In September 1928, two eminent economists with an interest in price history met and conversed at Hanover, New Hampshire: Sir William Beveridge and Edwin F. Gay. The former was Director of the London School of Economics and the latter, Professor of Economic History at Harvard University. For some time Sir William had been conducting research in medieval English manorial records and had already amassed data on price movements of English commodities. Moreover, he seems to have shared Gay's long-held views that broader research was needed to provide carefully selected and critically handled long homogeneous series of commodity prices and wages for a number of countries.

The essay challenges Karl Polanyi's position—that ancient Near Eastern economies knew state and temple administration but not price-making markets. It is found that the prerequisite functions of a market economy listed by Polanyi—the allocation of consumer goods, land, and labor through the supply-demand-price mechanism; risk-bearing organized as a market function; and loan markets—were all present in the ancient Near East. Although Polanyi criticized stage theories with their “predilection for continuity” he imposed his own version of continuity on history in lumping together many thousands of years under the rubric of “archaic society.” This perspective prevented him from recognizing that ancient Mesopotamia experienced lengthy and significant periods of unfettered market activity as well as periods of pervasive state regulation.

We estimate the self-selection of Mexican migrants into and out of the United States in the 1920s. Officials recorded migrant height on border crossing manifests, which we use to proxy migrant quality and to measure self-selection into migration in 1920. Migrants were positively selected on height compared to the Mexican population. We link these migrants to the 1930 U.S. and Mexican censuses to obtain samples of permanent and return migrants and to estimate the selection into return migration. Return migrants were not differentially self-selected on height relative to permanent migrants.

The Midwest made the transition from primary to secondary activity before 1880 by developing a large diversified industrial sector to serve burgeoning midwestern demand for manufactures. Because the Midwest had industrialized, its firms were able to compete with eastern producers in multiregional and national markets after 1880, when the transportation and communication systems were fully integrated. Supporting evidence is drawn from a national set of 327 urban-industrial counties, with a focus on the Midwest.

In 1900 bovine tuberculosis was a serious and growing threat to animal and human health. Early private and state initiatives in the United States often increased the incentives for the interstate trade of diseased stock. One unscrupulous dealer exposed thousands of dairy herds and families to the disease. Our study helps explain the expanding federal role in regulating food safety. In this case regulations arose from genuine health concerns. Before the development of strict regulations, diagnostic innovations that could have helped prevent the spread of the disease actually made the operation of markets worse by aggravating asymmetric information problems.

The decades of the 1820's, 1830's and early 1840's form a fascinating period i n the process of American nineteenth-century development. In many ways that era represents a classic case of interdependence between developed and underdeveloped economies through the movements of factors, goods and specie. During these formative years in American development, the United States was predominantly a single primary product exporter, her rate of economic expansion very much a function of the state of the external market for cotton. The flow of capital moves in the classic fashion, from capital-rich Great Britain to capital-scarce America, but varying with relative degrees of expected returns; that is, varying with the relative rate of development between the two countries. But the period from the 1820's to 1840's exhibits another interesting aspect as well: it reveals the first substantial evidence of a long swing in the rate of American economic development.

During the last two decades of the nineteenth century protection for agriculture became an important feature of the economic and political landscape in Germany. The large landlords, who specialized in arable agriculture, used their political power to get high levels of protection. Peasants, who specialized in animal husbandry, received lower but substantial and rising levels of protection. Material interest can thus help explain the peasants' political alliance with the landlords. Protection encouraged German agriculture to modernize along intensive lines, bringing to the countryside the social and political developments dreaded by the same conservative elites who promoted protection.

Students of agricultural history, of pre-industrial labor productivity, of New England town histories, and, especially, of pre-1840 rates of economic growth have long needed a price index of Massachusetts farm prices for this period. The article presents two indexes, covering 15 farm products, weighted by their relative importance, first in 1800, then in 1855. Among the several issues raised by the behavior of farm prices between 1750 and 1855, one of the most interesting may be what this behavior reveals about the market imbeddedness of these farmers, particularly in view of the fact that the prices come, not from market quotations, but from farm account books.

