earlier decision by the U.S. Supreme Court finally came true: The Court decided in a 6–3 vote that the Constitution of the United States bars the execution of mentally retarded offenders. With its “landmark death penalty ruling,” as it was called by the New York Times, the Court saved the life of Mr. Atkins, a man with an I.Q. of 59 who was convicted of committing murder and robbery at the age of 18. Empirical estimates show that this decision could move 200 or more people off death row. Unfortunately, the ruling is too late for at least 44 mentally retarded inmates who have been executed since 1976.

Each of us was asked to approach the theme of globalization and human rights from a distinct perspective. I chose democracy, which is both an enumerated right and a means to the realization of other rights, because it leads ineluctably to some of the thorniest ethical and conceptual issues that engage or ought to engage morally alert people.

It is common knowledge that the Internal Market is based on the notion of free movement which, in turn, rests on four basic freedoms (goods, persons, services and capital). The European Court of Justice (hereinafter “Court”) has always interpreted these freedoms broadly while construing the exceptions to these freedoms strictly. This approach was to no small extent based on a presumption of mutual trust and mutual recognition among Member States. It allowed the Court, in many cases, to ensure free movement within the Internal Market without having to await the adoption of harmonised European Community measures.

Since 1995 the Commission has repeatedly reviewed the operation of directive 87/102/EEC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states concerning consumer credit. This was regarded to be necessary mainly for two reasons: firstly, even at the time of the enactment of the original directive its level of protection was lower than in most member states; secondly, the Commission repeatedly emphasised several changes, which had taken place in regard to the credit services sector in recent years. Whereas the previous directive was targeted at the two most common “products” at that time, namely hire purchase agreements and instalment credit and reflected the cash-based society of that time, the range of products presently offered is much more colourful.

Judgement of the CJEC in Case C-491/01, The Queen and the Secretary of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (Tobacco Manufacturing Directive Case)

The United Nations Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights unanimously approved the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights” (the Norms) on 13 August 2003. Together with the interpretative Commentary, the Norms constitute an authoritative guide to corporate social responsibility. They are the first set of comprehensive international human rights norms specifically aimed at and applying to transnational corporations and other business entities (companies). They set out the responsibilities of companies with regard to human rights and labor rights, and provide guidelines for companies in conflict zones. They prohibit bribery and provide obligations with regard to consumer protection and the environment. General provisions of implementation include the obligation to provide reparation for a failure to comply with the Norms.

After nearly fifty years of its existence, the European Community currently faces two constitutional challenges: In a conscious effort to bring Europe closer to its citizens and to break away from the undemocratic executive and judicial constitution-making, Europe has set up a “Constitutional Convention” in charge of constitutional soul-searching. The second project – and indeed one of no less “constitutional” significance – is, of course, the Union's enlargement that will turn it into an organization of twenty-five plus. The two projects are in many ways intertwined and can be synthesized into the phrase: “A new Constitution for a new Europe”.

Critiques of Robert Kagan's recent, inflamatory work on the nature and state of transatlanticisim seem to come in three forms: material, analytical and emotional. By “material” I mean critiques of the fundamental and more or less obvious facts and structures out of which he has spun his claims. These facts amount to little more than the less than revelatory reminder that the U.S. devotes considerably more resources to security and defense spending than do Europeans. Critiques of Kagan's work at this level are pointless. At least on this much, Kagan has it right: we are now all too familiar with the staggering statistic that reveals that American security and defense spending is equal to the total of the expenditures of the next twenty countries.

It has been argued that the best possible constitution is a short constitution. If so, then the Draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe is a spectacular failure: at more than 250 pages, comprising some 450 articles and a handful of protocols and declarations, the Draft constitution is anything but short.

The “post”-phase of a conflict has become the justification for both the possible action and the inaction of the Western states. It is not so much any longer that we would be averse to war in any circumstances, as the non-use of force principle in its absolute sense would require. Again, after a good fifty years of the UN and its raison d'etre – the guardianship of peace – we seem to have arrived at an era where ideological contestation no more has the deterrent effect that it did during the Cold War and, consequently, there are cases of the use of force that are accepted and even regarded as just as long as they are quick. When looking back at the NATO bombings of FRY in 1999 as the response to atrocities in Kosovo many are able to accept that ‘though illegal they were legitimate’ in some sense. This is the conclusion irrespective of whether one, at the time, was for action or inaction. Such a ‘condoning condemnation’ has become the popular middle road as so many other paradoxes in world politics. Through the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq the paradox has gained in strength. Although there is quite strong and unequivocal opposition to the wars and a condemnation for their illegality, the political elite of the West seems to be quick in forgetting scruples and taking a keen interest in the “post”-management of the targets, i.e. the states that are about to be or already have been ‘bombed into the stone age’ or into shambles in any case. There is a general rush to the “post”-phase; both in the sense that the tacit requirement for the condoning condemnation is that the action be quick – the use of force should be very limited in time – and, secondly, in the sense that already before the bombs fall (or during) the major reconstruction plans and projects are dealt. This article outlines some points of critique that could be launched at the phase when the majority cannot be bothered to re-analyze the wrongs committed ex ante.