Tontine insurance, introduced in 1868, combined the features of life insurance with an unusual old-age saving plan. A portion of the annual premium was accumulated in a fund that was divided among the surviving policyholders after twenty years. By 1905, two-thirds of all life insurance in force was of this type. Despite consumer appeal, sales of tontine policies were prohibited in 1906 after the Armstrong Investigation charged the tontine business with corruption and extravagance. We argue that tontine insurance was actuarially sound and an attractive life-cycle investment. Prohibition was probably unnecessary.

Single women dominated the U.S. female labor force from 1870 to 1920. Data on the home life and working conditions of single women in 1888 and 1907 enable the estimation of their earnings functions. Work in the manufacturing sector for these women was task-oriented and payment was frequently by the piece. Earnings rose steeply with experience and peaked early; learning was mainly on-the-job. Occupational segregation by sex was a partial product of the method of payment, and the early termination of human capital investment was a function of the life-cycle labor force participation of these women, although the role of the family was also critical.

The integration of capital markets is usually tested with an interest rate arbitrage model even though much different financial assets must be compared. This paper compares prices of identical assets that are traded simultaneously in two or more markets. The range, average level, and time series pattern of the differences can be used to infer threshold levels, transaction cost levels, and the efficiency of arbitrage operations, respectively.Examples are given for financial crises from 1745 to 1907, using prices from the London, Amsterdam, Paris, and New York stock exchanges. These show European capital markets to be well integrated by mid-eighteenth century.

Few generalizations find wider acceptance among specialists onChina than that which holds that the Chinese Imperial Government was hostile to commerce and industry and that this hostility was a major element in the country's failure to achieve modern economic growth. There is, of course, an important element of truth in this generalization, but analysis of the issues involved has generally suffered from a failure to make clear just what it was that the Chinese government in the nineteenth century should have done to promote development.

A case study, a formal model, and an anaLysis of Census of Manufactures data support a conclusion that cost heterogeneity was a major source of the “compliance crisis” affecting a number of National Recovery Administration “codes of fair competition.” Key elements of the argument are assumptions that progressives at the NRA allowed majority coalitions of small, high-cost finns to impose codes in heterogeneous industries, and that these codes were designed by the high-cost firms under an ultimately erroneous belief that they would be enforced by the NRA.

In their day Arthur Young's tours of England, Ireland, and France represented a revolutionary approach to agricultural research. Here we avail of one part of the wealth of statistical data collected by Young—that on grain yields—to provide a comparative perspective on agricultural technique and progress in these countries around 1770 to 1850. We show that, ironically, Young's carefully assembled data do not always support some of his best-remembered generalizations.

Between 1870 and 1900 American farmers organized in the Grange, the Alliances, and the Peoples (Populist) Party and protested against a variety of economic ills. Economic historians have generally explained the farm organizations and the protests in the same way that the farmers themselves explained them—in terms of low agricultural prices and high costs of inputs resulting in part from the monopolistic organization of the suppliers of those inputs. However, there now exists considerable evidence indicating that the economic conditions of the time were not: as the farmers depicted them, thus raising two questions: (1) if the farmers' statements about their economic state cannot be accepted as historical fact, then why were the farmers so angry? and (2) why did they choose to protest the issues which they did?

We present new estimates of the British industrial unemployment rate for 1870–1913, which improve on the Board of Trade's prior estimates. We use similar sources, but our series includes additional industrial sectors, allows for short-time working, and aggregates the various sectors using appropriate labor-force weights from the census. The resulting index suggests a rate of industrial unemployment that was generally higher, but less volatile, than the board's index. We then adjust our series to an economywide basis, and construct a consistent time series of overall unemployment for 1870–1999.

We study the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) on mortality and economic activity across U.S. cities during the 1918 Flu Pandemic. The combination of fast and stringent NPIs reduced peak mortality by 50 percent and cumulative excess mortality by 24 to 34 percent. However, while the pandemic itself was associated with short-run economic disruptions, we find that these disruptions were similar across cities with strict and lenient NPIs. NPIs also did not worsen medium-run economic outcomes. Our findings indicate that NPIs can reduce disease transmission without further depressing economic activity, a finding also reflected in discussions in contemporary newspapers.

Progressive-Era reformers claimed typhoid, a waterborne disease, was more prevalent in cities with private water companies than in cities with public water companies. This article tests this claim for the 1880 to 1920 period. The evidence suggests private companies invested in water filters more often than public companies, and that switching from private to public provision of water did little to improve typhoid rates.

In this article the convergence of U.S. interregional interest rates in the late nineteenth century is examined and two major hypotheses are tested in the framework of a bank portfolio selection model based on the capital-asset-pricing model. Both the spread of the commercial paper market and the lowering of entry barriers through the reduction of national bank minimum capital requirements are rejected as principal explanations. The erosion of local monopoly power is shown to have been of central importance, and this development was due to the growth of state rather than national banks.

