The activities of the General Managers' Association of Chicago in the great strike of the American Railway Union in 1894 are well known, but the earlier history of this association has remained obscure. Even the most scholarly writers on the Pullman strike have accepted statements made in testimony before the United States Strike Commission that this association first participated in a labor conflict in 1893. As a matter of fact, it originated in a strike, and early in its career it set precedents for many of its exploits a few years later.

In spite of the recognized difficulties of dividing the white population of the antebellum South into two distinct classes—slaveowners and poor whites—historians have persisted in differentiating the roles of the small slaveholder and nonslaveholder vis-à-vis that of the large slaveholder or plantation owner. It is the purpose of this dissertation to evaluate the roles of the nonslaveholding and small slaveholding farmer in comparison with that of the large slaveholder in the westward expansion of the antebellum cotton economy.

We identify the longest expansion in U.S. history, a recession-free 16-year period from 1841 to 1856 that we call America's First Great Moderation. Using newer data on industrial production, we show that the record-long expansion was primarily driven by a boom in transportation-goods investment following the discovery of gold in California. Furthermore, the low volatility of industrial production and stock returns during the First Great Moderation, which occurred during a period without a U.S. central bank, is similar to that observed for the Second Great Moderation (1984–2007).

Original and useful ideas are infrequent in both economics and history. Most of us have to make do by appropriating from others and repackaging. But this book develops an idea that is both novel and ingenious. The author deserves much praise. The idea is to extract information on time use in Industrial Revolution England from witness statements in criminal trials. His central conclusion is that average hours of work for male workers increased by 30 percent between the 1750s and 1800, and by 20 percent between the 1750s and 1830. Indeed, his estimate of 3,500 hours per male worker in 1800 is the all-time high for England. Thus Voth finds evidence that the Industrious Revolution posited by Jan de Vries did accompany the Industrial Revolution. He concludes that even the meager productivity growth reported by Nick Crafts is still too high, since some increase in output was due to increased labor inputs. This reviewer has doubts, explained below, whether he has large enough samples of the appropriate types of workers to convincingly assert this central finding. But his method is correct in principle, and if extra data can be secured they will tell us a lot.

Historically speaking, social security systems are a recent development. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was limited state social intervention in the developed world, and even less in Latin America. A remarkable expansion of “social rights” took place in the second half of the century. By the 1970s most Latin American countries had set up at least some form of old-age protection, while others had already developed a wide welfare network. Public social expenditures grew to represent over 20 percent of the gross domestic product in a number of countries, including Argentina.

We investigate how historical patterns of primary production influenced development across local economies in Argentina. Our identification strategy exploits exogenous variation in the composition of primary production induced by climatic features. We find that locations specializing in ranching had weaker linkages with other activities, higher concentration in land ownership, lower population density, and less immigration than cereal-producing areas. Over time, ranching localities continued to exhibit lower population density, and they experienced relatively sluggish industrialization. Ultimately, ranching specialization had large negative effects on long-run levels of income per capita and human capital.

We study the decisions of state-chartered banks to join the Fed in its first decade. Ours is the first study to combine state regulatory environment characteristics and individual bank characteristics to explain Fed membership choice. Regulatory environments that reduced the benefit of discount window access or increased the regulatory cost of joining the Fed led to fewer banks joining. Individual bank characteristics that affected the magnitude of benefits from accessing the discount window (either passing on liquidity risk reduction to respondents or reducing the member bank’s own seasonal liquidity risk) were even more important in determining which banks joined.

I believe that, through the Federal Reserve Banks, … the better shall we be equipped to cope with the problems ahead of us, of helping ourselves and of helping the world; I believe it to be the duty of every bank in the country to contribute its share in equipping our nation for this task; … I firmly believe that the future will belong to those banks—national or state—that are members of the Federal Reserve System.

