In its August 2019 decision in Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay, the Human Rights Committee recognised, for the first time, the existence of a connection between environmental protection and the right to life with dignity. This is not only a landmark decision for the Committee but also represents the consolidation of a body of case law and practice from the three regional human rights courts and other UN human rights bodies which has developed over the last quarter of a century. It also shows the potential of two important and widely debated paragraphs in the newly adopted General Comment No. 36 on the Right to Life, which describe environmental degradation as both an enabler of threats and a direct threat to the right to life. Such potential has been confirmed in another landmark decision of the HRC—Teitiota v New Zealand, relating to climate change as threat to life. This article draws on Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay and Teitiota v New Zealand to analyse this wider field of practice in order to clarify the connection between the right to life and environmental protection, as recognised by the Committee, and considers its potential impact on future litigation.

This article offers a critical assessment of the role of international human rights law in the regulation of genome editing. Given the rapid scientific developments in the field of genetics, it is important to explore the implications of the human rights framework for the research into and the clinical application of genome editing. The broader normative question is whether the existing human rights standards are sufficient to address the challenges posed by this new technology. It will be argued that while international human rights law does not prohibit genome editing, it imposes important restrictions upon it. However, existing human rights are arguably insufficient to regulate germline genome editing as there are significant loopholes in the protection of embryos. Nor do they fully address the wide-ranging implications of the new technology for society and humankind. It will be suggested that new standards are needed, ideally set out in a new international instrument and supported by an institutional framework, which address the specific challenges posed by this new technology.

Once the ‘popular plaything of Realpolitiker’ the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus post the 1969 VCLT is often described as an objective rule by which, on grounds of equity and justice, a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for termination of a treaty. Yet recent practice from some States suggests that it is returning with a new livery. They point to an understanding that is premised on vital State interests––a view popular among scholars such as Erich Kaufmann at the beginning of the last century.

Existing approaches to ‘algorithmic accountability’, such as transparency, provide an important baseline, but are insufficient to address the (potential) harm to human rights caused by the use of algorithms in decision-making. In order to effectively address the impact on human rights, we argue that a framework that sets out a shared understanding and means of assessing harm; is capable of dealing with multiple actors and different forms of responsibility; and applies across the full algorithmic life cycle, from conception to deployment, is needed. While generally overlooked in debates on algorithmic accountability, in this article, we suggest that international human rights law already provides this framework. We apply this framework to illustrate the effect it has on the choices to employ algorithms in decision-making in the first place and the safeguards required. While our analysis indicates that in some circumstances, the use of algorithms may be restricted, we argue that these findings are not ‘anti-innovation’ but rather appropriate checks and balances to ensure that algorithms contribute to society, while safeguarding against risks.

The effectiveness and legitimacy of the Council of Europe can be undermined by the actions of Member States which fail to comply with their international law obligations of genuine cooperation with the organization. This article first briefly examines the practice of international organizations in applying sanctions such as expulsion and suspension to their members. It then explains why it is necessary to discuss potential sanctions that the Council can apply in the context of current controversies involving the Council and Member States. It will be argued that the scale and intensity of challenges distinguish the current state of affairs from other ‘problematic’ periods in the Council's history. It proceeds to outline the considerations that should be taken into account in deciding whether a Member State should be suspended or expelled. These considerations include the implications of sanctions on the legitimacy of the Council of Europe, the level of human rights protection and the financial stability of the organization.

This article explores how a procedural approach in the case law of the ECtHR combines subsidiarity and progressive development of international obligations. Rather than constituting a simple retreat from substantive commitments, it renders the obligations of Conventions States more flexible and has the potential to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Court's rulings. This article first sets out various aspects of proceduralization in international human rights law. This is followed by a discussion of how procedural approaches are linked to subsidiarity. In the case law of the ECtHR, procedural approaches facilitate dynamic evolution, both in the practice of Convention States (analytic or bottom-up approach) or by the Court itself (constructive or top-down approach). This interaction of the procedural approach and arguments based on European Consensus allows the ECtHR and domestic institutions to fulfil their ‘shared responsibility’ for the effective protection of human rights in Europe.

This article explores the procedural environmental rights practice of regional human rights and environmental protection systems through a comparative lens in order to identify the ways in which existing developments and current trends can inform and enrich the procedural dimension of the right to water. The study suggests that enhanced levels of transparency, public engagement and justiciability in water-related decisions are significant steps towards the achievement of the substantive dimension of the right to water and highlights the potential for cross-fertilization between such regimes towards good water governance.

This article analyses both cooperative and confrontational interactions between domestic judges and UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies. Based on a number of cases collected through multiple databases, this article addresses the basis on which the monitoring bodies encourage the domestic acceptance of their views, general comments, and reports; how domestic courts engage with these findings; on what basis; and why some courts are more willing to engage with these findings. A key argument is that judicial accommodation is highly selective; domestic judges occasionally avoid, discount, and contest the interpretation put forward by the treaty monitoring bodies and thereby pose a challenge to their legitimacy.

In 2015, frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations in the International Maritime Organisation, the EU issued Regulation 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting, and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport. Echoing the controversial Aviation Directive, the Regulation is intended to support a unilateral market-based measure, and includes emissions from outside EU territory. This raises the question whether, according to international law, the EU has jurisdiction to regulate such ‘extraterritorial’ circumstances. In exploring the appropriate jurisdictional bases, we argue that neither the Law of the Sea Convention, nor world trade law definitively decide this issue. We therefore devote more detailed attention to the customary international law of State jurisdiction supplementing these regimes. We seek to build on the existing analysis by examining climate change as a ‘common concern of mankind’. We argue that this emerging concept has distinct legal implications that can and should be accommodated within the interest-balancing exercise underlying the jurisdictional analysis.

Non-execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights is a matter of serious concern. In order to address it, the reasons for and dynamics of non-execution need to be fully considered. This paper engages with non-execution by sketching the underpinning issues that help to explain it and, we argue, must shape our responses to it. Through this engagement, we conclude that non-execution is properly understood as a phenomenon that requires political rather than legal responses. This calls into question the usefulness of the infringement proceedings contained in Article 46(4) of the Convention and which it has recently been suggested ought to be embraced in attempts to address non-execution. We argue that, even if the practical difficulties of triggering Article 46(4) proceedings could somehow be overcome, the dynamics of non-execution suggest that such proceedings would be both futile and counterproductive, likely to lead to backlash against the Court and unlikely to improve States’ execution of its judgments.

The field of human rights monitoring has become preoccupied with statistical methods for measuring performance, such as benchmarks and indicators. This is reflected within human rights scholarship, which has become increasingly ‘empirical’ in its approach. However, the relevant actors developing statistical approaches typically treat causality somewhat blithely, and this causes critical problems for such projects. This article suggests that resources—whether temporal or fiscal—may be better allocated towards improving methods for identifying violations rather than developing complicated, but ultimately ineffective, statistical methods for monitoring human rights performance.