The fiscal policy accomplishments of the ancien régime during its last two decades in France have been greatly underappreciated. While the collapse of the monarchy has been attributed to persistent peacetime deficits, these did not appear until the mid-1780s when earlier reforms and successful budget policies were abandoned by reactionary finance ministers. Had the earlier policies been continued, it is unlikely that a severe crisis would have occurred in 1788/89.

Indentured servitude is modeled as a trans-Atlantic market in forward-labor contracts. The model is applied to servant-auction evidence in Philadelphia, and the determinants of contract prices are used to test the efficient-market hypothesis. While competing for servants in Europe, most of the expected price differences across servants were lost through arbitrage by recruiters.

Studies of postbellum financial markets have shown that the United States was not served by an integrated short-term capital market until the turn of the twentieth century. Until recently the data necessary for the study of a similar phenomenon in the antebellum period have not been available. This article reports several new regional interest rate series for the antebellum era that show that antebellum credit markets were more integrated than postbellum markets.

Geographic clustering in inventive activity has often been attributed to clustering in production. For the glass industiy, we find that despite a general association between location of invention and production, there were significant deviations. Centers of production were not always centers of invention, and some of the most inventive areas, such as southern New England, had very limited production. We hypothesize that the growth of a market for technology facilitated a geographic division of labor between invention and commercial exploitation and stimulated inventive activity in places where there were institutions capable of mediating among inventors, suppliers of capital, and firms seeking new technologies.

By analyzing a newly compiled database of exchange rates, this article finds that in Central Europe money markets integrated cyclically during the fifteenth century. The cycles were associated with monetary debasements. Long-distance financial integration progressed in connection with the rise of the territorial state, facilitated by the synergy between princes and emperor, which helped to avoid coordination failures. For Central Europe, theories of state formation and market integration should therefore take interstate actors into account.

In both northern and southern cities of the United States, African-Americans faced a web of social constraints on such activities as housing, shopping, and everyday interpersonal interactions. These constraints had implications for the labor market as well. In particular, norms against white subservience to blacks played an important role in determining the racial composition of occupations. Close attention to the operation of such social norms can add much explanatory power to conventional economic analyses of discrimination based on human capital and taste for discrimination.

Most American financial crises of the postbellum gold standard era were caused by fluctuations in the cotton harvest due to exogenous factors such as weather. The transmission channel ran through export revenues and financial markets under the pre-1914 monetary regime. A poor cotton harvest depressed export revenues and reduced international demand for American assets, which depressed American stock prices, drained deposits from money center banks and precipitated a business cycle downturn—conditions that bred financial crises. The crises caused by cotton harvests could have been prevented by an American central bank, even under gold standard constraints.

To assess competing theories of democratization, we analyze British sovereign bond market responses to the 1832, 1867, and 1884 Reform Acts, and to two failed Chartist agitations for reform. Analyses of high-frequency 3 percent consol yield data and historical financial press suggest three conclusions. First, democratic reform episodes were preceded by increases in perceived political risk, comparable to democratizing episodes in other countries. Second, both democratic reform and repression were followed by yield declines. Third, the source of political risk in Britain was both social unrest and political deadlock. Together, the findings challenge the “Whig” characterization of British democratization as exceptionally risk-free.

The nature of migration into Australia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provides much valuable material relating to the mechanism of interregional population transfers during one of the most important periods of demographic redistribution in recorded history. Examining this country's experience during the seventy years, 1865–1935, two problems are treated which not only contribute to the understanding of Australian growth but also provide insight into important aspects of American economic development.

Although cotton smuggling through the North's blockade of the South during the American Civil War has often been viewed as a highly profitable activity, only a small percentage of blockade-running ships made more than one run. New figures for capture rates reconcile these observations by showing that the risks of blockade running were substantial. Estimates are also provided for the amount of cotton smuggled through the blockade and of its disposition between the North and Europe.

In the mid-1820s, banks became the first businesses in Great Britain and Ireland to be allowed to form freely on an unlimited liability joint-stock basis. Walter Bagehot warned that their shares would ultimately be owned by widows, orphans, and other impecunious individuals. Another hypothesis is that the governing bodies of these banks, constrained by special legal restrictions on share trading, acted effectively to prevent such shares being transferred to the less wealthy. We test both conjectures using the archives of an Irish joint-stock bank. The results do not support Bagehot's hypothesis.