—Paul Warburg, Speech at the New York State Bankers’ Association Convention, 9 June 1916

Assessing the role of government in economic development in situations where public and private sectors coexist is extremely difficult. The nature of modern government is so complex and its activities are so broad, that a clear statement of “influence” or “impact” on a national economy becomes almost impossible. Interpretations of Japanese economic history illustrate these problems vividly. Few scholars have dealt with the issue explicitly, and those that have seem unable to reach clear conclusions.

For anyone on the green side of fifty who didn't start historical browsing in the playpen it may be quite hard to see the present appeal of statistical theory and method in perspective. To one lucky enough to have been a student abroad in the 1920's, it is merely one of the consequences of a fundamental shift, which was firming in that decade, in conceptions of the economic historian's job. Essentially the shift consisted in making the economy and the social institutions in which it is embedded analytically distinct. Voices from the Polanyite school still claim that this step was as wrong as Adam's eating of the apple. Milder critics complain only that some of us let economic analysis run away with the ball to the neglect of social analysis and of the interplay between the two. For workers on the recent past this is defensible, because the heavy fall-out of purely economic data clamors to be dealt with in its own terms. The preindustrialist, who has to dig harder for data, and seldom turns up such pure economic ore, is more inclined to think in terms of interplay.

An increase in labor productivity and a reduction of fuel consumption rates were two notable and closely related achievements of the management of Hopewell Forge, an ironworks in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania. Significantly, these economies were realized in the face of technological stasis through learning by doing. The analysis of this accomplishment is cast in the larger context of the performance of the iron industry before and after 1800.

In Choosing to discuss land policy in that part of the Spanish Southwest which comprises present central and northern New Mexico and most of southern Colorado, I would appear to be using a model area of the West to demonstrate once again that the Homestead Act and principle were unworkable. In actuality the purpose is to note generally what can happen when an American land system runs into an older and highly different Spanish-Mexican one. As Howard W. Odum has observed, “Here two great culture systems have met and clashed and fused and are still in process of clashing and fusing.”

In studies of the late medieval economy, the dominant position of the textile industry has long been recognized. Since the opening decades of this century however, scholarly attention has been directed almost exclusively toward the luxury industries of silk and fine woolens, which involved a complex financial and commercial structure geared to the satisfaction of the needs and desires of a wealthy and select clientele. Relatively neglected is that branch of the textile industry devoted to the production of low-priced cotton cloth for popular consumption. This neglect is all the more surprising in view of a rich if somewhat dispersed documentation attesting to the importance of this industry in numerous towns of Northern Italy. The large-scale production of cotton cloth posed problems of financing and organization not unlike those of silk and wool and gave rise to similar entrepreneurial forms. At the same time a study of the organization of cotton manufacture provides a number of unique insights into aspects of economic organization in Northern Italy. In the period covered by this paper, the cotton manufacturing centers of this area formed a single production zone characterized by a high degree of economic interdependence and a marked tendency toward the standardization of products.

Taken as a whole the half century from 1835 to 1885 was a periodof substantial economic growth in the United States. The population increased nearly fourfold, or at an annual rate in the neighborhood of 2½ to 2½ per cent per year. Estimates of the national income show a figure at the end of the period six- or sevenfold as large as that at the beginning, the equivalent of an average growdi rate of about 3½ to 4 per cent per year. A crude available estimate of national wealth suggests about a tenfold change, or an annual growth averaging close to 5 per cent. These growth rates for income and wealth do not need to be adjusted downward for price changes, because the available wholesale price indexes suggest that in the middle of the 1880's the price level was a little lower than in the middle of the 1830's. The figures are not to be taken as first class statistical data. They merely indicate the apparent order of magnitude of the degree of growth.

J. D. Gould in a fairly recent article attempts to explain why Thomas Mun did not develop the “self-regulating mechanism of specie distribution.” I find Mr. Gould's argument unconvincing and while I hesitate to question one point in an otherwise interesting atricle, I think the point merits further discussion.