Understanding the political impact of economic growth requires knowledge of the timing of structural changes within a national economy. The decline of agriculture's share in the national economy and variations in regional economic structures are of particular importance. The corrected figures on farm employment discussed in Section II indicate that between 1861 and 1907 the share of agriculture in national employment in Germany declined considerably more rapidly than appears in the census results; regional shares also tended to diverge from each other and from the average throughout the period. New international competition and the thrust of urban and industrial development required regional readjustments within German agriculture. They also made it progressively more difficult for agricultural regions to compete for resources and markets without outside help. In the absence of internally generated pressure from commerce and industry, the elite in the eastern regions of Prussia opposed outside help whenever it threatened the local economic structure. The result was to increase the dependence of the region's labor for jobs on relatively declining regional industry. The response of the landowners to these changes in turn strongly influenced national political groupings. The whole experience laid a foundation for the reaction in German political life to the social discontents and economic miseries of the First World War and decades following.

In nineteenth century Britain atmospheric pollution from coal-fired industrialization was on the order of 50 times higher than today. We examine the effects of these emissions on child development by analysing the heights on enlistment during WWI of men born in England and Wales in the 1890s. We find a strong negative relationship between adult heights and the coal intensity of the districts in which these men were observed as children in the 1901 census. The subsequent decline in atmospheric pollution likely contributed to the long-term improvement in health and increase in height.

The article examines the diffusion of waterworks in one hundred Rhenish Prussian towns. It exploits features of the institutions of local political representation to develop and estimate a median voter model of demand for water capacity. The results suggest that rising income of the median voter and demand of industrial users, rather than crises in public health, spurred the installation of improved water supply.

The lack of nineteenth-century national income figures for the small states of present-day Central and Eastern Europe hampers studies of long-term economic development in the region. This article fills the gap by using a proxy approach to estimate GDP per capita on the territories of the Habsburg successor states for the period 1870 to 1910. The results give added support for more optimistic interpretations of the region's performance under Habsburg rule. More importantly, they can be linked to national income figures for later years and used directly in comparisons of international income levels between 1870 and 1987.

The Knappschaft was a mutual association through which German miners insured themselves against accident, illness, and old age. The Knappschaft underlies Bismarck's sickness and accident insurance legislation, and thus Germany's system today. This article focuses on moral hazard, which plagued the Knappschaften in the later nineteenth century. Sick pay made it attractive for miners to feign illness that made them unable to work. We outline the moral hazard problem the Knappschaften faced as well as the mechanisms they devised to control it, and then use econometric models to demonstrate that those mechanisms were at best imperfect.

We provide 16 purchasing-power-parity-adjusted estimates of U.K. and U.S. income per capita and output per worker between 1872 and 1990 based on new estimates of their price levels. Our income benchmarks depart from current estimates in four crucial respects. The United States, not the United Kingdom, led in income per capita in the 1870s. The United Kingdom kept pace with the United States through the late Victorian era. Most of the United Kingdom's relative decline occurred between 1905 and 1950. Finally, the post-1950 performance of the U.K. economy was stronger than is now estimated.We thank Michael Edelstein for getting us interested in the topic. We are also indebted to two referees for comments on the first draft. Susan Carter, Greg Clark, C. Knick Harley, Alan Heston, Peter Lindert, Robert Lipsey, Luis Locay, Bryan Roberts, Christina Romer, Richard Sylla, Jeffrey Williamson, and the participants in a seminar at the University of California, Riverside gave helpful suggestions. Finally we are especially grateful to Deirdre McCloskey for advice at an early stage.

Building social tables in the tradition of Gregory King, we develop new estimates suggesting that between 1774 and 1800 American incomes fell in real per capita terms. The colonial South was richer than the North at the start, but was already beginning to lose its income lead by 1800. We also find that free American colonists had much more equal incomes than did households in England and Wales. The colonists had greater purchasing power than their English counterparts over all of the income ranks except in the top percent.

The Seven Years' War warrants a reinterpretation of the colonial paper-money experiment. Pennsylvania, New York, and South Carolina with fiduciary standards issued large quantities of paper money to finance the war accompanied by only moderate increases in the rate of inflation. Massachusetts with its pure specie standard financed the war with interest-bearing debt and fared little better, if not a little worse. Success of war finance in Pennsylvania, New York, and South Carolina can be attributed to paper-money issues that financed government expenditures and were matched by imposition of tax labilities for early redemption.

Biased technical change, scale economies, and factor substitution were part of U.S. manufacturing's technical response to factor price movements during the period 1850 to 1919. In this article we employ the cost dual of a Generalized Leontief production function to test directly for the presence of these three effects for nineteen two-digit manufacturing sectors. Biased technical change is found in all but one sector; scale economies in all but two; factor substitutability, in all but five. Estimates of scale and bias effects for labor, capital, and materials are presented by sector, and the results are compared with other recent work.